

The Advent of Freedom



The Presence of the Future in Hegel's Logic



John F. Hoffmeyer

The Advent of Freedom

The Presence of the Future in Hegel's Logic

John F. Hoffmeyer



Rutherford • Madison • Teaneck
Fairleigh Dickinson University Press
London and Toronto: Associated University Presses

© 1994 by Associated University Presses

All rights reserved. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by the copyright owner, provided that a base fee of \$10.00, plus eight cents per page, per copy is paid directly to the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Massachusetts 01923.

[0-8386-3558-X/94 \$10.00 + 8¢ pp, pc.]

Associated University Presses
440 Forsgate Drive
Cranbury, NJ 08512

Associated University Presses
25 Sicilian Avenue
London WC1A 2QH, England

Associated University Presses
P.O.Box 338, Port Credit
Mississauga, Ontario
Canada L5G 4L8

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements
of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hoffmeyer, John F.

The advent of freedom : the presence of the future in Hegel's
Logic / John F. Hoffmeyer

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8386-3558-X (alk. paper)

1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. Wissenschaft der
Logik. 2. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831--Contributions
in concept of liberty. 3. Liberty--History--19th century.

I. Title

B2942.E5H65 1994

193--dc20

93-45045

CIP

Contents

Preface	VII
Acknowledgments	IX
1. Hegel's Explicit Analysis of Time	3
2. Reflection: The Basic Movement of the Doctrine of Essence	7
3. Actuality as Contingency	15
4. Actuality as Contingent Necessity	25
5: Actuality as Necessary Contingency	39
6: The Actuality of Possibility and the Presence of the Future	55
7: Conclusion	73
Notes	77
Selected Bibliography	101
Index	111

Preface

Hegel saw himself as a philosopher of freedom. Critics have depicted him as a defender of domination and the status quo. After all, is it not Hegel's position that "*what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational?*"¹ This position seems to nullify freedom by absolutizing what already is. It is a basic presupposition of the present work that without the capacity to call into question and transcend what is already given, there is no freedom.

Refuting the charge that Hegel's philosophy is fundamentally a glorification of the status quo requires a demonstration that Hegel's concept of actuality is not equivalent to "what is already given." It requires showing that Hegel's thought accounts for future possibilities relativizing present actualities. It requires examining Hegel's understanding of both time and the relation of actuality to possibility.

I hope to show that those two areas of investigation are not disjunct. This undertaking runs contrary to Hegel's self-understanding. He examines the relation of actuality and possibility in the *Science of Logic*, but insists that time has no place in logic. My thesis is that time and the relation of actuality to possibility are related in the concept of freedom that Hegel develops in the *Logic*. Despite Hegel's explicit claims, he understands freedom in such a way that time is constitutive of freedom. The *Logic* contains an implicit concept of temporality.

My investigation begins with a general consideration of Hegel's explicit understanding of time, as presented in the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. This consideration leads to an examination of Hegel's logic of reflection in chapter 2. It is the logic of reflection that structures the relation of actuality and

possibility. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 detail the three subsections of the *Logic's* chapter on actuality and its relation to possibility. In chapter 6, I make explicit Hegel's implicit understanding of temporality. I also seek to show how this understanding of temporality meets with Hegel's conception of actuality and possibility in his concept of freedom.

Acknowledgments

The persons who made this project possible are too numerous to mention, but I would like to single out a few of them. Richard Bernstein kindled my interest in Hegel during my undergraduate studies. Oliva Blanchette first led me through the thickets of Hegel's *Logic*, and has provided detailed and insightful criticism of this manuscript. Jacques Taminiaux also assisted by his reading of the manuscript. Before I developed a deep appreciation of Hegel's thought, Drew Griffin repeatedly challenged my misguided attempts to dismiss Hegel. Louise Dietenhofer and Margaret Bakalo provided technical assistance in ways both large and small. The staff of the Associated University Presses not only transformed what I had written into a book, but also made my writing better.

Of those scholars whose writings have influenced this project, I would like to mention three in particular. Robert Jenson has greatly stimulated my thinking on temporality and possibility. Eberhard Jüngel taught me the importance of the ontological priority of possibility over actuality. Pierre-Jean Labarrière, S.J., has been a model of careful reading and liberating interpretation of the Hegelian texts.

In the long hours of writing, Mark Edwards and Linda Edwards provided special encouragement. Above all, Janet Corpus supported, challenged, accompanied and tolerated me through the completion of the project.

The Advent of Freedom

1

Hegel's Explicit Analysis of Time

In the introduction to his *Science of Logic*, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel declares that the content of logic “is the expository presentation of God as God is in God’s eternal essence, before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit.”¹ This declaration seems clear enough as a negative response to any question whether time plays a role in the content of the *Logic*. I would like to examine this appearance and see whether it holds true.

In the *Encyclopedia*, Hegel defines time as “intuited mere *becoming*.”² This becoming is the immediate unity of being and nonbeing: “being that, in that it *is*, is *not*, and in that it is *not*, *is*.”³ As the unity of being and nonbeing, becoming is their truth. Apart from and prior to becoming, there is neither being nor nonbeing. “What the truth is, is neither being nor nothing, but that being—does not pass over—but has passed over into nothing and nothing into being. . . . Their truth is therefore this *movement* of the immediate disappearing of the one in the other: *becoming*.”⁴ There is no being apart from becoming: being becomes. Not only that, being *comes*. Becoming is a being that is a coming. “Intuited mere *becoming*” is “pure being-within-itself as nothing other than a coming-outside-itself.”⁵ Time as intuited becoming is both internal and external, but its internality turns out completely into externality. As the closing pages of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* make clear, spirit in its internality offers up itself in the process of self-externalization. “This offering up is the externalization in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *self as time*.”⁶

Time is spirit’s own self, and spirit is eternal: “the true . . . the idea, spirit is *eternal*.”⁷ So, eternity does not lie outside of time. “The con-

cept of eternity, though, must not be taken negatively as the abstraction from time in such a way that eternity would exist outside of time."⁸ Rather than lying outside of time, eternity is the *inside* of time. Time is externalized spirit.

In the oral addition to §258, Hegel goes so far as to say that "time itself is . . . eternal." The crucial qualification is that time is eternal only "in its concept."⁹ Hegel then specifies time's concept as "time as time."¹⁰ What is the difference between mere time and time in its concept? The concept is "total negativity in it-self." It is "in and for itself absolute negativity."¹¹ Time is "this negativity as externality."¹² Negativity is total and absolute when it is no longer external. As long as negativity is external, negativity's power is external and foreign. The temporality of that which is finite lies in the finite's relation to total negativity as an external power. "Thus the finite is transitory and *temporal* because it is not, like the concept, in it-self total negativity, but . . . relates itself to total negativity as to its [the finite's] *power*."¹³ Hegel can also say that finitude is subjection to time. "Only that which is natural is subject to time, insofar as that which is natural is finite."¹⁴ Time is identical with the total negativity to whose power the finite is subject. The caveat is that time is this negativity as external.

The concept is the full identity with this negativity. The concept is no outsider to the power of time; it *is* the power of time. Its relation to time is not subjection, but freedom. "The concept . . . is in and for itself absolute negativity and freedom. Thus time is not the power of the concept, nor is the concept in time and something temporal. Rather the *concept* is the power of time."¹⁵

The concept holds unmistakable primacy over time, but the two are not disjoint. The concept is power, and this power has a specific determination. It is the power of time. If "time as time is time's concept," then that which is *in* time does not exhaust what time is. Time's power does not lie *in* time. Nor, as we have seen, does it lie *outside* of time.

In the oral addition to §258, Hegel calls time process. "That which is not in time, is devoid of process."¹⁶ In calling something "devoid of process," Hegel means that it is not a mere part of the process. Referring specifically to the universal, Hegel writes both that it is "itself devoid of process," and that it "lives only as process." "The universal as law also has a process in itself and lives only as process. But it is not part of the process, not in the process, but rather contains its two sides and is itself devoid of process."¹⁷

Time as time, the concept of time, is not itself in time. If the power of time were in time, then it would be subject to the power of time. In time, it would be subject to itself as that which is not in time. That which is in time requires a concept beyond itself, a concept that is not merely intratemporal. Time requires going beyond the simply intratemporal. This is the movement to the concept, the eternal. But this movement does not leave time behind: "time itself is in its concept eternal." Its concept is "time as time."

A brief look at the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will help clarify the differentiated identity of time and concept. There Hegel repeatedly asserts that time *is* the concept: the merely intuited concept. "*Time is the concept itself that is there and presents itself as empty intuition to consciousness. . . . Time is the external, intuited, pure self that has not been grasped by the self. It is the merely intuited concept.*"¹⁸ The movement from mere intuition to conception does not abolish intuition. Hegel goes so far as to say that it is not only intuition that is conceived, but also intuition that does the conceiving. When the concept grasps itself, it is "conceived and conceiving intuition." The concept does not abolish time, but "sublates" it, taking it up and retaining it in the concept. "In grasping itself, the concept sublates the form of time, conceives intuiting and is conceived and conceiving intuiting."¹⁹

Immediately between the two preceding citations from the *Phenomenology* Hegel makes the misleading assertion that spirit, in grasping its pure concept, "annuls" [*tilgt*] time. Given Hegel's argument in the immediate context that we have just examined, the idea of annulment seems too strongly one-sided. Particularly because of the argument in §258 of the *Encyclopedia*, it seems that Hegel in the passage from the *Phenomenology* intends the reader to understand the meaning of *tilgen* within the structure set by the meaning of *aufheben*. The relation between time and concept can not be one of exclusive opposition, which would be the case if the explicit advent of the concept annulled time.²⁰

Hegel refuses to treat spirit as merely intratemporal because doing so would subject spirit to time as an exterior power. The *Phenomenology* calls the subjection to time and space as external powers "contingency." That which is in time is contingent. At the close of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel describes "the externalization in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *self* as time outside it [i.e., spirit's self] and likewise its *being* as space."²¹

At the outset I quoted Hegel's claim that the content of logic "is the expository presentation of God, as God is in God's eternal essence before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit." We saw above in Hegel's treatment of time in the *Encyclopedia* that eternity is not outside of time. Rather eternity *is* time: time in its concept. As time in its concept, or the concept of time, eternity is the power of time. The *Logic* is about the power of time: the power by virtue of which spirit is free in its relation to time, rather than being subjected to an external power.

Although the *Logic* contains no extended discussion of the intratemporal as such, it does examine contingency at length. This discussion is doubly important, since it occurs in the same chapter that treats of necessity, which turns out to be what Hegel calls the "blind" form of freedom. Just as freedom is the "truth," again in the Hegelian sense, of necessity, so necessity shows itself to be the truth of contingency. Remembering the *Phenomenology's* equation of the contingent with the intratemporal, we are again confronted with the relation between the intratemporal and the free power of time. To examine this relation further, let us turn to the text of the *Logic* itself.

2

Reflection: The Basic Movement of the Doctrine of Essence

Hegel treats of contingency and necessity in the chapter of the *Logic* entitled "Actuality." The chapter contains three parts: (A) "Contingency," (B) "Relative Necessity," and (C) "Absolute Necessity." The chapter belongs to a larger section likewise entitled "Actuality." This section contains three chapters: (1) "The Absolute," (2) "Actuality," and (3) "Absolute Relation." The section is the last of the three sections that constitute "The Doctrine of Essence." The full order of the sections is: (1) "Essence as Reflection within Itself,"¹ (2) "Appearance," and (3) "Actuality." The whole of the *Logic* is divided into three major sections: (1) "The Doctrine of Being" or simply "Being," (2) "The Doctrine of Essence," and (3) "The Doctrine of the Concept." Together the first two constitute part 1 of the *Logic*, "Objective Logic." Part 2, containing "The Doctrine of the Concept," is "Subjective Logic."

Hegel claims that this architectonic of triadic structures within triadic structures is the content's ordering of itself. The method that Hegel follows in presenting logic's system is the method "that that system follows in it-self."² The listing of the various parts of that ordering in table form is deceptive, for the content is in movement. The content moves itself by what Hegel calls the content's "dialectic." "It is the content within itself, *the dialectic that the content has in itself*, which moves the content forward."³

In the Doctrine of Essence the content's movement takes the specific form that Hegel terms "*reflection*."⁴ "Essence as such is reflection."⁵ Hegel equates reflection with "*being posited*."⁶ Hegel examines the precise relation between reflection and being posited under

the heading "Reflection." That examination is divided into three subsections: (1) "Positing Reflection," (2) "External Reflection," (3) "Determining Reflection." Reflection "is *positing*, insofar as it [reflection] is immediacy as a returning."⁷ Positing reflection has no point of origin. There is no substrate that undergoes the movement of reflection. If one asks for the "that" which begins the movement or returns in the movement, the only answer is: the movement, and more specifically, the movement as return. "Reflection is thus the movement that only inasmuch as it is return, is that which begins or that which returns."⁸ Immediacy is not immediate, for it is a return. This immediacy that is immediate only as return is *Gesetzsein*, "being posited."

For a returning to occur, there must be that from which the returner returns. As we saw above, the movement of positing reflection is itself the returner. To be this it posits that from which it returns. It posits a *prius* to its own movement. Such a positing is a "pre-positing," a pre-sup-posing, a *Voraus-Setzen*. At the same time, that which is presupposed is not prior to the movement, for the movement has no point of origin. It is the movement itself that posits the presupposition. That which is presupposed is not a given, but *becomes*. It "*becomes* only by being *abandoned/left behind*."⁹ Hegel's German is more precise, for the translation could just as rightly be "becoming abandoned" as "being abandoned." The presupposition comes to be, but this same event is the abandoning of its being.

But what being is there to be abandoned, since the presupposition *is not* prior to the event of abandonment? Hegel here takes recourse to a temporal term: *Ankommen*, "advent." *Ankommen* shares with *Zukommen* the root *kommen*, *to come*. From *Zukommen* is derived *Zukunft*, the German word for *future*. *Ankommen* is also the direct German parallel to the French *advenir*, from which is derived the French word for *future*, *avenir*. Hegel identifies "the arriving of essence at itself" with "presupposing reflection, repelling from itself."¹⁰ Presupposing reflection is the event of arriving. Or, to follow the French parallel noted above, presupposing reflection is advent.

The following paragraph enriches the register of *Ankommen* with additional words built on the root notions of coming and going. The presupposition is "that *from* which essence *comes* [*herkommt*] and is only as this coming back [*Zurückkommen*]."¹¹ The idea of "coming back" echoes Hegel's prominent use of "return." On pp. 251–52 (*SL* 401–2) the noun "return" [*Rückkehr*] appears ten times; the phrase

“return into self” [*Rückkehr in sich*],¹² an additional seven times; and the verb “return” [*Rückkehren*], five times. The movement of reflection is circular, a return into self. Hegel also calls it “*absolute counter-impulsion* into itself.”¹³ The movement remains within itself. Its going forward is not a going beyond itself. “The movement turns itself, as going forward, immediately around within itself, and is only thus self-movement.”¹⁴ Hegel does use the expression “going beyond,” but only to make clear that “the going beyond the immediate is the arriving at the same.”¹⁵ The movement of reflection is self-movement, movement within itself, return into self.

Central to the exposition of presupposing reflection are several words that we normally associate with time: words of coming and going, movement, and return. In addition, the “pre-” [*Voraus*] in “pre-sup-posing” establishes a relation between that which is prior and that which is posterior. Hegel reinforces the point when he says that presupposing reflection “*finds* an immediate *before* it,” finds an immediate already there.¹⁶ How can something be found already there, already *present*, which “becomes only by being left behind?” According to Hegel’s exposition, that which is “already,” that which is prior, derives from that which is posterior. “Only this return [reflection’s return from the immediacy that it “finds before”] is the presupposing of that which is found before.”¹⁷ The presence of that which is found already there is not the limiting edge of a perdurance that has a prior origin. It is a presence called forth by that which is posterior in order that the latter might be itself. That which is already present *is* only by virtue of that which is posterior to it. More concretely, it is not the case that that which is already present simply *is*. It *becomes*, and it becomes by being left behind. That which is already there comes into being only inasmuch as that which is posterior leaves it behind.

At the level of positing and presupposing reflection, this transcendence remains mere show. Presupposed immediacy “emerges at all only as return.”¹⁸ The otherness of this immediacy over against reflection disappears as soon as it is established. Presupposed immediacy is only “the show of beginning.”¹⁹

The treatment of reflection that I am explicating constitutes part C of a chapter that bears as a whole the title “Show” [*Schein*]. Hegel thematizes show as “essenceless being.”²⁰ The idea of essenceless being falsifies being, for “the *truth of being* is *essence*.”²¹ In the idea of essenceless being lies the illusory character of show.

Show as such is "an *immediately* determined."²² Early in the major section on Being it became clear that simple immediacy and determination are not consistent with one another. There is no determinacy without negation. "*Determinacy is negation (Determinatio est negatio)*," said Spinoza."²³ The presence of negation means that simple immediacy has been left behind. To be simply immediate is inconsistent with any relation to an other, to that which the simply immediate is not.

Hegel introduces the idea of determinacy in the context of his treatment of *Dasein*, determinate being. At first immediacy and determination seem compatible. On the one hand, "*Daseyn is determinate being*."²⁴ At the same time, *Daseyn* has "the form of an *immediate*."²⁵

But this immediacy is not the immediacy of pure being at the beginning of the *Logic*. Pure being is "pure indeterminacy."²⁶ It is being in its "undetermined immediacy."²⁷ But this undetermined immediacy exists only as an analytical moment.²⁸ Pure being has always already "gone over" into becoming, the "*unity of being and nothing*."²⁹ As the "result"³⁰ of becoming, determinate being is "*immediate* unity . . . of being and nothing."³¹ Yet it is not that unity merely in the form of immediacy. Determinate being is "that unity not only as being, but just as essentially as nonbeing."³² "But *Daseyn*, as containing non-being within itself, is essentially *determinate* being, negated being, other."³³ Determinacy is incompatible with simple immediacy, for determinate being necessarily includes otherness.

The immediacy by which show is "an immediately determined" can not be simple immediacy. If it were, show would be impossible already on the grounds of the analysis of determinate being. Show's immediacy is determinate. It is "the immediacy of *nonbeing*."³⁴

Since the immediacy that reflection presupposes is "the show of beginning," it is a beginning that is not. Reflection requires a beginning, for reflection is the transcending of that beginning. The fact that the beginning is reflection's own presupposition can not have as its consequence that the beginning simply is not. It is not the case that show simply is not. Its "nonbeing is nothing other than the negativity of essence in it-self."³⁵ But that which is presupposed, *pre*-posited, can not be mere negativity. If it were, it would be only posited; the "*pre*-" would have no function. That which is presupposed must have some positive standing over against reflection. That which is presupposed can not simply collapse into reflection's return out of that presupposition. As the treatment of positing reflection draws to a close,

that which is presupposed does not yet have that independence. Presupposed immediacy "is only as *being posited* . . . that is not distinct from the return into self, and itself is only this returning."³⁶

Presupposed immediacy must not only be identical with reflection but also must be other than reflection. Hegel points out that presupposed immediacy, since it is "determined as *negative*," is "therefore over against an other."³⁷ Hegel moves very quickly here without making the steps of his argument explicit.³⁸ The crucial factor in the argument is the interdependence of negation and determination. We have already seen the roots of this interdependence in Hegel's appropriation of Spinoza's assertion that *determinatio est negatio*. Hegel developed the identity of determinacy and negation to show that determinacy is relation to an other. Reflection is the other of presupposed immediacy. Reflection has a determinate place over against its presupposition. This situation is what Hegel calls "external reflection."

External reflection is insufficient because it obliterates the sense that presupposition, pre-positing, is nevertheless a kind of positing. Reflection is not a finite quantity that can be separated over against its presupposition. That presupposition is indeed its presupposition, not only in the sense that reflection *has* that presupposition, but also in the sense that reflection *makes* the presupposition, *posits* it, in the first place. Reflection must be determinate, and external reflection articulates this determinacy. What it does not articulate is that reflection determines itself. External reflection is determinate reflection that has a presupposition. "Thus reflection is *determined*; it is, in that it *has* a presupposition according to this determinacy . . . *external reflection*."³⁹

External reflection must give way to "determining reflection," reflection whose determination is reflection's own act. Determining reflection articulates that which positing reflection makes so clear, but which external reflection covers over; namely, the presupposition is reflection's own positing. On the other hand, determining reflection articulates that which external reflection brings to bear, but which is absent from positing reflection: reflection is determinate. It does not collapse into sheer identity, but respects genuine otherness. As determinate reflection whose determinacy is its own act, determining reflection is "the unity of *positing* and *external reflection*."⁴⁰

Positing reflection presented a relation between what is prior and what is posterior. The being of what is prior was a becoming. What is prior *is* only in the process of being transcended by what is posterior.

This relation collapsed, though. Rather than being transcended by what is posterior, what is prior disappeared into what is posterior. Positing reflection was unable to maintain a distinction between the two.

External reflection made what is prior independent of what is posterior. Reflection's presupposition appeared as an externally given beginning for reflection. Reflection had a prior point of origin in its presupposition.

Determinate reflection sees through the pretended independence of what is presupposed. It dismantles that particular way of according primacy to what is already given. It also presents a determinate relation, which positing reflection was unable to do. It holds up the goal of articulating a determinacy that does not accord primacy to what is given. But it can not complete the project.

Determining reflection gives rise to the "determinations of reflection." "In them determinacy, through relation to itself, has consolidated itself and made itself infinitely fixed."⁴¹ Determining reflection's unity of positing and external reflection does not do justice to the dynamism of the former. In external reflection, determinacy was fixed in a given presupposition. That was a finite fixedness, since the presupposition was finite, bounded by the reflection over against which it stood. Determining reflection makes the fixedness infinite by swallowing up the relation to an other into reflection's own self-relation. Reflection's determinacy lies in the fixed circular movement of its own self-relation.

It is revealing that now in the text Hegel turns to the language of domination. He writes of "the determinate that has subjugated to itself its transition and its mere being posited, or has turned around its reflection into other into reflection into self."⁴² The subjugation operates at the expense of relation to an other, engulfing that relation in self-relation. But self-relation can only apparently profit from such subjugation. In this fixedness, in this subjugation, reflection is at odds with itself. It is "the reflection that has come outside itself."⁴³ The attempt to subjugate otherness to identity results in essence losing its identity in a relation of domination: "The likeness of essence with itself has been lost in negation, which is that which dominates."⁴⁴

This fixedness of reflection-into-self is only one side of the determination of reflection. It also *is* only through an other. In Hegelian language, it is "being posited." The inadequacy of determining reflection lies in its inability to articulate the identity of these two sides.

"This its [the determination of reflection's] reflection and that being posited are diverse; its being posited is rather its being sublated; its being reflected into itself, though, is its subsisting."⁴⁵ In principle, the determination of reflection has its being in being transcended. At the level of determining reflection, this being in being transcended can not find adequate expression because it is submerged in fixed subsistence.

The domination of subsistence is the domination of that which already is. It already was, and it continues to subsist, fixed as what it is. By contrast, that which is posited *is* only by being transcended. The movement is a going beyond that which immediately is. In this movement, that which immediately is derives from an other; it is posited by an other.

How does Hegel conceive that positing other? Is it an origin that lies behind that which is immediately present, and from which the latter has become estranged? Or does it lie in front of the immediate present? Is the movement to that other one of restoration and return? Or is there no already given origin to which to return, so that the movement is a new coming?

Already at the level of positing reflection, Hegel refuses to accept this alternative. Positing reflection unmask that which is supposedly already given as being in truth posited. At the same time, "return" is Hegel's word of choice for describing the movement of positing reflection. Hegel's project is to work out the logic of a movement that is a return, but not a return to that which is fixed as already given.

By the end of his thematic treatment of reflection, Hegel has not yet accomplished his project. Fixedness encumbers the movement of determining reflection. Hegel has proposed a way of accounting for determinacy without appealing to something already given. Reflection must be self-determining. Its determinations can not be dictated to it by an other. The issue is ultimately the freedom of reflection. Hegel explicitly raises the topic of freedom in introducing "the determinations of reflection . . . as free *essentialities*."⁴⁶ We have already seen the inadequacy of freedom at this level, characterized by subjugation and domination.

Among the subsequent chapters that move toward presenting a more adequate idea of freedom, the chapter on actuality plays the crucial role of developing the idea of necessity. Necessity is the penultimate stage on the road to the concept of freedom. Freedom is "the *truth of necessity*."⁴⁷ It was also the chapter on actuality that led me to

examine the logic of reflection. The consideration of Hegel's explicit treatment of time led to the concepts of contingency and necessity. The chapter on actuality prepares the way for the concept of freedom by examining its predecessor concepts, contingency and necessity.

The chapter on actuality may be the linchpin of Hegel's understanding of temporality. On the one hand, it is the exposition of key concepts that result from Hegel's explicit analysis of time. On the other hand, it picks up the unfinished project of the logic of reflection. In reflection, relations of priority and posteriority, of return and arrival, and of the already given were central. All these relations suggest temporality. Now they lead us to the same chapter as Hegel's explicit analysis of time.

3

Actuality as Contingency

The beginning of the preceding chapter located the chapter on actuality within the architectonic of the *Logic*. Hegel presented this structure as a structure in movement.¹ In the Doctrine of Essence, reflection is the basic form of this movement. If the multiple and multi-leveled triads of the Doctrine of Essence all articulate a common structural movement, structural parallels between the various triads should point to similar relations to the basic movement of reflection. All the second members of triads, for instance, should bear a basic similarity to external reflection, the second moment in reflection itself. We have already seen this in the analysis of reflection. Determining reflection issues in the determinations of reflection, which are then treated at length in the second chapter of the first section. In the determinations of reflection, fixedness dominates. Fixedness, the fixedness of that which is already given in an external manner, also dominates external reflection.

“Actuality” is the second chapter in its section. We can expect the domination of some form of fixedness and externality. At the same time, the chapter on actuality belongs to a larger section also entitled “Actuality.” This is the third section of the Doctrine of Essence. As third section it parallels determining reflection, the third moment of reflection. Hegel presents determining reflection as the unity of positing and external reflection. That unity should fully articulate the determinacy of external reflection not as an external given, but as posited. Determining reflection mounts the project, but can not carry it through. We can expect the section on actuality as a whole to move toward showing that determinacy is posited, not pre-given, but to be unable to carry through the exposition.

In the introduction to the section as a whole, Hegel specifies the section's topic more completely as "*absolute actuality*."² The titles of both the first and the third chapters of the section retain this explicit reference to the absolute: "The Absolute" and "Absolute Relation," respectively.³ The first chapter presents the absolute in abstraction from any difference. Difference appears only as "*empty or external*."⁴ Such difference is attributed to reflection that is external to the absolute. The second chapter moves beyond the abstract separation of reflection and the absolute. This movement opens the way to seeing difference and the absolute as compatible. The chapter thematizes actuality, possibility, and necessity. These three make up reflection as the absolute's own reflection. But they are one-sidedly formal. "*Actuality, possibility and necessity make up the formal moments of the absolute or the reflection of the absolute*."⁵ "In actuality as this absolute form the moments are only as sublated or formal, not yet realized."⁶ The third chapter presents "the unity of the absolute and of its reflection."⁷ Here difference belongs to the nature of the absolute. Difference is the absolute's own difference from itself. The absolute is "*the absolute relation or rather the absolute as relation to itself*."⁸

Actuality, possibility, and necessity mediate between the absolute as antithetical to difference and the absolute as being what it is only by virtue of its own difference from itself. They introduce difference into the absolute. Their introduction of difference is not surprising in view of the parallel between the chapter on actuality and the subsection on external reflection. External reflection asserted abiding otherness against the vanishing otherness articulated by positing reflection.

It is important to remember that the concept of actuality operates on three levels in Hegel's exposition. First it is absolute actuality, the theme of the entire section. Second, as the theme of a specific chapter, it introduces difference into the absolute. Third it is a particular moment of that chapter, along with possibility and necessity. On this third level, possibility and necessity initially stand over against actuality. Their relation to actuality is an open question. At the same time, possibility and necessity are already actuality, if we understand actuality as Hegel presents it on either of the first two levels. Understanding the section as a whole depends on understanding the relations between the three levels on which Hegel presents the concept of actuality.

In introducing the chapter on actuality, Hegel discusses the relation of the section on actuality to the preceding section of the *Logic*. The

section on actuality follows the section entitled "Appearance," whose three chapters are "Existence," "Appearance" and "Essential Relation," in that order.⁹ The culmination of that section and the transition to the section on actuality comes when appearance's "immediacy is posited as reflection-into-self and vice versa. This unity, in which existence or immediacy, and being-in-itself, ground or that which is reflected are simply moments, is *actuality*."¹⁰ Hegel presents actuality in the unity that the logic of reflection initially proposed but could not articulate, the unity of immediacy and reflection.

At the point where the determinations of reflection arose from determining reflection, reflection-into-self was dominant over reflection-into-other. This dominance is still asserting itself in Hegel's introduction of actuality. The text speaks of the identity not of reflection and immediacy, but of reflection-into-self and immediacy.

The text continues: "The actual is therefore *manifestation*."¹¹ The actual is an event, the event of manifestation. Hegel also calls it movement. The actual is "movement that differentiates itself from itself and determines itself."¹² The latter formulation's reference to self-determination again shows the lineage from determining reflection to actuality.

The concept of manifestation is a further step in the logical breakdown of the distinction between the internal and the external. In the act of manifestation the absolute does not enter into an external form that leaves behind its internal self. It is "*itself* in its externality, and is *itself* only within *it* [i.e., within this externality]."¹³

Although Hegel introduces the *chapter* on actuality by locating the *section* on actuality within the larger structure of the *Logic*, he gives no indication of the difference between the two levels of actuality. He moves without clarification from talking about actuality as the sectional successor to appearance, to discussing the merely formal moments of actuality as absolute form. In the introduction to the *section* on actuality, he specified actuality, possibility, and necessity—the contents of the *chapter* on actuality—as "the formal moments of the absolute." Now he says that the distinction of those formal moments "thus belongs at first to external reflection."¹⁴ In the introduction to the *section* external reflection figured only in the preliminary sketch of the first chapter entitled "The Absolute." Reflection in the sketch of the second chapter was no longer external. It was the reflection of the absolute itself.

The lack of definition between those two levels of actuality contin-

ues into the paragraph in which Hegel introduces the third level of actuality, actuality on a par with possibility and necessity. The paragraph opens by referring to actuality as "itself *immediate* formal unity of the internal and the external."¹⁵ This is a strong echo of the *sectional* introduction's sketch of the chapter on the absolute: "This unity of the internal and the external is *absolute actuality*."¹⁶ Actuality on the sectional level emerges as the fulfillment of essential relation. This fulfillment is "that *relation* of *internal* and *external* where the *content* of both is only One *identical substrate*, and likewise only One *identity of form*."¹⁷ Actuality on the sectional level is "unity of the internal and the external," and "identity of form." The language could hardly be closer to that of the chapter introduction. Either Hegel is simply identifying the two levels or he has yet to make the transition to the chapter level. But the sentence in the chapter introduction that calls actuality the "immediate form-unity of the internal and the external" proceeds without a break to say that actuality is "in the determination of *immediacy* over against the determination of reflection into self; or it is an *actuality over against a possibility*."¹⁸ If Hegel has in mind a distinction between actuality on the sectional level and actuality on the chapter level, he does not mention it. His exposition obscures the fact that all of chapter 1 intervenes between that immediate form-unity and the opposition between an actuality and a possibility.

The three levels of actuality do not mean that actuality falls apart into three actualities. The absolute, which as absolute actuality is already actuality, is "the identity each of whose moments is in it-self the *totality*."¹⁹ The subsequent development of actuality can not fall beneath this unity of moment and totality. In part A of the second chapter, for instance, determination is at the same time "*totality of form*."²⁰ It is consistent with this stage of the development of the *Logic* that actuality be both the totality of the section and a moment within the section. It is likewise consistent with the unity of totality and moment that actuality be both the totality of the second chapter and a moment of that totality.

At the beginning of part A, "actuality" denotes both a formal totality and a formal determination within this totality. Actuality as formal totality consists of two formal moments: actuality and possibility. The full mediation by which the moments of actuality and possibility demonstrate their identity with the totality of actuality, and thus with each other, is the content of the entire chapter. In part A, the two moments achieve only an external relation. In external relations,

the relata do not constitute the relation in and of themselves. They are related in a third.²¹ In the introduction to the chapter, Hegel writes that "the *relation* of both [actuality and possibility] to each other is the *third*. . . . This third is *necessity*."²²

There are two points to note here. First, necessity is a *relation*. Second, necessity is the relation of actuality and possibility. In A, where actuality and possibility are only formal, their relation is also only formal. This formal relation is contingency. If Hegel's general claim is true that the relation of actuality and possibility is necessity, then contingency must be identical to necessity. From the closing paragraphs of A onward, the burden of the chapter will be to establish this identity of contingency and necessity.

The formal moments of actuality and possibility emerge as follows. Actuality is the achieved unity of immediacy and reflection. This unity is already present in the chapter on existence, which opens the section on appearance. But at that point it is present in a different and lesser way than at the level of actuality. This difference is one of countless instances in the *Logic* that Hegel characterizes by the opposition between that which is merely "in itself" and that which is "posited." Existence is "*in itself*" that which actuality is, *real reflection*, but it is not yet the *posited* unity of reflection and immediacy."²³

Actuality emerges from essential relation as the "*immediate* formal unity of the internal and the external," and "is thus in the determination of *immediacy* over against the determination of reflection into self."²⁴ How can that split remain, if actuality is the "posited unity of reflection and immediacy?" Evidently the unity of reflection and immediacy has so far been posited only in relative abstraction. The unity of internal and external has not yet been posited as a reflected unity. At the level of appearance, the internal and the external are two totalities. The movement from essential relation to the absolute makes clear that these two totalities are identical. This identity, the absolute, is "the identity each of whose moments is in itself the *totality*."²⁵ This identity of moment and totality has emerged by dint of the preceding logical development. But the moments that make up the totality have not yet shown that they are by virtue of their own dynamic the totality. They must do so, since the unity of reflection and immediacy is in general already posited. The fact that they have not yet shown that they are the totality is the remaining opposition between actuality's determination as immediate and actuality's determination as reflection-into-self.

Actuality is the “immediate unity of form of the internal and the external.” Since the unity of immediacy and reflection is in general already posited, actuality must include not only the determination of immediacy, but also the determination of reflection-into-self. Its immediate appearance, though, is just that: immediate.

The other moment, the determination of reflection-into-self, is possibility. After discussing the immediate moment of actuality in A.1, Hegel turns to possibility in A.2. The lead sentence of this subdivision introduces possibility as “actuality reflected into itself.”²⁶ The reader of the *Doctrine of Essence* has by now grown accustomed to Hegel ringing the changes on the relation of immediacy to reflection. At this stage of the *Logic* clearly actuality must be both immediate and reflected into itself. It must be both those determinations and the totality of which those determinations are determinations.

In the following paragraphs Hegel appeals to two common ideas of possibility. First, “*everything is possible that does not contradict itself.*”²⁷ Possibility in this sense is “the mere formal determination of identity with itself or the form of essentialness.”²⁸ In his earlier analysis of the determinations of reflection, Hegel argued for the necessary progression from identity to ground. Identity leads to difference [*Unterschied*], whose internal movement is from absolute difference through diversity [*Verschiedenheit*] to opposition. Opposition gives way to contradiction, which “goes back into its negative unity.”²⁹ This negative unity, the last of the determinations of reflection, is ground.

The logic of the determinations of reflection shows that it is *impossible* to articulate possibility as simple self-identity. Hegel reinforces the point with an additional argument. Possibility can not be the simple identity of reflection into self. Reflection into self is only a moment of the totality. It can not stand on its own. It is only in relation to an other: in this case, actuality. Reflection into self can be itself only by being reflected out of itself. “The possible is *reflected being-reflected-into-self.*”³⁰ The possible is only a moment within the totality. It is “*only a possible.*”³¹ This last formulation is Hegel’s second reference to common understandings of possibility. The formulation echoes expressions such as “It’s only possible” and “You’re dealing in mere possibilities.”

As the determination of immediacy abstracted from the totality, actuality “is nothing more than a *being or existence* in general.”³² At the same time, actuality is “*essentially not mere immediate existence.*”³³ Hegel

emphasizes the word “essentially” because it is essence that is the difference between being and existence. The being “into which essence makes itself is *essential being, existence*.”³⁴ The situation is reversed with formal possibility. As the determination of reflection—into-self abstracted from the totality, it is essence in abstraction from being. Hegel calls this abstraction “mere essentialness.”³⁵ Hegel opened the Doctrine of Essence by asserting that “the *truth of being is essence*.”³⁶ Now he echoes that statement from the other side by saying that “essence itself [is] only moment and without being does not have its truth.”³⁷

Both actuality and possibility are the unity of being and essence. This unity is already present at the level of existence. There this unity is not yet posited. That task falls to actuality. Within actuality as totality, it is in the moment of possibility, *not* the moment of actuality, that this positing occurs. Both actuality and possibility are moments that are at the same time the totality. They are what they are by virtue of a relation: the relation of moment to totality. Since actuality is still only immediate, it blocks recognition of that relation. Simple immediacy is the absence of relation. As reflection, possibility has a relational structure. The initial deficiency of formal possibility is to pretend that relation is possible as pure self-relation. We saw above that there can be no reflection into self without reflection into an other. The other of reflection’s self is immediacy. Reflection itself establishes that only by being immediate can reflection be itself. In view of the pairings of actuality with immediacy and possibility with reflection, it follows that possibility can be itself only by being actual.

The actuality that arises from possibility’s process of reflection can no longer be simply immediate, simply the counter pole to possibility. “This actuality is not the first, but rather the reflected actuality, *posited as unity* of itself and possibility.”³⁸ But then Hegel turns around and says that this actuality is that “which came forward at first—namely, formal actuality.”³⁹ It is “formal actuality, which is only *being or existence* in general.”⁴⁰ This statement is almost an exact repetition of Hegel’s introduction of formal actuality, where he said that it “is thus nothing further than a *being or existence* in general.”⁴¹

The seeming contradiction between Hegel’s statements about actuality at this stage (A.3) results from the difference between actuality at this stage and actuality in its initial form. In the Hegelian vocabulary, it is the difference between posited and not yet posited. Formal actuality is initially “only being or existence in general.” Now it is “mere

being or existence, but posited in its [i.e., being's] truth."⁴² This truth is actuality's unity with possibility. This unity is contingency.

Contingency is the unity of formal actuality and formal possibility. The latter are *merely* formal moments in that the identity of moment and totality, the defining characteristic of the absolute, seems to have been lost. As only a moment of the totality, possibility does not simply stand on its own. To be what it is within the totality, the possible stands in relation to that which is other than itself within the totality. The concept of "other" is a reciprocal one. To have an other is to be an other: other to one's other. The possible gives rise to its other as also possible. Since each is just as possible as the other, each is *only* possible.

In contingency, the unity of formal actuality and formal possibility, the actual is only possible. Its other could just as well be. "The contingent is an actual that at the same time is determined only as possible, whose other or opposite to an equal extent is."⁴³

Contingent actuality is the same as initial formal actuality, with the crucial difference that the former is the latter "posited in its truth." This truth is "to have the value of a being posited or of possibility."⁴⁴ Neither possibility nor actuality are immediate here. Hegel equates possibility with a being posited. Actuality is also posited, and in fact with the value of a being posited. "On the other hand," Hegel begins the next sentence, "possibility . . . is posited as being posited."⁴⁵

In the next sentence, which opens a new paragraph, Hegel proceeds to draw the conclusion from that line of argument: "The contingent *therefore* presents two sides."⁴⁶ According to the first side, the contingent is "not being posited."⁴⁷ Although in contingency both actuality and possibility are posited, their unity, contingency itself, is immediate. "The actual as such is possible; it is in immediate positive identity with possibility."⁴⁸ This statement is the basis for Hegel's conclusion concerning the first of the two sides that the contingent presents. "Insofar as it [i.e., the contingent] has possibility *immediately* in it . . . it is *not being posited* nor mediated, but *immediate* actuality; it has *no ground*."⁴⁹ The other side to contingency lies in the fact that both actuality and possibility are being posited. That which is posited "has its true reflection-into-self in an other, *or it has a ground*."⁵⁰ Contingency is simultaneous groundedness and groundlessness.

Hegel began the chapter by describing actuality as "*immediate* formal unity of the internal and the external." As such actuality is "in the determination of *immediacy* over against the determination of

reflection-into-self." With contingent actuality, this unity is posited. The contingent "is the *posited*, unmediated *reversal* into each other of the internal and external or of being reflected-into-self and of being."⁵¹ But it is posited as an unstable unity. This unity unites nothing more than vanishing moments. The unity is an illusion to the extent that the difference that it unifies is a vanishing one. The difference has no continuity.

Contingency's structure as a unity of vanishing moments recalls the category of becoming. Hegel makes the parallel explicit: "This *absolute unrest* of the *becoming* of these two determinations is *contingency*."⁵² Hegel also uses similar language in describing the movement from becoming and contingency to their respective succeeding logical determinations. Becoming is "an unstable unrest," but it "likewise goes together into *restful unity*."⁵³ Each of the determinations of contingency "likewise goes . . . directly *together with itself*" in its other.⁵⁴

Yet contingency is not merely becoming. The result of becoming is the unity of determinate being. In describing the movement from becoming to determinate being, Hegel uses the word "result" twice and the word "unity" six times.⁵⁵ Neither term appears in the description of the movement from contingency to necessity. Necessity is the "*identity*"⁵⁶ of the determinations of contingency. Determinate being appears as an exterior result of becoming. Determinate being's "mediation, becoming, lies behind it."⁵⁷ Far from presenting contingency and necessity as external to each other, Hegel identifies them. "The contingent is therefore necessary because the actual is determined as possible, and thus its immediacy is sublated and repulsed into *ground* or *being in itself*, and into *grounded*, as well as because this its *possibility*, the *relation of ground*, is directly sublated and posited as being."⁵⁸

The contingent as contingent was already simultaneous groundedness and groundlessness. Now Hegel uses simultaneous groundedness and groundlessness as a justification for calling the contingent necessary. The difference lies in the relation between groundedness and groundlessness in the two cases. Contingency is a juxtaposition of groundedness and groundlessness. Necessity is their identification.

It is impossible to articulate contingency from its own standpoint. Since its moments are simply juxtaposed, their relation can be perceived only from an alien perspective. From the perspective of either of the moments that make up contingency, the other of that moment is excluded. Moreover, neither of the moments of contingency has a

standpoint in the proper sense of the term. There can be no standing where all is unmediated reversal and absolute unrest.

Necessity provides the standpoint from which to articulate contingency. Since groundedness and groundlessness are identical, each contains the relation to the other. No alien perspective is required to account for the relation. The standpoint of necessity is literally a standing point, since moving from one moment to the other no longer requires abandoning the first moment.

Actuality as Contingent Necessity

The problem with necessity in its initial form is that the standpoint of necessity is no longer the standpoint of either of its moments as moments. The moments have lost their independence. In the transition from becoming to determinate being that serves as the key parallel for the movement from contingency to necessity, becoming “sinks together” into the “*immediate* unity” of determinate being.¹ The first form of necessity, formal necessity, is likewise “*immediate* unity” whose moments “do not have the shape of standing on their own.”²

Formal necessity is a form of the totality of actuality, which constitutes the theme of the entire chapter. The totality of actuality differentiates itself into the formal determinations of immediacy and reflection-into-self. The determination of immediacy is the moment of actuality over against the moment of possibility, the determination of reflection-into-self. The *totality* of actuality “in the determination of *immediacy*”³ is the *moment* of actuality. Since formal necessity is an immediate unity, it belongs to the moment of actuality. Yet we have seen that formal necessity emerges from contingency as the identity of actuality and possibility. Formal necessity is actuality that “*is determined as indifferent to the difference of the formal determinations*”⁴ of actuality and possibility.

Hegel terms the actuality of formal necessity “real” actuality. Real actuality is parallel to “existence,” the theme of the first chapter of the section on appearance. Part A of the chapter on existence bears the title “The Thing and Its Properties.”⁵ “Real actuality *as such* is initially the thing of many properties, the existing world.”⁶ The chapter on existence opens with a statement of the “principle of sufficient reason”: “*Everything that is, has a ground.*”⁷ Hegel argues that,

since existence is the truth of being, there could be a parallel "principle of existence."⁸ Hegel continues, "But if it was further said: *that which exists has a ground and is conditioned*, it would likewise have had to have been said: *it has no ground and is unconditioned*."⁹ Existence, like the formal necessity which is real actuality, is simultaneous groundedness and groundlessness.

The simultaneity is different in the two cases. That which exists, the thing, "indeed contains reflection, but its [i.e., reflection's] negativity is initially extinguished in its [i.e., the thing's] immediacy."¹⁰ By contrast, real actuality is the unity of possibility and actuality such that, precisely by being actuality, it is also the movement of negativity, of reflection. Real actuality "as actuality is at the same time being-in-itself and reflection-into-self."¹¹ When the negativity of reflection hidden in existence asserts itself, existence dissolves into appearance. A gap opens between the external and the internal: "The world that is reflected into itself, the *world that is in itself*, places itself over against the world of appearance."¹² Such a gap is no longer possible in the realm of actuality. This realm is governed by the idea of manifestation, the idea that the externalization of the absolute *is* the absolute's reflection-into-self. The real world is no front, no exterior appearance of a separate interior. Real actuality's "externality is internal relation only *to itself*."¹³ Real actuality is not actuated by some other "behind" it or interior to it. Since it is actual, it has the power to act. "That which is actual *can act*."¹⁴

If the movement of manifestation characteristic of actuality differs from the movement of appearance characteristic of the thing, it certainly differs from the movement of transition proper to the early logical form of "something" [*Etwas*]. Each of those three movements is a way of relating to otherness, of mediating internal and external. Only at the level of manifestation are internal and external so united that relation to other is immediately self-relation. This unity of internal and external is already present at the outset of the chapter on actuality. Yet there the unity still suffers from a new kind of division, an internal externality. The formal determinations of actuality and possibility stand over against each other. The logic of formal necessity makes clear that actuality and possibility are in truth identical. But this unity is also incomplete. The identity that is formal necessity first appears only on the side of actuality. The opposition between actuality and possibility remains because the identity of actuality and

possibility has not yet shown itself in the form of possibility. Only when that occurs, and when possibility and actuality emerge as each the same identity of the formal moments of possibility and actuality, will the formal opposition be truly overcome.

Real actuality at this stage can be articulated only by holding on to two contradictory ideas of possibility. On the one hand, possibility is identical with actuality. The unity of the two is real actuality. "Real actuality now also has *possibility* immediately *in it-self*."¹⁵ On the other hand, real actuality is what it is precisely by standing over against possibility as an alien other. Real actuality is "in *one* of the determinations of form. Thus as that which is it is different from being-in-itself or possibility."¹⁶

Hegel concludes next that "possibility as the being-in-itself of *real* actuality is itself *real possibility*, initially being-in-itself that is *full of content*."¹⁷ Hegel does not make his reasoning explicit on this point, but there is no need to do so. It is tautological that the possibility of actual content is possible content. For instance, the possibility of a goal in soccer is a possible goal. Content distinguishes the real from the merely formal. Real actuality "has a *content*" because real actuality's "unity now is *determined as indifferent* over against the *difference* of the formal determinations."¹⁸ Content in possibility likewise distinguishes real possibility from merely formal possibility.

There is another angle from which one could argue to content in possibility. The argument is again one that Hegel does not explicitly work out. Hegel does say that content is indifferent to the formal determinations of actuality and possibility. Actuality and possibility are on equal footing when it comes to content. If content is in actuality, then it must also be in possibility. Otherwise content's relation to the two would not be indifference. Hegel picks up the argument at this point, saying that the identity of possibility and actuality "is at first only *content* that is indifferent over against these formal determinations [of possibility and actuality]; they constitute the *form determined* over against their identity."¹⁹ As content, actuality and possibility are both indifferent to the formal opposition between actuality and possibility.

Content is indifferent to the formal opposition from which it differs. Within the chapter on actuality, content first appears in the treatment of formal possibility. Formal possibility first has the determination of being-in-itself. The analysis of formal possibility later makes clear that formal possibility "is being-in-itself determined as only a

posited, or equally as *not to be in itself*.”²⁰ Formal possibility can equally be or not be its formal determination. Its formal determination does not exhaust what it is. Formal possibility must also have a content. This content is at first plagued by the same formal contradiction to which it proposes an answer. The content is both in itself and not in itself. It is both itself and an other.

If one were to express the possibility of a content A in the form of a statement, the idea of formal possibility would allow nothing richer than the tautological “A is A.” Formal possibility is mere noncontradiction. At the same time, the content is also an other. If A is an other, then A has an other. Hegel at this point chooses a specific other of the content A: namely its *opposite*, -A. He does not justify this move, since he has already done so, or at least thinks he has done so, in the chapter on the determinations of reflection. In Part B of that chapter he argues that difference by its very nature is ultimately opposition. If we accept that argument, we can accept Hegel’s statement expressing the formal possibility of A’s other and opposite: -A is -A.

The content of formal possibility is both itself and an other. That “both . . . and . . .” signifies at first no more relation than mere juxtaposition. Possible contents, and the statements of formal identity which express them, are indifferent or “like-valued”²¹ to each other. Whatever relation they have is not their own doing. The relation can only be external comparison or “likening.” Since the mutually indifferent contents both belong to possibility, possibility “is the likening relation of both.”²²

The language of “identity,” “like-valuedness” and “likening” replays at a more advanced stage portions of the argument in the chapter on the determinations of reflection. Part A of that chapter discusses identity. Part B analyzes difference, of which the second moment is diversity. Diversity is the “like-valuedness of difference.”²³ Between that which is diverse there are only external relations. “External identity is *likeness* and external difference, *unlikeness*.”²⁴ “External reflection relates the diverse to the like and the unlike.” This relation is “*likening*.”²⁵

The discussion of formal possibility reintroduces the play between “like-valued” and “likening.” The text also plays between “content” [*Inhalt*] and “contain” [*enthalten*]. Possibility relates the two opposed contents by likening them. It can do this because it “contains”²⁶ the possibility of the opposite of any given possibility.

Hegel immediately draws the conclusion that formal possibility is not only “the likening relation” of opposed contents, but also “the relating *ground*”²⁷ of the one in the other. This conclusion again relies on the earlier analysis of the determinations of reflection. Diversity, the proper realm of likening, is ultimately opposition. Opposition in turn is ultimately contradiction, and the truth of contradiction is ground. Possibility does not just compare “A is A” with “-A is -A.” It grounds the latter in the former: “*because* A = A, -A = -A also is.”²⁸ This amounts to saying that “in the possible A the possible not -A is also *contained*.”²⁹

Despite Hegel leaning heavily upon his earlier development of the determinations of reflection, the current passage is partially inconsistent with that earlier development. Hegel jumps from the possibility of an other to the possibility of an opposite. In the language of the determinations of reflection, he jumps from difference to opposition. In itself this is admissible. Hegel need not mention the intervening step of diversity. The difficulty arises when Hegel introduces diversity *after* he has moved to opposition. In placing the statements “A is A” and “-A is -A” under the rubric of diversity, Hegel recalls the extended wordplay built upon the root *gleich*. But A and -A are not merely diverse. As even the way they are written makes apparent, they are related as positive and negative. Positive and negative are terms of opposition. They are a step beyond likeness and unlikeness, in that each “contains” the relation to its opposite. The positive is “likeness to itself reflected into itself, which contains within itself the relation to unlikeness.”³⁰ The converse is true of the negative. Even before Hegel introduces the terms A and -A, he speaks of a possible content and “its” opposite. The use of the possessive pronoun “its” shows that the relation is not the merely external one of diversity. The grammar makes clear that if y is x’s opposite, y in some sense “belongs” to x. In that same sense x *contains* y.

The content that we have been considering is possible content. The content of real actuality is the unity of actuality and possibility. It is indifferent to those opposed formal determinations. This indifference is already present at the level of contingency. Contingency is the contradiction of being both of the mutually excluding moments of actuality and possibility. It is indifferent to this opposition because whether it is actuality or possibility has no bearing on its status as contingency.³¹ At the same time, contingency can not articulate itself as content over against those formal determinations, for its unity is

unstable. Formal necessity articulates a more stable unity by being the identity of formal actuality and formal possibility. Since formal necessity is the *immediate* unity of actuality and possibility, it is in the mode of actuality, the mode of immediacy.

Indifference belongs to the logical figure of diversity. But the content of real actuality does not simply reproduce diversity. We saw earlier that diverse moments are merely juxtaposed, while opposed moments contain each other. On the one hand, the content of real actuality is indifferent to the formal opposition of actuality and possibility. On the other hand, as formal necessity it contains those formal moments, for it is their unity. The content contains the form, but the difference in the form is a matter of indifference to the content. "Indifference of difference" is precisely the definition of diversity. Thus Hegel can say that content's "indifferent identity also contains the form as indifferent—i.e., merely *diverse*—determinations."³² The content is diverse or, as Hegel also says, "*manifold* content."³³

Real possibility *is* real actuality, since both are equally the content that is indifferent to the formal determinations of actuality and possibility. Real possibility is *not* real actuality, since possibility and actuality as opposed formal determinations do not share in the identity of content. Content that is possibility is also actuality. But it is "an actuality that is *not the same one* of which it is the possibility."³⁴

The identity of actuality and possibility is present only in fragmented form. Real actualities stand as alien over against each other. The presentation of the other as alien recalls in a global way the entire major section on Being. There the characteristic logical movement is transition or "going over" [*Übergehen*], since externality dominates the relation to the other in the logic of Being. This part of Hegel's treatment of real possibility also recalls a specific part of the Doctrine of Being: the discussion of "Limit and the Ought."³⁵ The "actuality that makes up the possibility of a Thing . . . is the actuality that *ought* to be sublated."³⁶ Real possibility is a "dispersed actuality, not reflected into itself," which is determined as that which "ought" "to go back into itself."³⁷

In the Doctrine of Being, the treatment of "Limit and the Ought" immediately precedes the "Transition of the Finite into the Infinite."³⁸ Limit and the ought belong to finitude. They also are the last stage of the merely finite. They are already moving beyond their finite condition to infinity. The idea of "ought" includes two parts. What ought to be is not. The limit of what is prevents what ought to be from being.

At the same time what ought to be is not simply absent. It is present, present as that which ought to be. It *is* as an ought. The ought is a transcendence of the very limit that it can not transcend without losing its character of 'oughtness.' "As *ought* something is thus *elevated above its limit*. But on the other hand, only *as ought* does it have its *limit*. Both are inseparable."³⁹ Limit and the ought are the unstable simultaneity of the finite and the movement to infinity.

Since real possibility carries with it an ought, it is a finite form of possibility. At the same time, it is already the movement beyond itself to infinity. The analysis of the determinations of reflection has provided a term, not available in the Doctrine of Being, for that unstable simultaneity. It is "contradiction." Hegel again presents the movement beyond the finitude of real possibility largely by appeal to the arguments made about the determinations of reflection. He has already shown that real possibility is diversity in content. According to the analysis of the determinations of reflection, diversity "goes over"⁴⁰ into opposition. Opposition then turns out ultimately to be contradiction. Contradiction in turn moves to its truth, which is ground, and ground gives rise to existence.

Hegel had earlier concentrated the movement from ground to existence in the statement: "*When all conditions of a Thing are present*, it steps into existence."⁴¹ Hegel now uses these same words, with two crucial changes, to sum up the movement beyond real possibility:⁴² "*When all conditions of a Thing are completely present*, it steps into actuality."⁴³ The movement is now into actuality, not merely into existence. That difference justifies Hegel's addition of the word "completely." The presence of a thing's conditions in the movement into actuality is different from the presence of a thing's conditions in the movement into existence. A totality is present in actuality that was not yet present in existence. Existence still suffers from the division between the internal and the external. Existence splits into "two *totalities of content*." Actuality is "*one absolute totality*."⁴⁴ Even that totality suffered initially from the division into the formal determinations of actuality and possibility. Now the actual and the possible are identified in the content. "The completeness of the conditions is the totality as in the content, and *the Thing itself* is this content, determined as being equally an actual and a possible."⁴⁵

The movement beyond real possibility into actuality is also the movement beyond real actuality, since real possibility and real actuality

have the same content. The movement beyond formal actuality and formal possibility occurred in contingency. Contingency was the unstable reversal of actuality into possibility and vice versa. There was no stabilizing factor. By the internal dynamic of real possibility, possibility turns out to be actuality and vice versa. But that movement away from the moments that make up real possibility is at the same time a movement to those moments. Possibility and actuality are already present in real possibility's content. What is *not* already present in real possibility's content is that possibility and actuality, far from standing in mere opposition to each other, arise out of each other. "This movement of real possibility that sublates itself thus brings forth *the same moments that are already present*, only each becoming out of the other."⁴⁶ The two opposed formal determinations of actuality and possibility "went together" in the identity of formal necessity. Real possibility is also a going together of actuality and possibility. But since it is already both actuality and possibility, it is "*a going together with itself*."⁴⁷

In going beyond itself, real possibility comes to none other than itself. "The *negation* of real possibility is thereby *its identity* with itself."⁴⁸ The movement is from real possibility to real possibility. The use of "real possibility" in describing the two poles of this movement is not simply identical, for otherwise there would be no movement. For analysis I will say that the movement is from real possibility (1) to real possibility (2). Real possibility (1) is already the identity of actuality and possibility. But in this identity actuality and possibility are given independently of each other. In that sense actuality and possibility are mutually prior to one another. Real possibility (2) is also the identity of actuality and possibility. But in this identity actuality and possibility each now is by "becoming out of the other." The movement from real possibility (1) to real possibility (2) is the overcoming of the independent givenness of the identified moments of actuality and possibility. The moments are not prior to their relation of identity with each other.

At the merely formal level, the identity of actuality and possibility was formal necessity. At the level of reality, the identity of actuality and possibility is real necessity. When the real possibility of a thing is present, its real actuality *must* also be present, and vice versa.

Hegel introduces the idea of real necessity only through the movement from real possibility (1) to real possibility (2). But then he writes that the identity of real possibility and real necessity "does not first *become*, but is already *presupposed* and lies at the ground."⁴⁹

Hegel is emphasizing that there never is a real possibility that is not real necessity. He is not putting forward the identity of real possibility and real necessity as somehow given prior to the movement whose exposition we have been considering. This identity is not a substrate to the movement, but *is* only in the movement and as movement. The Hegelian understanding of both presupposition and ground rejects the idea of a given substrate.⁵⁰

"Real possibility and necessity are thus only *apparently* different."⁵¹ Hegel's use of the adverb "apparently" [*scheinbar*] invites the reader to compare the relation between real necessity and real possibility with the relation between essence and show [*Schein*]. In part B, subsection 2 of the chapter on show it seems that show "contains an immediate presupposition, an independent side over against essence."⁵² It turns out "that essence, rather, contains show within itself [i.e., within essence's self]."⁵³ Show turns out to be reflection. Reflection is essence in the latter's "infinite movement within itself."⁵⁴

Show is none other than essence. Its independence over against essence proves to be nothing but "show." The independence of real possibility over against real necessity is also show. Yet in the logical triad that constitutes the exposition of show, the second part does put show forward as an immediate presupposition over against essence. This structure is in keeping with Hegel's exposition of presupposition in the logic of reflection. It is in the second part of the analysis of reflection that presupposition functions as immediate over against reflection.

Real necessity emerges from real possibility in the second part of the chapter on actuality. At this point necessity also has a presupposition over against it. "This necessity . . . has namely a *presupposition* from which it begins. It has in the *contingent* its *point of departure*."⁵⁵ This is clear from the genesis of real necessity within the chapter on actuality. The initial categories of formal actuality and formal possibility have their unity in contingency. From there the movement is: contingency — formal necessity — real actuality — real possibility — real necessity. Part A as a whole bears the title "Contingency"; part B, "Relative Necessity." Real necessity is relative because it depends on its relation to contingency as its point of departure.

At the same time, real necessity is not merely the *result* proximately of real possibility, and more distantly of contingency. Hegel claims that real necessity and real possibility are "an *identity* that does not first *become*, but is already *presupposed* and lies at the ground."⁵⁶ At

this stage this is only a claim. Hegel has not yet presented a logical movement in which contingency emerges as necessity's own act: "*Necessity has not yet determined itself, out of itself, as contingency.*"⁵⁷

Contingency is the unstable simultaneity of actuality and possibility. Contingency can not articulate the identity of the two. Actuality and possibility serve as limits to each other. Contingency is the immediate reversal back and forth between the juxtaposed sides of this relation of limitation.

Hegel does not explicitly talk about limitation in his main treatment of contingency. He does use the word "ought" twice in his analysis of real possibility. As noted above, this recalls his discussion of "Limit and the Ought" in the Doctrine of Being, a discussion that ushers in the movement from finitude to infinity. In the closing paragraphs of the exposition of real or relative necessity, the notion of limitation becomes explicit.

Real possibility both contains form and is indifferent to the determinations of form. It is this structure that makes possible the emergence of real necessity from real possibility. Real necessity's difference from real possibility is show. Real or relative necessity must also be "the identity that is indifferent to form, thus different from it and a *determinate content* in general."⁵⁸ The determinacy of this content consists in its indifference over against the form, as Hegel already argued in introducing real actuality. Hegel immediately proceeds to the following conclusion. "The really necessary is therefore any limited actuality, which on account of this limitation is also, in another regard, only a *contingent*."⁵⁹

The connection between contingency and limitation is not surprising. The earlier discussions of contingency and real possibility have prepared the way for this connection. If the really necessary is dependent on the contingent, then the former must also be limited. What is surprising is the immediate conclusion from determinate content to limitation. If determinacy entails limitation, then only the indeterminate can be unlimited. Any attempt to conceive the infinite or the absolute as unlimited is doomed, for the attempt will dissolve into indeterminacy. The only place that such indeterminacy has in Hegel's exposition of the absolute is in the presentation of the initial, most impoverished form of the absolute. The chapter entitled "The Absolute" opens with the words: "The simple massive identity of the absolute is indeterminate."⁶⁰ Hegel insists that the infinite and the

absolute be determinate. If determinacy entails limitation, he must also insist that the infinite and the absolute are not without limit.

In the Doctrine of Being infinity sublates—both transcends and preserves—limit. Limit and its accompanying idea of “ought” are already the movement from the finite to the infinite. It is impossible to articulate the idea of limit in the language of finitude alone. Admittedly the word *limit* itself expresses limit’s belonging to finitude, the realm of *fines*. “But limit points immediately beyond itself to its other, which is the ought.”⁶¹ The ought turns out to be the same as limit, “the same bifurcation of *being in itself* and of *determinate being* as [is] limit.”⁶² Limit’s movement beyond itself is in truth its movement to identity with itself. “Beyond itself it [i.e., limit] thus only goes together with itself.”⁶³ “This *identity with itself*,” limit’s identity with itself, is “the other of the finite.”⁶⁴

The other of the finite is that which is not finite. That which is finite can be what it is only by standing over against that which it is not. For example, the North American continent is a finite land mass. The continent is defined over against the oceans that bound it on the east and the west, and over against South America to the south. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans and South America map out the being of the North American continent. Its nonbeing makes up its being. “When we say of things, *they are finite*, what is thereby understood is that . . . nonbeing makes up their nature, their being.”⁶⁵

If nonbeing makes up the finite, then the other of the finite is the negation of that nonbeing. It is “the negation of negation, is affirmative being.”⁶⁶ The German and English languages both use a negative prefix to express this negation of the finite. The other of the finite is the infinite [*das Unendliche*].

Hegel introduced the other of the finite as limit’s identity with itself. Limit comes to that identity by going beyond itself as finite, as living under the regime of the ought. Limit finds its identity in the infinite.

How can limit go beyond the finite, since limit itself belongs to the finite? In answering this question, Hegel emphasizes the word “go.” He criticizes any attempt to conceive the infinite in static opposition to the finite. Such an infinite is simply “the beyond of the finite”; it is “the indeterminate void.”⁶⁷ This criticism of an indeterminate infinite prefigures the later criticism of an indeterminate absolute.

Against that static conception Hegel focuses on the lesson taught by the analysis of limit and the ought. “It is the nature of the finite itself

to go beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite.”⁶⁸ The finite can go beyond itself because it can differentiate itself from itself. It is not the case that the finite simply *is*. The finite is self-relation. Hegel calls this self-relation negation of negation. Earlier Hegel said that negation constitutes the finite. The analysis of limit and the ought developed this negation to the point of showing that negation is not just a given that constitutes the finite. Negation is also the work of the finite itself. By its own dynamic, the finite emerges as other to itself. The finite differentiates itself from the original form of itself, constituted by already given negation. The finite establishes itself as not simply that negation. In Hegel’s language, it negates that negation.

In negating its negation, the finite relates negatively to itself. That relation is nevertheless a *self*-relation. The language of finitude can not articulate negation as self-relation. At the level of finitude, negation is always the relation between the finite and its other. Negation that is self-relation, rather than merely other-relation, can find articulation only by going beyond the finite. But it is the finite itself that demands and executes this movement of going beyond the finite. It is the nature of the finite “to relate itself to itself as limit, as limit as such as well as as ought, and to go beyond these, or rather as relation-to-self to have negated them and to be beyond them.”⁶⁹

Hegel’s use of the past tense in the preceding quotation can easily lead to misinterpretation. To the extent that the finite has already negated limit and the ought and is already beyond them, it is infinite and not finite. “It is the nature of the finite . . . to become infinite,” not to *have* become infinite. The finite’s becoming infinite can not be a mere thing of the past. If it were, there would be no more finite. It would disappear in the infinite.

Hegel introduces his critique of the “Reciprocal Determination of the Finite and the Infinite”⁷⁰ by focusing on that disappearance. “Thus the finite has disappeared in the infinite, and what *is*, is only the *infinite*.”⁷¹ If the finite has disappeared in the infinite, the relation of the finite to the infinite remains purely negative. Rather than integrating the finite, the infinite spells the finite’s disappearance. The infinite is the nonbeing of its other, the finite. But that which is by not being its other is precisely the finite. This infinite is in truth finite. The infinite “has fallen back into the category of something with a boundary.”⁷² Hegel calls this infinite “the *bad-infinite*, the infinite of the *understanding*.”⁷³

How is it possible to regress to this sterile opposition between the finite and the infinite, when the exposition has already shown that the finite is finite precisely by becoming infinite? In one sense the regression is not a regression, but a playing out of the Doctrine of Being's inadequate understanding of becoming. According to that understanding, that which becomes does not find itself in the other. In moving to the other it simply leaves itself behind. To use the phrase characteristic of the movement of the Doctrine of Being, it "goes over" into the other. "The finite . . . is determinate being posited with the *determination* to go over into its *being in itself*, to *become* infinite."⁷⁴ Such finitude is incompatible with conceiving limit as by its own nature moving beyond itself to the infinite. Such finitude is rather "the limit posited as limit."⁷⁵ Here Hegel plays upon the verb *setzen*. When he writes that the limit is *gesetzt* as limit, the reader is to hear that the limit is "put in place" as limit. The limit is nailed down and secured as limit against a supposedly inherent movement to the infinite.

Yet the concrete analysis of limit and the ought has opened up an idea of becoming that goes beyond the sterile opposition of the moments that constitute becoming. In its first stage, the idea of becoming is still very abstract. Yet as the unity of being and nothing, becoming is a global category that covers the entire Doctrine of Being, and indeed the entire *Logic*. The entire *Logic* is an exposition of what becoming truly and more concretely is. The first chapter of the Doctrine of Being ends with becoming giving rise to determinate being. Determinate being turns out to be quality, something, and eventually finitude. Now in the movement from finitude to infinity Hegel further specifies the becoming that finitude is. Finitude is the process of becoming infinite. Wherever the finite is present, the infinite is in becoming. Although this conception of becoming appears already at this stage of the exposition, nowhere will the Doctrine of Being manage to articulate it adequately, for it contradicts the Doctrine of Being's basic conception of logical movement as "going over." This contradiction will eventually require going beyond the Doctrine of Being as a whole to the Doctrine of Essence. In the Doctrine of Essence "going over" will give way in turn to showing [*Scheinen*], reflection, appearance and manifestation as ideas of logical movement that are increasingly capable of articulating becoming.

The analysis of limit and the infinite demonstrates that, since the really necessary is a *limited* actuality, it is both not itself the infinite,

and by its nature movement to the infinite. The really necessary "is, on account of its limitation, in another regard also only a *contingent*."⁷⁶ The assertion that real necessity is in some regard contingent opens up the possibility of saying something about the relation of the contingent to the infinite. *What* can be said remains unclear as long as the identification of the really necessary with the contingent remains under the qualification of "in another regard." In the exposition of diversity Hegel has already criticized comparison by means of "*insofar's, sides and regards*."⁷⁷ This kind of comparison is characteristic of "reflection that is alienated from itself."⁷⁸

Hegel immediately proceeds to use one of his favorite terms to formulate the "regard" in which the really necessary is also a contingent. Real necessity is "*in itself also contingency*."⁷⁹ The ensuing explanation plays off "in itself" against "posited": "real possibility is only *in itself* the necessary, but it is *posited* as the *being other* of actuality and possibility over against each other."⁸⁰ If one substitutes "real necessity" for "real possibility" and makes the corresponding changes, the result is the assertion that "real necessity is only in itself the contingent, but it is posited as the being other of contingency and necessity over against each other." It is this remaining opposition between contingency and necessity that accounts for the penultimate sentence of part B. On the one hand, real necessity is "the return into-itself out of that restless *being other* of actuality and possibility over against each other."⁸¹ The restless being other of actuality and possibility is contingency, so real necessity is the return into itself out of contingency. On the other hand, real necessity is "not [the return] out of itself to itself."⁸² Real necessity is the return into self that identifies contingency with necessity. Real necessity contradicts this identification by preserving as exclusive opposites movement from contingency and movement from necessity.

5

Actuality as Necessary Contingency

Although the unity of necessity and contingency is only present in itself, this unity is a new figure in the logic of actuality: “*absolute actuality*.”¹ The announcement of this new figure ushers in part C, entitled “Absolute Necessity.” At the level of relative or real necessity, the determinacy of necessity consists in its having a determinate content. This content is indifferent in relation to the form. This unresolved difference between form and content goes hand in hand with the unresolved difference between contingency and necessity. “The really necessary is, to be sure, *according to its form* a necessary, but according to its content it is a limited, and through it [i.e., its content] it has its contingency.”² With the transition from real necessity to absolute actuality, necessity’s determinacy no longer lies in the exclusive opposition of necessity and contingency. Contingency is still the negation of necessity. And necessity’s determinacy still depends on necessity’s negation. It is still true that *omnis determinatio est negatio*. But now necessity “has its negation, contingency, in it.”³ Hegel intends this statement, from the first paragraph of part C, simply as a summing up of the end of part B. His next sentence, the concluding sentence of that first paragraph, makes clear the relation of that paragraph to the preceding exposition: “Thus it [i.e., necessity] has turned out.”⁴ Hegel’s central point at the end of part B, that necessity is in itself contingency, entails the claim that necessity has contingency in it.

At the beginning of part B necessity first appeared as actuality, since actuality is the moment of immediacy over against the moment of reflection. The same is true of the new level of necessity at the outset of part C: “*Determinate* necessity is therefore immediately *actual necessity*.”⁵ From the beginning of the exposition of formal actuality

onward, actuality has had possibility as its being-in-itself. Now that the analysis of real possibility has shown possibility's identity with necessity, clearly the being-in-itself of actuality is necessity. The being-in-itself of actuality is the unity of actuality and possibility. When Hegel refers here to *absolute* actuality, he means actuality that is a one-sided unity of actuality and possibility. It is a unity that has not yet fully integrated the difference between actuality and possibility. Because it is a unity that does not do justice to the difference of actuality and possibility, absolute actuality is "only an *empty* determination, or it is *contingency*."⁶ Contingency does not hold together actuality and possibility in their difference from each other. It is the "*restless being other* of actuality and possibility over against each other."⁷ Rather than doing justice to the difference of actuality and possibility, contingency reduces actuality, including absolute actuality, to "*a mere possibility*."⁸

When Hegel first introduced contingency in part A, he described it as the relation of "actuality in its *immediate* unity with possibility."⁹ Contingency is the "unity, not yet reflected into itself, of the possible and the actual."¹⁰ Absolute actuality is contingency because absolute actuality is a particular kind of unity of actuality and possibility. It is an immediate unity, a unity that is not yet reflected into itself.

It may at first surprise when Hegel writes that "this actuality, *because* it is posited *to be absolute*—i.e., *to be itself the unity of itself and of possibility*—is only an *empty* determination, or it is *contingency*."¹¹ The surprise is based on an understanding of "absolute" that is not Hegel's. "Absolute" in Hegelian usage is not equivalent to "ultimate" or "fixed." Hegel calls the first, inadequate form of actuality "the absolute." It is the absolute unity of the internal and the external in the sense that that unity is not yet developed.¹² Absolute actuality is contingency because it is not yet the fully posited unity of the internal and the external.

However, absolute actuality is not just actuality over against possibility. It is actuality as well as possibility: the two in unity. Absolute actuality is also possibility: absolute possibility. It is indifferently the one or the other. Since it is both, that indifference is "indifference over against itself."¹³ Indifference indicates diversity. The self-relation of contingent absolute actuality is not a *self*-relation in the full sense of the word, for it remains caught in the indifference of diversity.

The logic of real necessity in part B demonstrated that real necessity in itself is contingency. The first paragraphs of part C show that contingency is not merely *given* as the being-in-itself of real necessity.

Contingency is a process of becoming in real necessity. Contingency becomes as the absolute actuality that is the immediate form of real necessity. "Thus real necessity contains contingency not only *in itself*, but the latter also *becomes* in it [i.e., in real necessity]." ¹⁴

Even as a process of becoming, contingency still presents itself as immediately given. It gives no account of what determines either the moments or the process of its becoming. It is "*immediate being determinate*." ¹⁵ To the extent that contingency is immediately given, it is not integrated into real necessity. It stands in a relation of "*externality*" ¹⁶ to real necessity.

The spatial metaphor of externality has its place in the context of the spatial metaphor of reflection that permeates the Doctrine of Essence. Both real necessity and contingency are the unity of actuality and possibility. Contingency is the "unity that is not yet reflected into itself." Real necessity is "the return into itself."

In Hegel's analysis of reflection, externality comes to the fore in the second of reflection's three moments: external reflection. In external reflection an immediate presupposition stands over against reflection into self. The overcoming of this externality is the movement from external to determining reflection. In this movement it becomes clear that the pre-sup-posing is itself a positing. It is posited, not simply immediate.

The relation of real necessity to contingency is one of external reflection. Real necessity "begins" from contingency: "This *presupposing* and the *movement that returns* into itself is still separated." ¹⁷ The analysis of reflection has already shown that this externality is not the final word. Hegel's use of the singular verb "is" anticipates the unity that will emerge from this externality. According to the analysis of reflection, the movement now will be from external to determining reflection. In describing the separation of real necessity and contingency, Hegel explicitly points ahead to the overcoming of that separation in determining reflection: "*necessity has not yet out of itself determined itself as contingency*." ¹⁸

Contingency's self-relation is dispersed in the indifference of diversity. Contingency is the unity of actuality and possibility. But contingency can not articulate that unity, for actuality is possibility only by disappearing as actuality, and vice versa. Real necessity is also the unity of actuality and possibility. It is their unity as "the being sublated of actuality in possibility and vice versa." ¹⁹ This sublation is not

the disappearance of one into the other. Hegel here uses the German preposition *in* with the dative. This translates as English *in* without the movement of *into*. Only the German *in* with accusative conveys the latter notion. Movement *into* connotes the passage from one place into another, from actuality into possibility and vice versa. *In* without the movement *into* does not carry with it that idea of passage from one place to the other. Actuality is possibility without ceasing to be actuality, and vice versa. Actuality and possibility each “in the other only goes together with itself.”²⁰ Contingency’s unity of actuality and possibility continually gives up one side or the other of its unity in moving from one to the other. Necessity’s unity is a “positive unity,”²¹ for it holds together both actuality and possibility. Neither disappears negatively into that which it is not.

The difference between “the sublation of actuality in possibility and vice versa” and the “*simple reversal* of the one of those moments into the other”²² only shows the difference between real necessity and contingency, respectively. Hegel means to show their identity. He means to show that contingency is not just necessity’s presupposition, but that it is necessity’s own positing. Hegel asserts that real necessity is the “simple reversal of the one of those moments [i.e., actuality or possibility] into the other.” He introduces no new argument in support of this point, but appeals to the initial treatment of the relation of contingency to necessity in part A. The language of “reversal,” referring to contingency, and of “going together with itself in the other,” referring to necessity, both repeat formulations from the earlier discussion. “But because each [i.e., actuality or possibility] immediately reverses into that which is opposed, it thus in the latter likewise goes directly together with itself.”²³

The next sentence in the discussion in part A proceeds: “The necessary is an *actual*.”²⁴ Hegel draws the same conclusion in part C from actuality and possibility each going together with itself in the other. “But thus it [i.e., necessity as the positive unity of actuality and possibility] is *actuality*.”²⁵ As always, actuality has the determination of immediacy. But actuality now carries with it the clear indication that it is an immediacy that has become. It is actuality “that only is as this simple going together of the form with itself.”²⁶ The going together of the form with itself is the going together of the formal moments of actuality and possibility. If actuality only is—or better, becomes—as this going together, it is *not* as an isolated determination prior to

this going together. Actuality is prior to this going together only because it is *pre-sup-posed*. The event of going together must have something out of which to go together. But that which is prior has no actuality in isolation from the process itself of going together, since actuality *is* this going together. Actuality as this going together posits, pre-posit, the actuality of that which is prior, out of which the going together that is actuality occurs.

The truth that pre-sup-posing is also a positing separates determining reflection from external reflection. In external reflection that which is presupposed stands in isolation from reflection. Positing reflection has the opposite problem. There reflection swallows up all pretenders to immediacy. Determining reflection overcomes the one-sidedness of its predecessor forms of reflection by identifying positing and presupposing. This identification remains unsatisfying, though, to the extent that determining reflection can only bring it off in a way characterized by domination. Contrary to what the term “determining” suggests, determining reflection does not fully determine the determinations of reflection to which it gives rise. In them reflection is estranged from itself. It is “the reflection that has come out of itself.”²⁷

Actuality as the going together of its presupposed formal moments of actuality and possibility has gone beyond that estrangement. Hegel describes actuality, which as the unity of actuality and possibility is necessity, in terms that echo the pure reflective movement of positing reflection. Positing reflection’s “arriving at itself [is] the sublation of itself and presupposing reflection, which repels from itself, and its repelling from itself is the arriving at itself.”²⁸ Similarly, necessity “in its being repels itself from itself, in this repulsion itself has only returned into itself, and in this return as its being has repelled itself from itself.”²⁹

There are two major differences between the two descriptions of this movement of arriving at self through repelling from self. First, the description of positing reflection stays in the present tense, while the description of necessity favors the past tense. Second, the description of necessity adds talk of being that is absent from the passage on positing reflection. The failure of positing reflection is precisely that it can not account for being in its immediacy in relation to reflection. By contrast, necessity goes as far as the Doctrine of Essence can go in giving such an account. Only the concept, the “absolute unity of *being* and of *reflection*,”³⁰ can go further. Existence already incorporates being

in a way that reflection alone is incapable of doing. Existence is "the truth of being," because it is "essence that has gone forth into immediacy."³¹ But existence is initially only the "undifferentiated unity of essence with its immediacy."³² "Actuality is the *unity of essence and existence*."³³ It is the unity that emerges from appearance, which is the differentiation of existence's undifferentiated unity. Actuality, too, is differentiated into reflective moments of immediacy and reflection into self, of actuality and possibility, respectively. Now actuality as necessity has shown itself to be the integration of these differentiated moments. Its reflective return is its immediate being: necessity is "in this return [i.e., its return into itself] as [in] its being."³⁴

Positing reflection remains indeterminate because it swallows up immediacy in the movement of reflection. The determinate relation of priority and posteriority established in the act of presupposing turns out to be illusory, since that which is presupposed disappears in the reflection that posits it. Actuality as necessity establishes a real relation of priority and posteriority. The priority and posteriority are real because that which necessity presupposes are real actuality and real possibility. Simply as real, actuality and possibility are contingent. Necessity presupposes contingency, but this presupposing is a positing. Just as determining reflection is the unity of positing and externally presupposing reflection, so necessity *determines* itself as contingency. Contingency is really prior to the actual necessity that presupposes it, but it *is* only because it is presupposed by that which is posterior to it. Hegel marks the reality of the relation of priority and posteriority by using the past tense. The priority that appeared in positing reflection was a collapsing priority, so it could not stand as a past tense over against that which is posterior.

Necessity that determines itself as contingency is absolute necessity. In general the absolute is the identity of the internal and the external. The absolute does not depend on anything external and alien to it. In the reflective determinations of actuality and possibility, the formal separation between the internal and the external reappears within the absolute. Their relation as contingency makes clear that, while they are not simply two diverse moments, neither do they collapse into a homogeneous unity. My going to buy ice cream this evening is a possibility, but it may not be an actuality in the sense that I may not actually go. Yet the possibility is actual in the sense that I am actually an animal capable of locomotion, there is actually a store down the

street that sells ice cream, I have actual money with which to make a purchase, I actually feel like eating ice cream, and so forth. By determining itself as contingency, absolute necessity confirms the reality of the moments of external and internal within the absolute, of actuality and possibility. At the same time, as necessity, it affirms the identity of these two moments. If one abstracts particular cases from the totality or the absolute, actuality and possibility do not coincide, as in my example above. At the level of the absolute, actuality is possibility and vice versa. Since there is nothing that is external and alien to the absolute, there can be no actuality that is not the absolute's actuality, and no possibility that is not the absolute's possibility. There can be no actuality of the absolute that is not a possibility of the absolute, for if it is not a possibility of the absolute, it is not a possibility at all. Nor can there be a possibility of the absolute that is not an actuality of the absolute. A possibility that was not actual could not *act*; it would have no power to be the possibility of anything.

Absolute necessity does not dissolve the difference of internal and external. It shows how the internal and the external, without either giving up its distinct status, are nevertheless identical. Their difference is essential to their identity. Their identity, necessity, is only as the process of each of its moments coming together with itself in the other moment. Hegel calls this process of identifying the moments without dissolving them the "penetration" of their difference. "Thus the *form* in its realization has penetrated all its differences."³⁵ When he does say that absolute necessity is the dissolution of difference, he is referring specifically to the indifferent difference characteristic of real necessity: content's indifference to form. "The difference of *content* and form itself has likewise disappeared. . . . The dissolution of *that* difference, though, is absolute necessity, whose content is *this* difference which in it [i.e., in absolute necessity] penetrates itself."³⁶ Far from identity swallowing up difference, it is difference that penetrates itself.

The penetration of difference by difference makes difference "transparent." "Thus the *form* in its realization has penetrated all its differences and made them transparent to itself."³⁷ The use of the optic metaphor of transparency suggests that absolute necessity is a form of reflection. We have seen the parallel between absolute necessity and determining reflection, and the way in which the former advances the project of the latter. The idea of transparency also expresses a difference of reflection at the level of absolute necessity from previous

forms of reflection. Not until absolute necessity has reflection been able to articulate an idea that on the one hand respects difference, and on the other hand does not make difference a barrier to self-relation. In terms of optic metaphors, such a barrier makes reflection opaque. With absolute necessity, reflection is no longer opaque, but transparent.

Hegel articulates the metaphor of transparency conceptually when he says that absolute necessity "is just as much simple immediacy or *pure being* as simple reflection-into-self or *pure essence*; it [i.e., absolute necessity] is this, that both is one and the same."³⁸ Hegel does not mean by transparency that we see through the illusory surface of things to the reality behind them. The surface of things *is* their depth, and their depth is their surface. Hegel denies that there is anything immediate in the sense of being given prior to mediation. The relationality of reflection itself makes up that which is given. Being is relation, not just in the sense that everything that happens to be caught up in various relations, but in the sense that it is in and through relation that anything *is* in the first place.

But if there is no immediacy that is not reflection, no unmediated immediacy, does it still make sense to talk of immediacy at all? The idea of mediated immediacy seems to be contradictory gibberish. Based on the analysis so far, though, the sense that the *Logic* expresses is coherent. On the one hand, there is nothing given prior to the relationality of reflection. There is no immediacy that is not reflection. On the other hand, reflection is never simply posterior to that from which or on which it reflects. The relation between reflection and that which is reflected is a self-relation. Reflection has no origin in the sense of something prior to reflection from which the relation of reflection first gets going. Any pretended origin is always already reflection. It is that sense of "always already" that is behind Hegel's speaking of reflection as immediate. The term "immediate" also conveys the sense that reflection is not mediated by anything external to itself. Reflection is immediately [i.e., without mediation by an external other] self-mediating.

Hegel also expresses the absence of any external mediation when he writes: "The simply necessary *is* only because it *is*; otherwise it has no condition or ground."³⁹ The absence of external ground or condition is not an absence of ground or condition, period. Grounding and conditioning are self-relations. "As reflection it [i.e., the simply necessary] has ground and condition, but it has only itself as ground and condition."⁴⁰

We saw above the parallel between determining reflection determining itself as presupposition and absolute necessity determining itself as contingency. In general, the chapter on actuality is the parallel, within the exposition of the absolute, to the chapter on reflection. "*Actuality, possibility and necessity make up the formal moments of the absolute or the reflection of the same.*"⁴¹ Absolute necessity is the goal of the movement in which the moments of actuality, possibility, and necessity are what they truly are. "Absolute necessity is thus the truth into which return actuality and possibility in general, as well as formal and real necessity."⁴² For this reason Hegel can express the reflective movement of the absolute simply as absolute necessity: "Absolute necessity is thus the *reflection or form of the absolute.*"⁴³

Determining reflection is the truth of the movement of reflection proper. Since reflection proper has not integrated being, as I argued earlier, the differences determined by reflection do not attain to existence. They are *only* determinations of reflection. By contrast, the differences determined by absolute necessity are existing differences. More than that, they are *actual* differences in Hegel's sense of actuality as "the *unity of essence and existence.*"⁴⁴ Absolute necessity's "differences are thus not as determinations of reflection, but *as multiplicity that is*, as differentiated actuality, which has the figure of independent others over against each other."⁴⁵

The determinations of determining reflection are "free . . . *essentialities.*"⁴⁶ The differences of absolute necessity—namely, actuality and possibility—are "*free actualities.*"⁴⁷ Hegel's use of the adjective "free" in these two expressions can lead to confusion, for he is appealing to an idea of freedom that he criticizes. In describing the free actualities, Hegel writes that "*neither shows in the other*, neither will show in it a trace of its relationship to the other."⁴⁸ The differences of absolute necessity are free in the sense of freedom from the other. Their ostensible freedom lies in their separation from and independence of the other. In absolute necessity's unity of being and essence, it is being that predominates. The differences of absolute necessity have "the figure of *reflection-into-self as of being.*"⁴⁹ In the free actualities, it is reflection in its function as immediacy rather than in its function as mediation that is dominant. Essence is certainly present, but it is bound and hidden within being. "Necessity as *essence* is locked within this *being.*"⁵⁰

The way in which the free actualities hide essence within being contradicts the transparency that distinguishes absolute necessity from

earlier, more opaque forms of reflection. Hegel continues the optic metaphors with the assertion that, in the free actualities, "essence is *that which flees the light*, because there is no *showing*, no reflex in these actualities."⁵¹ Since their essence flees the light, these actualities "are only *being*."⁵²

In the form of free actualities, absolute necessity is the contradiction between transparency and opacity. The "immediacy without show" of these actualities is itself show. Their freedom as simple, positive being is illusory. In absolute necessity there is no simple immediacy. "The *simplicity* of their [i.e., the free actualities'] being, their resting on themselves, is absolute negativity; it is the *freedom* of their immediacy without show."⁵³

Although the closing paragraphs of part C look ahead to the unmasking of the illusory freedom of the "free" actualities, it is the final chapter of the Doctrine of Essence that gives the detailed exposition of that unmasking. The title of the chapter is "Absolute Relation."⁵⁴ Only as relation is it possible to articulate truly free actuality.

One step in the exposition of the relational character of truly free actuality occurs at the end of part C. Each of the "free" actualities—actuality and possibility—is on its own, abstracted from the other. Each is indifferent to the relation between the formal determinations of actuality and possibility. In its indifference to form, each is merely content. But the "free" actualities are the *differences* of absolute necessity. They must be different actualities. Their respective contents must be determined as different. A content can be a determinate content only by virtue of a negation. Again Hegel makes use of his appropriation in the logic of Being of Spinoza's assertion that *omnis determinatio est negatio*. Determinacy depends on relation to an other. This relation is a negative relation to the self, to the extent that the other is not the self. But the language of "free" actuality is incapable of articulating relation to an other. To follow Hegel into the field of optic metaphors, the "free" actualities can not "see" their other. "This manifestation of that which *determinacy* in truth is—negative relationship to itself—is *blind* going under in being other."⁵⁵ This "blind going under" of actuality in possibility and of possibility in actuality is reminiscent of the earlier description of contingency as the absolute reversal of actuality into possibility and vice versa. In a formulation even closer to that description of contingency, Hegel says that absolute necessity is "the *absolute turning around* of its actuality into its possibility and of its possibility into actu-

ality.”⁵⁶ This formulation comes two sentences before Hegel’s introduction of the language of “free actualities,” and after he has drawn the parallel between the differences of absolute necessity and the determinations of reflection. In other words, he has begun describing the free actualities without yet giving them that name. The intervening sentence concludes from the “absolute turning around” into each other of the differences of absolute necessity: “Absolute necessity is therefore *blind*.”⁵⁷ It is blind because its differences take the form of actualities that conceal their relation to each other. To the extent that they are “free” of each other, any contact between these actualities is purely external. It is contingent in the literal sense of the German *Zufälligkeit*. It “falls to” the free actuality from the outside, having no inherent relation to that actuality. “The contact of these actualities by each other appears therefore as an empty externality; the actuality of *the one in the other* is the possibility that is *only possibility, contingency*.”⁵⁸

The “free” actualities “blind going *under* in being other” is also the “going over of actuality into possibility, of being into nothing.”⁵⁹ The language here recalls the language of the logic of Being. The logic of Being expresses logical movement as “*becoming* or *going over* of being into nothing.”⁶⁰ But going over at the level of absolute necessity is different from going over at the level of being. Absolute necessity is the identity of being and essence. Since actuality and possibility are differentiations of absolute necessity, the vocabulary of the logic of Being can not on its own articulate the movement between actuality and possibility. The characteristic logical movement of the Doctrine of Essence is reflection. Reflection is a self-relation. Hegel introduces reflection as “the showing of itself [i.e., of essence] into itself.”⁶¹ The development of the Doctrine of Essence increasingly strips away the opacity of reflection. The other becomes less and less a barrier to self, without at the same time ceasing to be other. When the exposition reaches the level of actuality, manifestation emerges as reflection in which the opacity in the relation between self and other, between the internal and the external, has disappeared. Since absolute necessity’s being is essence, absolute necessity’s becoming or “going over” is reflection, and now more specifically manifestation. In going over from itself as actuality to itself as possibility and vice versa, absolute necessity finds itself. “Thus the externality is its internality, its relation is absolute identity, and the *going over* of the actual into the possible, of being into nothing a *going together with itself*.”⁶²

Referring to absolute necessity's going together with itself in the movement from actuality to possibility, Hegel writes: "This *identity of being* in its negation *with itself*, it now is *substance*."⁶³ Since this identity is not a simple unity, but unity in its own negation, substance is itself only by being a relation. It is "*relation to itself*."⁶⁴ As relation to itself, it is not merely the blind going over of self into other, of being into nothing. The movement that the vocabulary of "free" actualities inadequately articulates in that way is not something that blindly happens to the absolute in its actuality and possibility. It is the absolute's own reflexive operation. "The *blind* going over of necessity is rather the absolute's *own proper* explication."⁶⁵ Absolute necessity is not just the reversal of one "free" actuality into the other. Absolute necessity explicates the substantial unity from which those actualities abstract. "The *explicator* of the absolute . . . is *absolute necessity*."⁶⁶

Absolute necessity is the absolute's explicating itself as "free" actualities. But we are still in Objective Logic, and have not yet entered into Subjective Logic. Because the concept of the subject is not yet part of the logical exposition, it is impossible to do justice to the idea of the absolute explicating *itself*. Only in a subject is it possible to articulate reflexive self-relation. To be sure, Hegel says that substance already is "relation to itself." Yet substance can only articulate this relation by presupposing something external. The absolute necessity that explicates the absolute as substance "is the presupposing of those first absolute actualities [i.e., of the "free" actualities]."⁶⁷ The absolute is necessary and is a unity, but it explicates itself only in the contingent multiplicity of "free" actualities. It depends on them, presupposes them, to be substance. Substance is a necessary unity, but a "unity as *in its negation* or as *in contingency*."⁶⁸

To say that substance can explicate itself only as "free" actualities is to say that substances *are* "free" actualities. Hegel identifies the two terms by apposition when he writes: "It [i.e., causality] is initially real necessity, absolute *identity* with itself, so that the difference of necessity and the determinations that in it relate themselves to each other, are substances, *free actualities* over against each other."⁶⁹

This text also makes clear that, just as substance can explicate itself only as "free" actualities, absolute necessity can explicate the absolute only in the form of *real* necessity. Although absolute necessity follows real necessity in the exposition of the chapter on actuality, the relation between real and absolute necessity is not one of linear

succession. Absolute necessity *is* real necessity, but in a way that differentiates the former from the latter. Absolute necessity is that which explicates the absolute as real necessity.⁷⁰

Absolute necessity explicated as real necessity is the way in which substances relate to each other. Substances are “free” actualities in the sense that they are absolutely reflected into self and stand in a relation of abstract independence over against each other. Hegel calls this abstract independence “substantial being other.” The movement beyond substantial otherness can only be a movement beyond necessity. For Hegel, to move beyond necessity is to move to freedom. Necessity is “internal identity.” In upholding the opposition between the internal and the external, necessity is not yet manifest, for manifestation is the identity of externality and reflection-into-self.⁷¹ Only freedom is the proper manifestation of necessity. In contrast to this *manifestation*, substantial otherness is the *show* of necessity. Only this manifestation removes the blindness that characterizes the movement between “free” actualities. “Necessity is in this way *internal identity*; causality is the manifestation of the same, in which its *show of substantial being other* has sublated itself and necessity is elevated to *freedom*.⁷²

We saw earlier that the blind going over of necessity from one “free” actuality to another is in truth necessity’s going together with itself. Correlatively, absolute necessity “is the presupposing of those first absolute actualities.”⁷³ Since absolute necessity presupposes the “free” actualities, it is posterior to them. Subsequent analysis has shown that the unmasking of the blindness of the “free” actualities, of “substantial being other,” occurs only with the elevation of necessity to freedom. Absolute necessity goes together with itself out of that blind, substantial otherness only by being manifest as freedom. Only the manifestation of necessity, only freedom, is posterior to the “free” actualities. Freedom is their presupposing.

This need not contradict the claim that necessity is the presupposing of the “free” actualities. It does circumscribe the sense of necessity for which that claim is true: that is, necessity manifest as freedom. Hegel discusses the relation of necessity to freedom in two different ways. First he says that necessity disappears in the elevation of necessity to freedom. “Necessity and causality have therefore disappeared therein.”⁷⁴ Later in the same paragraph he insists that necessity does not disappear. “Necessity does not become *freedom* by disappearing, but by its [i.e., necessity’s] still *internal* identity becoming

manifest.”⁷⁵ What disappears is the illusory opposition between the internal and the external. Necessity so-called depends on that opposition. For this reason Hegel sometimes refers to not yet manifest necessity as “internal.” With the manifestation of necessity as freedom, necessity so-called or internal necessity disappears. But necessity so-called is not the truth of necessity. On the contrary, “*freedom* shows itself as the *truth of necessity*.”⁷⁶

Both necessity and freedom are the identity of being and essence. The difference is that necessity abstracts from the movement of which this identity consists. “The *identity itself* of being and show is still *internal necessity*. The *movement* of causality sublates that *internality* or that being-in-itself.”⁷⁷ The manifestation of necessity as freedom is “a manifestation that is the *identical movement* of the differentiated into itself.”⁷⁸ The language of freedom does what the language of necessity can not do. It adequately articulates identity as movement and movement as identity. Necessity, like the determining reflection whose structure it reproduces, sacrifices movement to fixity. This fixity results in both determining reflection and necessity advancing illusory notions of freedom. Determining reflection does so in the form of “free” essentialities; necessity, in the form of “free” actualities. For both those essentialities and those actualities, their supposed freedom consists in their fixed abstraction from each other. They pretend to be what they are without inherent connection to an other.

Hegel introduces absolute necessity in part C as “simple *identity of being in its negation* or in *essence with itself*.”⁷⁹ When he opposes necessity to freedom, he calls necessity the identity of being and *show*. The identity of being and show is the identity of being and essence, since essence is “the showing of itself into itself.”⁸⁰ But show is essence in a specific sense. “Show is essence itself in the determinacy of being.”⁸¹ Abstracting being from essence results in illusion. Show contains the possibility of functioning as illusion. Abstracted from freedom, internal necessity is such an illusion. Though it is the identity of being and essence, it abstracts from the reflective movement that is essence. This abstracting both gives rise to and can not move beyond the idea of substance.

Freedom identifies being and essence differently. Freedom is “the *manner of relation of the concept*. . . . Now the *concept* is this absolute unity of *being* and of *reflection*, that *being in and for itself* is only insofar as it [i.e., being in and for itself] is just as much *reflection* or *being*

posited, and in so far as *being posited* is *being in and for itself*.”⁸² In discussing freedom and the concept, Hegel no longer talks about the identity of being and show, but about “the unity of being and of reflection.” “Show is the same as reflection; but it is reflection as immediate.”⁸³ Unlike show, reflection is essence not in the determinacy of being or immediacy. The illusion that masks essence as being does not cling to reflection as it does to show. Unlike internal necessity, freedom does not perpetrate illusion.

Freedom does not perpetrate the illusion that there is a given that is not itself posited. There is no stable resting point prior to and outside of the movement of reflection. At the level of substance, the identity of being and essence still depends on a unifying factor that remains external to the movement of reflection. This unifying factor is internal necessity. The name “internal” expresses the illusion that there is something external to the movement of reflection that is not also internal to it, and the correlative illusion that there is something internal to the process of reflection that is not also external to it. Looking back at the logic of substance from the perspective of the concept, Hegel calls the substantial identity of being and essence “*the identity that is in and for itself*, which makes up the necessity of substance.”⁸⁴ Freedom means that that “identity that is in and for itself” “is at the same time as sublated or as *being posited*.”⁸⁵ Necessity in its truth, manifest as freedom, is not external to reflection. This understanding of the relation between necessity and freedom contradicts all deterministic ideas of necessity, which see necessity as an outside determinant of whatever it determines. This view of necessity as an outside determinant finds expression in statements like: “It’s fated to be that way” or “God has already predestined the elect for salvation.”

Necessity manifest as freedom determines the absolute’s manifestation of itself, but it does not do so from outside the absolute. It determines that manifestation only because it itself is posited by the absolute. It does not disappear into the “infinite reflection”⁸⁶ that is the absolute. That would be a regression into merely positing reflection. The absolute posits necessity as prior to the absolute; it pre-posites necessity. Necessity manifest as freedom does not have the status of that which is merely posited: “*being posited* is *being in and for itself*.”

Far from determining the absolute from outside, necessity is the absolute’s self-determination as still explicated in absolute, “free” actualities. But this self-determination, this causing itself to be what

it is, is for Hegel freedom in the true sense. "The *original* Thing is . . . the *cause of itself*, and this is *substance freed to be concept*."⁸⁷

The blindness of necessity lies in necessity's presence as an original given, prior to the positing movement of reflection. Freedom dispels this blindness by exposing as illusion the idea of an original given. "The obscurity for each other of substances standing in causal relation has disappeared, for the originality of their self-subsistence has gone over into being posited, and thus has become *clarity* that is transparent to itself."⁸⁸

The concept in its freedom articulates that which determining reflection could articulate only in an initial and inadequate way. It identifies positing and presupposing without subsuming one under the other. It identifies reflection and immediacy while expressing their ineradicable difference. In the essentialities that arise from determining reflection, "determinacy has, by means of the relation to itself, solidified itself and made itself infinitely fixed."⁸⁹ In the realm of freedom, determinacy is not fixed. No determination is merely given. All determination is a positing; it is self-determination.

6

The Actuality of Possibility and the Presence of the Future

The most common misunderstanding of Hegel's concept of necessity results from absolutizing what Hegel calls "relative" or "real" necessity. This necessity is a causal relationship between substances that exist in abstraction from each other. Each is given independently of, and in this sense prior to, the other. By contrast, absolute necessity manifest as freedom makes clear that there is no given prior to the absolute's movement of positing.

This misunderstanding even appears in interpreters who explicitly seek a positive appropriation of Hegel's contribution to a philosophy of freedom. For instance, Wolfhart Pannenberg claims that Hegel shares with traditional Christian theology in the West "the assumption of an absolute essence that is already given prior to the act of divine freedom."¹ According to Pannenberg, Hegel "sought to think God's freedom as an expression of God's essence supposedly given prior to it [i.e., God's freedom], namely as a manifestation of that essence."² But Hegel does not understand manifestation as the "expression" of something behind it or prior to it. Absolute actuality, the richest categorial figure of essence within the Doctrine of Essence, *is* manifestation. "Thus as the *manifestation* that it is nothing other than and has no content other than being the manifestation of itself, the absolute is *absolute form*. *Actuality* is to be taken as this reflected absoluteness. . . . The actual is therefore *manifestation*."³

Of greater interest than Pannenberg's version of a common misreading of Hegel is the conception that Pannenberg puts forward as a supposed alternative to Hegel. Pannenberg's program is "to under-

stand God's essence itself out of the absolute future of freedom, rather than thinking it conversely as a capacity that underlies God's freedom."⁴ I wish to show in this chapter how much the *Logic* carries out the very program that Pannenberg proposes as an alternative to Hegel. This demonstration will sometimes require reading the *Logic* against the grain of Hegel's understanding of what he is doing in the text, since he insists that logical content is atemporal.

Pannenberg himself argues that the *Logic* is not as atemporal as Hegel claims. "Rather the Hegelian determinations of thought prove themselves in their dialectical nature to be in them-selves anticipatory. . . . The thinking of those determinations itself is related to a future of its truth, from which it arises, in that it [i.e., the thinking] anticipates it [i.e., the truth of that thinking]."⁵ For example, determinate being anticipates its fuller truth in existence, which anticipates its fuller truth in actuality. Even the absolute idea, which all the categories of the *Logic* anticipate as their fulfillment, still anticipates "a future of its truth." It has not yet "released"⁶ itself and thus determined itself as nature.

Pannenberg is well aware that his analysis contradicts Hegel's own understanding of the movement of the *Logic*.⁷ "The *truth of being is essence*,"⁸ Hegel writes to open the Doctrine of Essence. Hegel does not consider essence as the truth of being to be future to being. On the contrary, "essence is being that has passed away, but timelessly passed away."⁹ The problem with Pannenberg's challenge to Hegel's self-understanding is that Pannenberg's challenge contradicts his own reading of Hegel on essence and freedom. Pannenberg criticizes Hegel for presenting freedom as merely the expression of an already given essence. For Pannenberg's criticism to stand up, he must mean that Hegel puts forward essence as already the truth, with freedom being only the expression of that truth. If the truth is only as expression—or as Hegel would say, manifestation—then Pannenberg's criticism has no hold. But taking essence as the truth of which freedom is merely the expression goes against Pannenberg's attempt to read earlier logical categories as anticipating a future of their truth in later ones.

Pannenberg makes an important contribution by arguing that Hegel's self-understanding is wrong inasmuch as it denies the importance of the future in the movement of the *Logic*. But Pannenberg's interpretation of the relation between essence and freedom is also wrong. On the basis of my earlier analyses of selected portions of

Hegel's texts, I hope to give a more coherent account of the place of temporality in general, and the future in particular, in the *Logic*.

Hegel's exposition of reflection makes clear that that which is prior as opposed to posterior is not a given origin. That which is posterior posits that which is prior, and posits it as *prior* by *pre*-positing it. Clinging to the myth of a given origin¹⁰ sets up a deterministic idea of necessity that wrongly opposes necessity and freedom. The manifestation of necessity as freedom is the disclosure that that which is prior is what it is only by virtue of that which is posterior to it. I want to argue that the relation of prior and posterior in reflection is a temporal relation. In temporal terms, the freedom that Hegel articulates is the power of the future over the past.

It is precisely for the sake of freedom that Hegel rejects all temporal interpretations of logical movement. In time as Hegel understands it, the concept is outside itself. Time by its very nature opens up the opposition between internal and external that denies freedom, since freedom is being "*at home with oneself*" precisely in one's other.¹¹ The future specifically is no more than "the being of nonbeing."¹²

Hegel's opposition between time and freedom, and his particular neglect of the future, rest upon a simplistic understanding of time as the mutual externality of the three modes of past, present, and future. Like Augustine long before him, he starts with the problem of how to relate these three as radically distinct modes. Augustine's reflections lead him to say that the simple past and the simple future have no being. They *are not*, since only the present *is*. The disunity of the temporal modes threatens to destroy the idea of time. Augustine responds to the threat by interpreting time as a complex present. "Nor is it properly said: there are three times—past, present and future. But perhaps it would be properly said: there are three times—a present of past things, a present of present things, a present of future things."¹³

Augustine thus took some first steps in what Niklas Luhmann calls the "manifold modalization"¹⁴ of time. The simple temporal modalities can be reflexively modalized. For example, one can speak of a past present. This is the basic domain of historical research. Martin Luther King's speech at the end of the Selma march was a present event at a certain point in 1964. Historical investigation now treats it as belonging to the past, distinct from the present, that is, a past present. It would be bad historiography to interpret the speech without qualifications in the context of U.S. society at the beginning of the

1990s. But Dr. King's speech is also a present past. It is present by empowering and giving hope to social movements today.

There is likewise an essential distinction between the future present and the present future. Projections that simply extrapolate from present trends treat the future as a future present. It is not yet present, but one day it will be. A present future is a future that, while still coming upon our present, already shapes that present. Again Dr. King's speech at the end of the Selma march provides a helpful example. As Dr. King neared the conclusion of his speech he invoked the vision of "a day not of the white man, not of the black man," but "of man as man." Of the three simple temporal modalities, Dr. King is referring to the future. Dr. King continues by anticipating the natural question about that future.

I know you are asking today, "How long will it take?" I come to say to you this afternoon however difficult the moment, however frustrating the hour, it will not be long, because truth pressed to earth will rise again.

How long? Not long, because no lie can live forever.

How long? Not long, because you still reap what you sow.

So far it is possible to interpret Dr. King with the simple idea of the future. According to Dr. King that future is not distant, but it is still future. But then he says something that does not make sense in simple temporal modalities. "How long? Not long. Because the arm of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice." The time until the advent of the just future is simultaneously long and not long. The continuation removes the apparent contradiction. "How long? Not long, 'cause mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord." The coming of justice in its glory is not merely future, be that future far off or near. The coming of justice is already visible. Dr. King has already seen it—most immediately in the march from Selma to Montgomery, whose successful completion he is helping to celebrate. The future, without ceasing to be future, is already present. It is present as having already been present in the past. It is a present future that is at the same time a present past. In the immediately past event of the Selma march, and in the more distant past of Freedom Rides, the Montgomery bus boycott, and other events of the Civil Rights Movement, the future was present. Since those events live in Dr. King's speech as present past, the future that was present in them also lives in the present of his speech. It is a present past future present. The Lord of the

just future “*has loosed the fateful lightning of his terrible swift sword. His truth is marching on.*”¹⁵

Temporal modalities are not the only modalities open to this kind of reflexive modalization. The logical modalities of actuality, possibility, and necessity are also open to the same type of operation.¹⁶ Without the language of reflexive modalities, I might speak simply of the possibility of my playing volleyball this evening. Using the language of reflexive modalities, I can distinguish between my playing volleyball this evening as a possible actuality and as an actual possibility. In the former case, I envision my spouse and myself out in the backyard after supper, knocking a ball back and forth across a net. I recognize that that event is not yet the case, but that, come this evening, it will be. If I speak of my playing volleyball this evening as an actual possibility, I focus on those actualities that enable me to play this evening: having access to a net, a ball, and someone with whom to play; not being locked in a prison cell or otherwise confined; having the physical capacity to move the body parts required to hit the ball; and so forth. A whole range of actualities constitute the possibility of my playing volleyball this evening.

In Hegelian terms, the example just given would illustrate real actuality and real possibility. The analysis of real possibility makes clear that it is itself actuality, although not the same actuality as that of which it is the possibility. This identification of actuality and possibility is crucial to Hegel’s understanding of necessity, and ultimately of necessity manifest as freedom, as the full identity in difference of actuality and possibility. Hegel uses the reflexivity of modal determinations to posit the identity of actuality and possibility, though he does not use the language of reflexive modal determinations. His exposition shows them.

Hegel could have gone much further in showing types of relation of actuality and possibility. He limits his options by discussing actuality and possibility in abstraction from time. The logical modalities actuality, possibility, and necessity are closely related to the temporal modalities of past, present, and future. Last night this day that is now coming to a close was future. It was full of possibilities: weeding the garden, reading another commentator on Hegel, taking the car to the garage. Now this day is mostly past, and many of what were once possibilities for it are no longer possibilities for it. It is too dark to weed and the garage is closed.

Although both the *Encyclopedia* and the *Phenomenology* contain extended discussions of time, nowhere does Hegel discuss at length the particular temporal modalities and their relations among themselves. Time in general is the relation that Hegel describes as "negativity that abstractly *relates itself to itself*."¹⁷ Hegel adds that "in this abstraction is not yet any real difference."¹⁸ Hegel presents what amounts to a reflexive modalization of actuality and possibility in his discussion of the reality of these modalities. Temporal difference as merely temporal is not yet real. This does not mean that there is no temporal difference. Rather that difference is indifferent diversity. Time is negativity "appearing as indifferent over against the restful juxtaposition."¹⁹ The analysis of the determinations of reflection in the Doctrine of Essence makes clear that diversity is difference in abstraction from its opposition, indeed from its contradictory nature. This abstraction qualifies temporal difference as unreal.

Since time has no real difference, it is purely ideal. "Time . . . is likewise a simply abstract, ideal."²⁰ Its ideality consists in its immediate identification of being and nonbeing. Time "is being that, in that it *is*, is *not*, and in that it is *not*, *is*."²¹ The immediate identity of being and nonbeing is, according to the logic of Being, becoming. But Hegel does not equate time directly with becoming. Time is "becoming, but *intuited* becoming."²²

Intuition is for Hegel a way in which spirit relates to itself. It is spirit's relating to itself as external to itself. At the conclusion of the *Phenomenology* Hegel writes of "the *externalization* in which spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*, intuiting its pure *self* as *time outside* it [i.e., outside spirit]."²³ Time "is the *external*, intuited pure self, *not grasped* by the self."²⁴ Time is not simply becoming, but specifically intuited becoming, because time is external self-relation. "The differences that are, to be sure, simply *momentary*—i.e., that immediately sublate themselves—are determined as *external*: i.e., however, external to *themselves*."²⁵

It is because time is *intuited* becoming that Hegel can speak of it as "restful juxtaposition." Simple becoming "is an unstable unrest."²⁶ Becoming comes to rest only by disappearing into determinate being, which is its "restful result."²⁷ Time must be becoming that has determinate being. Hegel opens his discussion of time in the concluding section of the *Phenomenology* by asserting that time *is* the determi-

nate being of spirit: that is, of spirit as concept. "*Time is the concept itself that is there.*"²⁸

Hegel's remarks on time call to mind three categories of the *Logic*. Along with becoming and determinate being, Hegel invokes the category of diversity when he says that indifference characterizes time. Since the *Logic* presents diversity as a form of difference, the reference to diversity helps clarify Hegel's assertion that time has no real difference. Time is indifferent difference. Like all becoming, time is the process of immediate difference. But time is also the indifference of determinate being into which becoming collapses. Time is a contradictory unity of becoming and determinate being.

The second moment of reflection is external reflection. Since time is spirit's externally intuited self, the exposition of time ought to connect it structurally with instances of the second moment of reflective movement. Diversity is the subject of the second subsection of the second part of the second chapter of the first section of the Doctrine of Essence, which is itself the second book of Objective Logic. Although reflection does not belong to the exposition of the Doctrine of Being, reflection must be the true movement of being, since essence is the truth of being. From the perspective of the Doctrine of Essence, second moments in the triadic structures of the Doctrine of Being evince something of the externality of the second moment of reflection. Determinate being is the subject of the second chapter of the first section of the Doctrine of Being. Within the chapter on determinate being, the second part focuses on finitude. It is "the finite" that Hegel characterizes as "transitory and *temporal*."²⁹

Finitude and temporality are both predicates of the natural: "the natural is subjected to time, insofar as it [i.e., the natural] is finite."³⁰ Hegel's treatment of time in the *Encyclopedia* falls within the section of that work devoted to the philosophy of nature. The *Phenomenology* presents spirit in the historical process of becoming itself. Up to this point I have interlaced comments on time from the two works without raising the possibility that they present two different views of time. Does Hegel differentiate natural from historical time?

We have seen that in the *Encyclopedia* Hegel defines time as "*intuited becoming*." The *Phenomenology* calls time "the concept that is only intuited."³¹ The concept that is only intuited is spirit's externalized self. More precisely, it is the externalized process of spirit's

becoming itself. In its self-externalization, "spirit presents its becoming spirit in the form of *free contingent happening*."³² In this presentation spirit is "intuiting its pure *self* as *time* outside it [i.e., outside spirit] and likewise its *being* as space."³³ The "free contingent happening" that spirit presents for its intuition of itself comprises time and space.

The very next sentence explicitly identifies space with nature: "This its [i.e., spirit's] latter becoming, *nature*, is its living immediate becoming."³⁴ In the structure of the immediately preceding sentence, just quoted, time is one side of becoming and space is the other. The next sentence in the text picks up the first side of spirit's becoming, time, and identifies it with history. "But the other side of its becoming, *history*, is becoming that *knows*, becoming that *mediates* itself—spirit externalized in time."³⁵ The earlier reference to time as "free contingent happening" already anticipated, by means of a German wordplay that the translation does not reproduce, the identification of time with history. "Happening" translates *Geschehen*, while "history" translates *Geschichte*. History is that which happens.

Yet in the text "free contingent happening" comprises space as well as time. In what way is space history? Both space and time are the externalized process of spirit becoming itself. Space as nature is spirit's *immediate* becoming. Time as history is spirit's becoming that *mediates* itself. Space as nature "is in its determinate being nothing but this eternal externalization of its *subsisting* and the movement that produces the *subject*."³⁶ History presupposes nature, for without the subject, which emerges from the movement of nature, it would be impossible to speak of history as spirit's *self*-mediation. Only if there is a subject can there be self-relation.

Hegel's analysis of presupposition in the logic of reflection makes clear that nature as history's presupposition has its being only by virtue of history. Nature is not something static over against history. It is nothing other than the movement of externalization that issues in history, the movement that produces the subject that makes history possible. Like nature, history is externalization. But in the case of history, "this externalization is likewise the externalization of itself."³⁷ History is externalization of externalization. Hegel also speaks of the externalization of space or extension as substance. Time is that externalization's self-externalization.³⁸ History is simple externalization, which is nature, reflexively externalizing itself. In so doing nature transcends itself, for nature isolated as nature is selfless. Isolating

nature as nature abstracts from what nature in truth is. Nature is prior to history only by being pre-posed by history. Taken abstractly, nature is movement without a subject. The subject that is mover of this movement is constitutive of history, posterior to nature. The mover is not yet at hand in the movement of nature taken in isolation. The mover is not some substrate given prior to the movement. That is, the mover is not past in relation to the movement. Nor is the mover ever exhausted by what has already been given of the movement up till now. The movement can not wholly contain the mover *within* itself, for the mover's presence is the *externalization* of the movement.

Hegel describes history as a succession of spirits. Speaking of the process of becoming that is history, he writes: "This becoming presents a sluggish movement and succession of spirits."³⁹ The final sentence of the *Phenomenology* speaks again of those spirits whose succession is history. But this time Hegel echoes the language of "free contingent happening" with which he earlier characterized time and space. "Their [i.e., the spirits'] preservation, regarded from the side of their *free* determinate being appearing in the form of *contingency*, is *history*, but regarded from the side of their conceptually grasped organization it is the *science of appearing knowing*."⁴⁰ The free contingent *Geschehen* that comprises time and space is free contingent *Geschichte*.

The sentence just quoted continues: "both together, conceptually grasped history . . ."⁴¹ Just as Hegel speaks of time in two internally related senses, so he speaks also of history. History as simply an external succession of spirits, as merely contingent happening, is natural time. This entails no confusion of nature and history. Since nature is a moment of history, natural time is a moment of historical time. History in the more complex sense, what I have also termed *historical time*, is conceptually grasped contingency. It is the activity of conceptual grasping that separates the latter sense of history from the former.

Being grasped conceptually does not dehistoricize history any more than being grasped conceptually detemporalizes time in the passage considered earlier. The *Phenomenology's* closing thought on history makes that earlier discussion of the "annihilation" of time clearer. Time as merely a moment of nature gives way to properly historical time.⁴² This time is not merely contingent succession. Its contingency coheres in being conceptually grasped.

Since the movement of nature can be articulated only in the vocabulary of history, talk of the opposition between natural and historical

time can be misleading. It is better to say that Hegel opposes abstractly natural to concretely historical time.⁴³ Time is "*abstracting that is*," which Hegel identifies with Chronos.⁴⁴ The abstracting of time lies in time's unmitigated externality. The analysis of the *Phenomenology* showed that time, identical with history, is the presence of subjectivity. But time is only "abstract subjectivity."⁴⁵ "Time is the same principle as the 'I = I' of pure self-consciousness, but the same [i.e., the same principle] or the simple concept still in its entire externality and abstraction."⁴⁶

Hegel also calls the temporal modalities of past, present, and future "the abstract moments of the unity that the becoming [i.e., the becoming that is time] is."⁴⁷ The "totality or reality" of the concept of time consists in abstract modalities each being "posited for itself as the whole . . . but under opposed determinations."⁴⁸

By this point in the analysis it might seem that Hegel does not so much distinguish between abstract time and concrete time as simply consider time abstract. I know of only one passage where Hegel refers explicitly to time, more specifically to the present, as concrete. The reference is not a casual one, for Hegel identifies the concrete present with the true present. The context is a discussion of the individual modalities of past, present, and future. The discussion issues in an Augustinian conclusion about the nonbeing of the simple past and the simple future. "In the positive sense of time one can therefore say: Only the present is; the before and after is not. But the concrete present is the result of the past, and it is pregnant with the future. The true present is thus eternity."⁴⁹

This description of the concrete present is Hegel's most explicit step toward a reflexive modalization of time. The concrete present includes both a present past and a present future. But in its concreteness time is no longer time, but eternity. Hegel rejects the attempt to think eternity apart from time. He says explicitly that "time itself is in its concept eternal."⁵⁰ To conceive time is not to leave the modalities of past, present, and future abstractly external to each other. Although Hegel refers to that abstraction as time, he is just as explicit in saying that the concept of time, time's truth, is not something other than and opposed to time. "Time as time is its concept."⁵¹

This passage from the *Encyclopedia* closely parallels the text in the *Phenomenology* that describes time as "the concept that is only intuited."⁵² The sublation of the form of time occurs when the concept

"conceives intuiting and is conceived and conceiving intuiting."⁵³ The intuiting is still there, but now it is conceived. Time is still there, but now it is in its concept, and thus eternal.⁵⁴

But Hegel also says that "it is the truth of time that its goal is not the future, but the past."⁵⁵ One could hardly ask for a clearer expression of the primacy of the past among the temporal modalities.⁵⁶ It would seem that the truth of time cancels time, devaluing the future to a transitional vehicle for returning to a truth that has already arrived.

This conclusion, though, assumes a linear model of time. Hegel proposes a different model. "Circular movement is the spatial or subsistent unity of the dimensions of time."⁵⁷ Hegel's explanation of this model is not as consistently one-sided as his claim that the past, rather than the future, is the goal of time. Speaking of a point moving in circular fashion, Hegel says that "that which it has behind it is at the same time that to which it will only later come; and it was already at the 'before' at which it arrives."⁵⁸ If before and after, prior and posterior, past and future are identical to that extent, then the past can not be the truth of time to the exclusion of the future. In the figure of the circle the past is at the same time a future at which that which is in movement has not yet arrived.

Yet ultimately Hegel's very choice of a circular model of time, or at least his presentation of that model, gives primacy to the past over the future. "Circular movement is the spatial or subsistent unity of the dimensions of time." Both space and subsistence are static categories.⁵⁹ They abstract from the very movement that Hegel claims to express with his circular model. Their temporal modality is a past that is already there and perdures immune to the changes of time.

The question is how much Hegel's circular model does justice to the concept of time at work in Hegel's texts. The moments of before and after in circular movement are only superficially reminiscent of what I have termed the *prior and posterior moments of reflection*. According to my reading in chapter 2, reflection is a movement of *transcendence* and *advent*. For that which is prior or "before" in the movement of reflection, to be is to be transcended. For that which is posterior or "after," to be is to be in advent, to be a present future. The model of a circle reduces transcendence and advent to *return*. The moving point arrives at the same place where it has already been.

Admittedly, Hegel does not corroborate this account of what is going on in the movement of reflection, since he takes reflection to be

atemporal. But even Hegel's explicit analysis of time exceeds the possibilities of the circular model. According to Hegel true time, or eternity, consists in the simultaneity of past, present, and future.⁶⁰ This simultaneity is not the obliteration of the differences between the three modalities, for that would reduce eternity to timelessness. A circle is better suited than a line to illustrate this simultaneity, since the center from which a circle originates is not itself a point in the circle. It is neither before nor after any of the successive points that comprise the circle. Its relation to each point of the circle is simultaneous with its relation to any other point of the circle. But since it is not any of the successive points of the circle, it buys this simultaneity at the cost of timelessness. The simultaneity exists only by removal from time. As we have seen, Hegel rejects this idea of temporal simultaneity, which, in its removal from time, is no longer temporal.

Hegel's approach in the *Encyclopedia* is to use the points of the circle themselves to illustrate temporal simultaneity. Any point on the circle is both a "before" and an "after." In it both *past* and *future* are *present*. The shortcoming of the model here is that it does not distinguish the future from the past. Arrival at what was once the future un.masks it as nothing other than a past that was already there. By reducing advent to return, Hegel's model reduces the future to the past. For this model it is indeed "the truth of time that its goal is not the future, but the past."⁶¹

Hegel identifies the past with actuality. "For the past is the preservation of the present, as actuality, but the future is the opposite of that. It is rather that which is without shape. . . . Therefore there can not be intuited any shape at all in the future."⁶² The *Logic* argues that the truth of actuality is penultimately necessity, and ultimately freedom. The preceding quotation identifies the past with freedom by way of actuality. It opposes the future in its lack of contour to actuality, and thus to freedom.

Identifying the past with freedom depends on identifying the goal of time with the purpose of the concept. The transition from the Doctrine of Essence to the Doctrine of the Concept argues that the truth of necessity is freedom and the concept. The *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* pick up this same pattern, but with the addition of the term "purpose." "Necessity according to its higher concept, *real necessity*, freedom, is then freedom as such, the concept as such or, more precisely determined, *purpose*." "In purpose begins the *determinate*

being of the concept in general, of the free that exists as free.”⁶³ The *Logic* had already anticipated the latter formulation: “purpose is the concept itself in its existence.”⁶⁴

Freedom exists as purposefulness. The past is the goal of time, according to the circular model. The relation of the past to freedom is as close as the relation of time’s goal to the concept’s purpose—and as distant. Purposefulness presupposes subjectivity, because only a subject pursues the realization of purposes. Teleology, the interpretation of objective actuality in terms of purposes, “presupposes a concept, something *determined in and for itself* and thus something self-determining.”⁶⁵

Time is the concept outside of itself. Only by finding itself in time, and thus going beyond time in its illusory opposition to the concept, can the concept manifest itself as self-determining. The intratemporal goal of time according to Hegel’s circular model, the past, is not yet manifest as purpose, since purpose is the self-determination of the concept. In the sense in which time is concept, but only in this sense, is time’s goal the concept’s purpose. Purpose can not be predicated of time in its opposition to the concept any more than freedom can.

When Hegel uses the category of actuality to describe the past as “the preservation of the present, as actuality,” he is not considering time in its opposition to the concept. In the language of the *Phenomenology*, he is not considering history in its merely contingent aspect. He is talking about “conceptually grasped history,”⁶⁶ the union of history as contingent happening and of the “science of appearing knowing.”

In Hegel’s analysis reflection reduces freedom to domination, because reflection could not articulate a return that is not a return to something fixed as already given. The manifestation of necessity as freedom has made clear that there is no given that is not itself posited. Spirit as concept is not subject *to* determinations imposed from without. It is the subject *of* its own determinations.

But it is not their substrate. It is only in its returning from its determinations. It is not a self prior to them. The concept has *being* only in *becoming* itself. Better, the concept has being only in *coming* to itself. We should not be misled by the grammar of “coming to itself” into thinking that there is a sort of prior other, already fixed and given, to which the concept comes. The concept’s self is already present, but present as coming. It is a present future.⁶⁷

Hegel associates the future with possibility by criticizing both of them for the same deficiency. On their own they are both vacuous.

Hegel holds that possibility must be actual and the future must already be present if they are to be concrete. I have argued that Hegel's understanding of the relation of time to eternity offers the potential for developing an idea of the present future, although Hegel does very little to exploit this potential. I would like to make a similar point about Hegel's understanding of the relation of possibility to actuality, and then to use that point to clarify further the dimension of temporality in Hegel's logical thought.

The *Logic's* chapter on actuality begins by giving clear primacy to actuality over possibility. Possibility—along with actuality in the narrower sense—is but a moment of actuality in the fuller sense. The chapter works through the relation of the moments of possibility and actuality until it arrives at their identity, which it terms necessity. In establishing necessity as the relation of possibility and actuality, the mediating moment is possibility. In part A the contradictory character of formal possibility initiates the emergence of contingency and formal necessity. In part B the contradictoriness of real possibility leads to real necessity. In the relation of actuality and possibility, actuality is the moment of immediacy and possibility is the moment of reflection into self. Actuality is structurally parallel to being, while possibility is parallel to essence. Far from being made subordinate to actuality, possibility is actuality's essence.

Within the exposition of necessity there is a final attempt to think the relation of possibility and actuality in the category of actuality. Necessity presents its moments as supposedly free actualities. The manifestation of necessity as freedom unmask the supposed freedom of these actualities. The truth of necessity is freedom in a sense that the vocabulary of actuality can not articulate. In freedom, being posited is not subordinate to being in and for itself. Reflection is not subordinate to immediacy. Essence is not subordinate to being. Possibility is not subordinate to actuality.

The possible is actual, but not by being subsumed under actuality. Possibility is not merely deficient actuality or would-be actuality that is not yet actualized. Just as there is an actualizing of possibility, there is also a 'possibilizing' of actuality. This 'possibilizing' is the difference between freedom and the illusory freedom of necessity as actuality.

This 'possibilizing' takes the form of actual possibility. Actual possibility is not simply a possibility that has been actualized and thus passed from possibility to actuality. It is a possibility that *acts pre-*

cisely in its power *as possibility*. Actual possibility in this sense interlaces logical modalities with temporal modalities, and reflexively relates both forms of modalities. The actualization of actual possibility remains future, but the possibility already acts in the present. Actual possibility is present future.

Hegel is suspicious of the categories of both possibility and the future because they seem to him to open the door to empty abstraction. Yet his exposition of freedom as the true relation of actuality and possibility precludes subsuming possibility under actuality. On the contrary, it suggests the idea of actual possibility introduced above.

Hegel's exposition does not explicitly develop the ideas of actual possibility and present future toward which it implicitly points. Within the logic of actuality, possibility is the structural parallel of essence within the entire *Logic*. Hegel correlates essence with the past, albeit a timeless one. "Essence is being that is past, but timelessly past."⁶⁸ Hegel strengthens the link between essence and the past by explicating essence as the "interiorizing remembrance" of being. He notes that the root of the verb *sich erinnern* (*to remember*) is *inner* (*internal*). Being "remembers itself through its nature, and through this going into itself becomes essence."⁶⁹ This same connection between the past and that which is internal characterizes possibility in its structural parallel to essence. Within actuality, possibility is the determination of reflection *into* self.

The truth of essence, which transcends the perspective of the Doctrine of Essence, is the manifestation of necessity as freedom. Apart from this manifestation necessity is merely internal. In manifestation the internal and the external are identical, although they do not collapse into a homogeneous unity. There is no "going into self" that is not also a "going out of self." The truth of essence is that essence's movement inward is also a movement outward. The movement inward's attempt to find a grounding in the past necessarily leads to a movement outward.

I use the idea of "grounding" because in the first section of the Doctrine of Essence, the inward movement of essence moves toward the category of "ground." Hegel plays on the literal sense of "to go to the ground" in the idiom *zu Grunde gehen* (*to collapse*). In going to its ground, the inward movement of essence collapses. It turns into an outward movement, the movement into existence. The search for a ground in the internal past finds only a ground that is none. The Thing that "steps into existence" "steps out of the ground only insofar

as it [i.e., the ground] has gone to the *ground* and is none [i.e., no ground], out of the groundless: i.e., out of its [i.e., the Thing's] own essential negativity or pure form."⁷⁰

As we have seen, a merely outward movement is no truer than a merely inward movement. Their mutual truth is their identity in manifestation. Manifestation identifies the groundedness presupposed by the inward movement of essence and the groundlessness from which emerged the external movement into existence. Contingency is the unstable form of the unity of groundedness and groundlessness. Necessity is the fixed form of their identity. In freedom the identity of groundedness and groundlessness, of the internal and the external coheres without becoming fixed. In freedom their identity is actual, yet no actual identity ever puts a stop to the advent of new possibilities for identity.

Initially the inward movement of essence is a remembrance of the past, of a ground that is "behind" and "within." But that ground is no ground. The movement of essence becomes outward and forward. In the section on appearance, which immediately follows the treatment of ground, the movement outward occurs at the expense of the movement inward. This is in keeping with the position of the section on appearance within the Doctrine of Essence as a whole. It is the second section, which makes it parallel to external reflection as the second moment of reflection. Like external reflection proper, appearance is an instance of the dispersion in externality that for Hegel is the deficiency of time.

The truth or concept of time is not its simple dispersion into past, present, and future, but the differentiated identity of past and future in what Hegel calls the true present or eternity. Similarly the truth of essence is the differentiated identity of the internal and the external in manifestation. Just as there is nothing internal in abstraction from that which is external and vice versa, so there is no past in abstraction from the future and vice versa.

We have seen that necessity is an inadequate form of the differentiated identity that is manifestation. It is inadequate because in articulating manifestation it gives primacy to actuality over possibility. Although the logic of actuality in general is the logic of manifestation, possibility is the mediating moment of this logic. The movement of manifestation hinges on possibility. Freedom is the truth of necessity by manifesting the movement that necessity freezes in the opposition

of the supposedly free actualities. Freedom reasserts the dynamism of possibility against this fixed form of actuality. In so doing it is the truth of actuality.

Freedom is "*the manner of relation of the concept*."⁷¹ The concept is not temporal in the sense of being in time. It is eternal, "the power of time." "But the concept . . . is in and for itself absolute negativity and freedom. Therefore time is not its power, nor is it in time and something temporal, but rather *it* is the power of time. . . . The idea, spirit, is *eternal*."⁷² Hegel pairs freedom with eternity in relation to time.

Chapter 1 of this study noted that the *Phenomenology* qualifies the intratemporal as contingent. That chapter closed with a question about the relation of contingency, necessity, and freedom, on the one hand, to time and eternity on the other. The analysis of the chapter on actuality in the *Logic* has shown that necessity and contingency are not mutually exclusive. The sense of real necessity is that, given a contingent beginning x , y necessarily follows. The sense of absolute necessity is that such a contingent beginning is not simply external and foreign to necessity.⁷³ One could say that contingency is integral to necessity. Hegel goes further. He identifies the two. Contingency is not just something external that necessity makes use of to be necessity. It is not a mere form in which necessity is clothed. Contingency is necessity's self-determination.

This determination is not deterministic, for two reasons.⁷⁴ First, the content of the determination is contingency.⁷⁵ Second, the determination is not a process of unfolding from some prior given. The absence of any such given is what distinguishes freedom from necessity. The two points are correlative. As long as necessity is conceived as the relation of a prior event or circumstance entailing a posterior one, it is impossible to identify the contingent with the necessary. The determination of the later event by the prior one precludes the later event being contingent. Hegel does not think necessity in such a simple line from prior to posterior. The logic of reflection that plays itself out in absolute necessity moves just as much from the posterior to the prior. That which is posterior poses that which is prior as its own pre-sup-position.

Contingency is necessity's content. Since necessity does not disappear in freedom, neither does contingency. The free and eternal concept does not spell the disappearance of the intratemporal in its contingency.⁷⁶ The free concept is "absolute negativity" that relativizes any and all prior givens. That which is finite, temporal, and contin-

gent has a “one-sided” relation to this absolute negativity, because it relates to this negativity as to an external “power.” But this negativity is the “universal essence” of time.⁷⁷ The universal essence of time is the free concept whose determinations are intratemporal and contingent. The concept is not some other behind or beyond time. It is the negativity that em-powers time. This empowering negativity is the freedom that possibilizes the actual.

Hegel calls this freedom eternal rather than temporal, because he generally uses the term *time* in the sense of external succession. With the help of the idea of reflexive modalization I have argued that it is incorrect to reduce time to external succession. In the language of reflexive modalization, Hegel’s understanding of freedom gives primacy to actual possibility as present future. Hegel claims that the *Logic* presents an atemporal content. Substantively the *Logic* articulates that primacy of the present future that I would like to term the *temporality of freedom*.

7

Conclusion

According to the movement of reflection that finds its truth in freedom, nothing is simply given. Something is in and for itself only inasmuch as it is posited. It is immediate only inasmuch as it is mediated. But Hegel explicitly rejects interpreting in temporal terms the transcendence of every given. The *Logic* is concerned not with the intratemporal, but with "God as God is in God's eternal essence." Not only does the word "essence" itself call to mind the second major division in the structure of the *Logic* but also Hegel places the divine eternal essence "before the creation of nature and of a finite spirit." In this eternal "before" echoes Hegel's claim that the reflective movement of essence is "timelessly past."

We have seen that eternity does not entail abstraction from time. The discussion of eternity in the *Encyclopedia* also makes clear that "timeless" does not mean "outside of time," for placing something outside of time reduces it to a moment of time. It becomes a time after time. I propose that Hegel equates "timeless" with "eternal." The concept is eternal. The concept is also the truth and identity of being and essence. The concept is being whose immediacy is mediated by the reflective movement of essence. Essence is not somehow outside of the concept. It is the concept's own mediation. Since the concept is eternal, essence is also eternal. It is this eternity to which Hegel refers when he qualifies essence as timelessly past. Similarly in the oral addition to §258, Hegel defines eternity as "absolute timelessness." "Absolute timelessness is different from duration; that is *eternity*, which is without natural time."¹

The essential movement of the concept is timeless in the sense that it is not simply in time. On the other hand, it is not abstracted from

time. Earlier argument has pointed out that "time itself in its concept," "time as time," is eternal. Hegel can call essence, and the eternal in general, timeless only because he restricts his understanding of time to external succession.

Here I differ from the interpretation of Robert Jenson, with whose reading of Hegel in general I agree wholeheartedly. According to Jenson, in Hegel's thought "Aristotle's question, 'What is anything *always*, i.e., so long as it is real?' is given the surprising answer: 'open to the future.'" Hegel creates "a picture of reality in which every given position of thought and reality is true to itself only in that it overcomes its own fixed and given actuality." But then Jenson argues that in Hegel "the search for the meaning of what happens is understood as the search for the *necessity* of what happens, for a 'logical' necessity determined by the transcendental laws of thought, that is, by the nature of an unchanging reality. . . . 'Freedom' itself is thus understood as the superiority to the contingencies of history of a subjectivity which is 'free' precisely in that nothing can alter its self-determination, in that it is unchangingly itself."²

As is clear from my presentation, I do not think that the "timelessness" of essence refers to "the transcendental laws of thought," or to any other "unchanging reality." The concept is free not by dominating contingency and thus preserving itself unchanged. It is itself by *becoming* itself through ever new contingencies. Apart from embodiment in these contingencies there is neither concept nor logic. I would make my own a question posed by Pierre-Jean Labarrière: "Would it not be more precise to say that the concept is not concept except 'outside' of the concept (that the logic is not logic except 'outside' of the logic)?"³

Hegel's restricted idea of time as external succession precludes talking about the determinative presence of the future, even though the movement of reflection that finds its fulfillment in freedom strongly suggests such a presence. His restricted understanding of time also precludes talking about actual possibility in the sense I have presented. More accurately, his restricted idea of time goes hand in hand with a restricted sense of possibility. In only one passage, and that in an oral addition, does Hegel refer to the future positively in articulating the meaning of eternity. Within the chapter on actuality, possibility is the mediating moment for the advance from the immediate to the mediated senses of actuality. Then in the movement from the ostensibly free actualities of necessity to genuine freedom, Hegel no longer refers to

possibility. I have tried to show that the content of Hegel's concept of freedom is the openness of new possibilities despite whatever is already given. Hegel's reluctance to use the language of possibility at this point reflects his adherence to a traditional understanding of possibility as "a lacking."⁴ On that understanding possibility is deficient actuality, actuality that is not yet actualized. In his treatment of real possibility, Hegel points out that every possibility is also an actuality. But the revolutionary move over against the traditional understanding comes when the concept of freedom unmasks the show of freedom in the "free" actualities. In relativizing all prior givens, the free concept is 'postdetermining.' It gives new possibility where possibility seemed to be already exhausted in its actualization.

Hegel's vocabulary, though, remains more traditional than his thought, so he refuses to use the term *possibility* at this level. Hegel understands both the future and possibility under the rubric of "not yet" or "beyond" [*Jenseits*]. The future is a "beyond," not yet present. The future *is not*, since it not yet *is*. Possibility is actuality that has not yet been actualized.⁵

I suspect that the same relation of "not yet" that governs Hegel's restricted sense of possibility and the future also governs the thought of many of those who criticize him for being a reactionary defender of the status quo. Since the category of "not yet" controls Hegel's use of the terms *possibility* and *future*, it is not surprising that interpreters read him in accordance with that category. When Hegel says that "the present is what is highest,"⁶ critics think that in rejecting an empty not-yet, Hegel has lost the critical leverage provided by the future over against the present. I hope to have shown that for Hegel the present is never fixed. It has being only in becoming, or more precisely in the present *coming* of the future.

Notes

Preface

1. “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich; und was wirklich ist, das ist vernünftig.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie*, 1818–1831, vol. 2, *Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen*, 1821–1825, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart: Frommann; Bad Canstatt: Holzboog, 1974), 70, lines 28–29; translated as *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, ed. Allen W. Wood, trans. H.B. Nisbet, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 20, Nisbet. All translations appearing in the text are the author’s own, except where noted by giving the translator’s name after the page number of the cited English source.

Chapter 1: Hegel’s Explicit Analysis of Time

1. “die Darstellung Gottes ist, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen, vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines endlichen Geistes ist” (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 11, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Erster Band: Die objektive Logik*, 1812/1813 ed., ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978], 21, 19–21). Although *er* is the correct German translation of *he*, *he* is often not the correct English translation of *er*. In German, *er* is the proper nominative pronoun to stand for any masculine noun: for example, *a tree* [*ein Baum*]. In English *tree* is not a masculine noun. We do not usually refer to a tree as *he*. Likewise, *God* is not a masculine noun. I have accordingly simply repeated *God* where Hegel substitutes *er*.

I shall cite from the *Gesammelte Werke* by using the abbreviation *GW*, followed by the specific volume number, page number, and line number. I do not cite an English reference for citations from the introduction and the major section on Being of 1812, since the existing English translations all work from the substantially revised edition of 1832.

2. “das angeschaute bloße Werden,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 19,

Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1827), ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Hans-Christian Lucas (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989), § 258, 192, 23–24; translated as *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*, vol. 1, *Introduction, Foreword and Mechanics*, ed. and trans. M. J. Petry (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), 230, 13–14. In citations from the *Enzyklopädie* the paragraph number will precede the page number. For the English citation I shall use *PN*, followed by the page number and the line number.

3. “das Seyn, das, indem es *ist*, *nicht* ist, und indem es *nicht* ist, *ist*” (GW 19, § 258, 192, 12–13; PN 229, 32–230, 1, Petry).

4. “Was die Wahrheit ist, ist weder das Seyn, noch das Nichts, sondern daß das Seyn in Nichts, und das Nichts in Sein,—nicht übergeht,—sondern übergegangen ist. . . . Ihre Wahrheit ist also diese *Bewegung* des unmittelbaren Verschwindens des einen in dem andern; *das Werden*” (GW 11, 44, 22–28).

5. “das angeschaute bloße *Werden*, das reine Insichseyn als schlechthin ein Außersich-kommen” (GW 19, § 258, 192, 23–25; PN 230, 13–15).

6. “Diese Aufopferung ist die Entäusserung, in welcher der Geist sein Werden zum Geiste, in der Form des *freyen, zufälligen Geschehens* darstellt, sein reines *Selbst*, als *die Zeit* . . . anschauend.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 9, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980), 433, 5–8; translated as *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 492. I shall cite the English text as *PhS*.

7. “Das Wahre . . . die Idee, der Geist, ist *ewig*” (GW 19, § 258, 193, 15–16; PN 231, 9–10).

8. “Der Begriff der Ewigkeit muß aber nicht negativ so gefaßt werden, daß sie die Abstraktion von der Zeit sey oder außerhalb derselben gleichsam existire” (GW 19, § 258, 193, 16–18; PN 231, 10–12). This passage contradicts Martin Heidegger’s claim that for Hegel, spirit is “properly external to” [*eigentlich außer*] time. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 15th ed., rev. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979), 435.

9. “Aber die Zeit selbst ist in ihrem Begriffe ewig.” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Theorie Werkausgabe*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 9, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Zweiter Teil: Die Naturphilosophie mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*, 1830 ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), § 258, Zu., 50; PN 231, 38–39. I shall cite the Moldenhauer and Michel edition as *TW* 9, and use it when referring to oral additions. Although it is not sound scholarship to advance arguments solely on the basis of the oral additions, they are useful in clarifying and amplifying lines of thought present in Hegel’s actual texts.

10. “Die Zeit als Zeit ist ihr Begriff” (*TW* 9, § 258, Zu., 50; PN 231, 39–232, 1).

11. “der Begriff, an ihm selbst die totale Negativität . . . Der Begriff . . . ist an und für sich die absolute Negativität” (GW 19, § 258, 193, 7–11; PN 230, 35–231, 3). I know of no satisfactory way for distinguishing in English translation between *an ihm selbst* and *an sich*. Without the *selbst* the difference is clear. *Sich* is reflexive, *ihm* is not. *An sich* is *in itself*, *an ihm* is *in it*. But the use of *selbst* makes reference to self explicit. If *an ihm* is *in it*, then *an ihm selbst* would seem to be *in itself*. *An ihm selbst* is a reflexive version of *an ihm*.

In the *Logic's* analysis of "reality" [Realität], Hegel reflects on the complex relation between *an sich* and *an ihm*. "The *An-sich* as well has in part this ambiguity" [*An-sich* is emphasized in Hegel's text: "Auch das *An-sich* hat zum Theil diese Doppelbedeutung"]. On the one hand, *an sich* refers to self-relation without reference to another. "Something is *An-sich* insofar as it has returned into itself out of being-for-another" ["*An-sich* ist etwas, insofern es aus dem Seyn-für-Anderes heraus, in sich zurückgekehrt ist"]. On the other hand, *an sich* in the sense of *an ihm* brings in the moment of externality and otherness. "But Something also has a determination or circumstance *an sich* (here the accent falls upon *an*) or *an ihm*, insofar as that circumstance is externally *an ihm*, is a being-for-another" [*An sich*, *an* and the first *an ihm* are all emphasized in Hegel's text: "Aber Etwas hat aber auch eine Bestimmung oder Umstand *an sich* (hier fällt der Accent auf *an*) oder *an ihm*, insofern dieser Umstand äußerlich an ihm, ein Seyn-für-Anderes ist"] (GW 11, 64, 3–7).

To bring out the aspect of externality, Oliva Blanchette has proposed translating *an ihm* as *to it* and *an ihm selbst* as *to itself*. This translation differentiates too cleanly between *an sich* and *an ihm*. For Hegel it is possible to speak of the difference between the two as a difference internal to the ambiguity of *an sich*. In an attempt to indicate the complex relation between *an sich* and *an ihm selbst* (or *an ihr selbst*), I shall translate the former as *in itself*, and the latter as *in it-self*.

12. "diese Negativität als Aeußerlichkeit" (GW 19, §258, 193, 13–14; PN 231, 7–8).

13. "Darum ist das Endliche vergänglich und *zeitlich*, weil es nicht, wie der Begriff, an ihm selbst die totale Negativität ist, sondern . . . sich zu derselben als zu seiner *Macht* verhält" (GW 19, §258, 193, 6–10; PN 230, 34–231, 1). Within quotations of Hegel, brackets mark off explanatory material that I have inserted. Parentheses are Hegel's own.

14. "Nur das Natürliche ist darum der Zeit unterthan, in sofern es endlich ist" (GW 19, §258, 193, 14–15; PN 231, 8–9).

15. "Der Begriff . . . ist an und für sich die absolute Negativität und Freiheit, die Zeit daher nicht seine Macht, noch ist er in der Zeit und ein Zeitliches, sondern *er* ist vielmehr die Macht der Zeit" (GW 19, §258, 193, 10–13; PN 231, 1–7).

16. "Was nicht in der Zeit ist, ist das Prozeßlose" (TW 9, §258, Zu., 50; PN 232, 5–6).

17. "Das Allgemeine als Gesetz hat auch einen Prozeß in sich selbst und lebt nur als Prozeß; aber es ist nicht Teil des Prozeßes, nicht im Prozesse, sondern enthält seine zwei Seiten und ist selbst prozeßlos" (TW 9, §258, Zu., 51; PN 232, 16–19).

18. "Die *Zeit* ist der *Begriff* selbst, der *da ist*, und als leere Anschauung sich dem Bewußtseyn vorstellt. . . . Sie ist das *äussere* angeschaute vom Selbst *nicht erfaßte* reine Selbst, der nur angeschaute Begriff" (GW 9, 429, 7–11; PhS 487).

19. "Indem dieser sich selbst erfaßt, hebt er seine Zeitform auf, begreift das Anschauen, und ist begriffnes und begreifendes Anschauen" (GW 9, 429, 11–13; PhS 487).

20. Pierre-Jean Labarrière also interprets this occurrence of *tilgen* within the framework of *aufheben*. "The verb used here by Hegel, *tilgen*, indeed indicates a disappearance, an elimination. But several lines further down, the same idea is expressed by the verb *aufheben*. There it is clear that this *elimination* of that which presented itself according to a successive order implies the *conservation* of the

process of effectuation, finally delivered from that formal insufficiency" ["Le verbe ici employé par Hegel, '*tilgen*,' marque bien une disparition, une élimination. Mais, quelques lignes plus bas, la même idée se trouve exprimée par le verbe '*aufheben*.' Où il appert que cette élimination de ce qui se présentait selon l'ordre d'une successivité implique la *conservation* du processus d'effectuation enfin délivré de cette insuffisance formelle"]. Pierre-Jean Labarrière, "La sursomption du temps et le vrai sens de l'histoire conçue," in Gwendoline Jarczyk and Pierre-Jean Labarrière, *Hegelianism*, Philosophie d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986), 153, n. 7.

21. "die Entäusserung, in welcher der Geist sein Werden zum Geiste, in der Form des *freyen zufälligen Geschehens* darstellt, sein reines *Selbst*, als *die Zeit* ausser ihm, und ebenso sein *Seyn* als Raum anschauend" (GW 9, 433, 5–8; *PhS* 492).

Chapter 2. Reflection: The Basic Movement of the Doctrine of Essence

1. "in ihm selbst": that is, in essence's self. Usually in translating German into English, German *in* followed by a dative construction becomes English *in*, and German *in* followed by an accusative construction becomes *into*. However, I follow most English translators of Hegel in using English *in* to render German *an* followed by a third-person pronoun: for example, *an sich* or *an ihm*. For the sake of clarity I shall translate German *in* as *within* when it is followed by a third-person dative pronoun referring to the subject of the verb. Otherwise I shall translate it as *in*.

2. "die diß System an ihm selbst befolgt" (GW 11, 25, 19).

3. "Es ist der Inhalt in sich selbst, *die Dialektik*, *die er an ihm selbst hat*, welche ihn fortbewegt" (GW 11, 25, 22–23).

4. I agree with Pierre-Jean Labarrière and Gwendoline Jarczyk that the movement of reflection is the "referential structure" [*structure référentielle*] of the entire *Logic*. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *La doctrine de l'essence*, *Science de la Logique*, vol. 1, bk. 2, trans., presentation and notes by Pierre-Jean Labarrière and Gwendoline Jarczyk, Bibliothèque Philosophique (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1976), xviii–xxv.

5. "Das Wesen als solches ist die Reflexion" (GW 11, 393, 8; translated as *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller, The Muirhead Library of Philosophy [London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989], 554). I shall cite the Miller translation of the *Logic* as *SL*.

6. "*Gesetztsein*," Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 12, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Zweiter Band: Die Subjektive Logik*, 1816 edition, ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981), 12, 10; *SL* 578.

7. "ist *Setzen*, insofern sie die Unmittelbarkeit als ein Rückkehren ist" (GW 11, 251, 15; *SL* 401, Miller, altered).

8. "Die Reflexion ist also die Bewegung, die, indem sie die Rückkehr ist, erst darin das ist, das anfängt oder das zurückkehrt" (GW 11, 251, 13–14; *SL* 401).

9. "*wird* nur darin, daß es *verlassen* wird" (GW 11, 252, 4–5; *SL* 402).

10. "das *Ankommen* des Wesens bey sich"; "die von sich selbst abstossende, voraussetzende Reflexion" (GW 11, 252, 6–7 and 8–9; *SL* 402).

11. "das woraus das Wesen *herkommt* und erst als dieses Zurückkommen *ist*" (GW 11, 252, 13–14; SL 402).

12. Grammar alone can not decide the question of whether to translate *in sich* as *in itself* or *into itself*. *In itself* would add confusion upon confusion, since that phrase is already translating both *an sich* and *an ihm selbst*. Hegel uses *Rückkehr in sich* to talk about the countermovement to a movement of externalization. It is a movement with a specific direction, the direction "into self." The same basic argument will also hold true for Hegel's use of *Reflexion-in-sich* in his discussion of actuality.

13. "*absoluter Gegenstoß in sich selbst*" (GW 11, 252, 11–12; SL 402). "Counter-impulsion" [*Gegenstoß*] picks up the earlier use of "repelling" [*abstossende*]. Labarrière and Jarczyk point out that *Gegenstoß* also plays critically upon Fichte's central notion of *Anstoß* (Hegel, *L'essence*, 23, n. 56).

14. "Die Bewegung wendet sich als Fortgehen unmittelbar in ihr selbst um, und ist nur so Selbstbewegung" (GW 11, 252, 16–18; SL 402).

15. "Das Hinausgehen über das Unmittelbare ist das Ankommen bey demselben" (GW 11, 252, 15–16; SL 402).

16. "*findet ein Unmittelbares vor*" (GW 11, 252, 2; SL 402).

17. "Diese Rückkehr ist erst das Voraussetzen des Vorgefundenen" (GW 11, 252, 3–4; SL 402).

18. "kommt überhaupt nur als Rückkehr hervor" (GW 11, 251, 30–31; SL 401).

19. "der Schein des Anfangs" (GW 11, 251, 31; SL 401).

20. "wesenloses Seyn" (GW 11, 244, 19; SL 394).

21. "Die Wahrheit des Seyns ist das Wesen" (GW 11, 241, 3; SL 389).

22. "ein unmittelbar Bestimmtes" (GW 11, 247, 5–6; SL 396).

23. "*Die Bestimmtheit ist Negation, (Determinatio est negatio)* sagte Spinoza" (GW 11, 76, 11–12).

24. "Daseyn ist *bestimmtes Seyn*" (GW 11, 59, 3). I shall generally translate *Daseyn* as *determinate being*. When Hegel juxtaposes *Daseyn* and *bestimmtes Seyn*, I shall leave *Daseyn* untranslated.

25. "die Form von einem Unmittelbaren" (GW 11, 59, 21).

26. "reine Unbestimmtheit" (GW 11, 44, 2).

27. "unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit" (GW 11, 43, 20–21).

28. Perhaps even the attempt to claim merely analytical status for undetermined immediacy encounters insuperable contradictions. For a critique of Hegel's exposition of pure being, see Traugott Koch, *Differenz und Versöhnung: Eine Interpretation der Theologie G. W. F. Hegels nach seiner "Wissenschaft der Logik"*, Studien zu Religion, Geschichte und Geisteswissenschaft, vol. 5 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967), 78–106.

29. "übergegangen"; "*Einheit des Seyns und Nichts*" (GW 11, 44, 24 and 21).

30. "Resultat" (GW 11, 57, 23).

31. "*unmittelbare Einheit . . . des Seyns und Nichts*" (GW 11, 60, 11–12).

32. "jene Einheit nicht nur als Seyn, sondern so wesentlich als Nichtseyn" (GW 11, 60, 16–17).

33. "Aber Daseyn als das Nichtseyn in sich schliessend, ist wesentlich *bestimmtes Seyn*, verneintes Seyn, Anderes" (GW 11, 62, 7–8).

34. "die Unmittelbarkeit des *Nichtseyns*" (GW 11, 247, 31; SL 397).

35. "(diß) Nichtseyn aber ist nichts anderes als die Negativität des Wesens an ihm selbst" (GW 11, 247, 32; SL 397).

36. "ist schlechthin nur als *Gesetztseyn* . . . das nicht verschieden ist, von der Rückkehr in sich, und selbst nur dieses Rückkehren ist" (GW 11, 252, 24–26; SL 402). I owe my basic understanding of the move from positing reflection to external reflection to Dieter Henrich, "Hegels Logik der Reflexion: Neue Fassung," in Dieter Henrich, ed., *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion, Hegel-Studien*, suppl. 18 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1978), esp. 295–98.

37. "bestimmt als *Negatives*," "also gegen ein Anderes" (GW 11, 252, 26–27; SL 402).

38. Henrich, 296.

39. "So ist die Reflexion *bestimmt*; sie ist, indem sie nach dieser Bestimmtheit, eine Voraussetzung *hat* . . . äussere *Reflexion*" (GW 11, 252, 28–30; SL 402).

40. "die Einheit der *setzenden* und der *äussern* Reflexion" (GW 11, 255, 19–20; SL 405).

41. "In ihnen hat sich die Bestimmtheit durch die Beziehung auf sich befestigt und unendlich fixirt" (GW 11, 256, 37–38; SL 407).

42. "das Bestimmte, das sein Uebergehen und sein bloßes Gesetzseyn sich unterworfen, oder seine Reflexion in anderes in Reflexion in sich umgebogen hat" (GW 11, 256, 38–257, 1; SL 407).

43. "die ausser sich gekommene Reflexion" (GW 11, 257, 3; SL 407).

44. "Die Gleichheit des Wesens mit sich selbst ist in die Negation verlohren, die das Herrschende ist" (GW 11, 257, 4–5; 407). "The capacity to stand on one's own which is genuinely characteristic of the logic of reflection rests namely on the following: the one which stands over against 'its other' is at the same time the whole, which contains in itself the other as its own moment. In other words, it presupposes *domination*" ["Die genuin reflexionslogische Selbständigkeit beruht nämlich darauf, daß das Eine, das 'seinem Anderen' gegenübersteht, zugleich das Ganze ist, welches das Andere als sein eigenes Moment in sich enthält. Sie setzt, mit anderen Worten, *Herrschaft* voraus"]. Michael Theunissen, *Sein und Schein: Die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980), 28.

45. "Diese ihre Reflexion und jenes Gesetzseyn sind verschieden; ihr Gesetzseyn ist vielmehr ihr Aufgehobenseyn; ihr Reflektirtseyn in sich aber ist ihr Bestehen" (GW 11, 257, 20–22; SL 408).

46. "die Reflexionsbestimmungen als freie . . . *Wesenheiten*." (GW 11, 256, 35–37; SL 407, Miller).

47. "die *Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit*." (GW 12, 12, 5–6; SL 578).

Chapter 3. Actuality as Contingency

1. I take the terminology of *structure* and *movement* from P.-J. Labarrière, *Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la "Phénoménologie de l'Esprit" de Hegel*, new ed., *Analyse et Raisons* (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1985).

2. "*absolute Wirklichkeit*" (GW 11, 369, 17; SL 529).

3. "Das Absolute" and "Das absolute Verhältniß."

4. "leeren oder äussern" (GW 11, 369, 19–20; SL 529).
5. "Wirklichkeit, Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit machen die formellen Momente des Absoluten oder die Reflexion desselben aus" (GW 11, 369, 24–26; SL 529).
6. "In der Wirklichkeit nun als dieser absoluten Form, sind die Momente nur als aufgehobene oder formelle noch nicht realisiert" (GW 11, 381, 6–7; SL 542).
7. "die Einheit des Absoluten und seiner Reflexion" (GW 11, 369, 27; SL 528).
8. "das absolute Verhältniß oder vielmehr das Absolute als Verhältniß zu sich selbst" (GW 11, 369, 28–29; SL 529).
9. "Die Erscheinung," "Die Existenz," "Die Erscheinung," "Das wesentliche Verhältniß."
10. "Unmittelbarkeit gesetzt ist als die Reflexion-in-sich, und umgekehrt; diese Einheit, in welcher Existenz oder Unmittelbarkeit, und das Ansichseyn, der Grund oder das Reflectirte schlechthin Momente sind, ist nun die Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 380, 31–33; SL 541–542, Miller, altered).
11. "Das Wirkliche ist darum *Manifestation*" (GW 11, 380, 33–381, 1; SL 542).
12. "sich von sich unterscheidende und bestimmende Bewegung" (GW 11, 381, 4–5; SL 542).
13. "in seiner Aeusserlichkeit *es selbst*, und ist nur in *ihr . . . es selbst*." (GW 11, 381, 3–5; SL 542, Miller, altered).
14. "gehört so zunächst der äußern Reflexion an" (GW 11, 381, 7–8; SL 542).
15. "selbst unmittelbare Formeinheit des Innern und Aeussern" (GW 11, 381, 9; SL 542).
16. "Diese Einheit des Innern und Aeussern ist die absolute Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 369, 17; SL 529).
17. "das Verhältniß des Inneren und Aeussern ist, daß der Inhalt beyder nur Eine identische Grundlage und eben so sehr nur Eine Identität der Form ist" (GW 11, 369, 12–14; SL 529, Miller, altered). The unusual capitalization of *Eine* emphasizes the idea of unity.
18. "in der Bestimmung der Unmittelbarkeit gegen die Bestimmung der Reflexion in sich; oder sie ist eine Wirklichkeit gegen eine Möglichkeit" (GW 11, 381, 10–12; SL 542, Miller, altered).
19. "die Identität, deren Momente jedes an ihm selbst die Totalität . . . ist" (GW 11, 371, 6–8; SL 531).
20. "Totalität der Form" (GW 11, 382, 4; SL 543).
21. J. Biard, D. Buvat, J. -F. Kervegan, J. -F. Kling, A. Lacroix, A. Lecrivain and M. Slubicki, *Introduction à la lecture de la "Science de la logique" de Hegel*, vol. 2, *La doctrine de l'essence*, Philosophie de l'Esprit (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1981), 320.
22. "Die Beziehung beyder auf einander ist das Dritte. . . Dieses Dritte ist die Nothwendigkeit" (GW 11, 381, 12–14; SL 542).
23. "an sich das, was die Wirklichkeit ist, reale Reflexion, aber ist noch nicht die gesetzte Einheit der Reflexion und der Unmittelbarkeit" (GW 11, 380, 25–27; SL 541).
24. "unmittelbare Formeinheit des Innern und Aeussern"; "ist damit in der Bestimmung der Unmittelbarkeit gegen die Bestimmung der Reflexion in sich" (GW 11, 381, 9–11; SL 542).
25. "die Identität, deren Momente jedes an ihm selbst die Totalität . . . ist" (GW 11, 371, 6–8; SL 531).
26. "die in sich reflectirte Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 382, 1; SL 542).

27. "ist *alles möglich, was sich nicht widerspricht*" (GW 11, 382, 15–16; SL 543).
28. "die blosse Formbestimmung der *Identität mit sich*, oder die Form der Wesentlichkeit" (GW 11, 382, 12–13; SL 543). I translate *Wesentlichkeit* with *essentialness* to distinguish it from *Wesenheit, essentiality*.
29. "geht in seine negative Einheit zurück" (GW 11, 289, 22; SL 442).
30. "Das Mögliche ist das *reflectirte In-sich-Reflectirtseyn*" (GW 11, 382, 29–30; SL 543).
31. "*nur ein Mögliches*" (GW 11, 382, 32; SL 543).
32. "ist so weiter nichts als ein *Seyn* oder *Existenz* überhaupt" (GW 11, 381, 31–32; SL 542).
33. "*wesentlich* nicht blosse unmittelbare Existenz" (GW 11, 381, 32–33; SL 542).
34. "zu dem das Wesen sich macht, ist das *wesentliche Seyn, die Existenz*" (GW 11, 323, 10–11; SL 479).
35. "blosse Wesentlichkeit" (GW 11, 382, 35–36; SL 543).
36. "Die *Wahrheit* des *Seyns* ist das *Wesen*" (GW 11, 241, 3; SL 390).
37. "das Wesen selbst nur Moment, und ohne Seyn seine Wahrheit nicht hat" (GW 11, 382, 34–35; SL 543).
38. "Diese Wirklichkeit ist nicht die erste, sondern die reflectirte, *gesetzt als Einheit* ihrer selbst und der Möglichkeit" (GW 11, 383, 19–20; SL 544, Miller, altered).
39. "welche zuerst vorkam, nemlich die formelle" (GW 11, 383, 32; SL 544).
40. "die formelle Wirklichkeit, welche nur *Seyn* oder *Existenz* überhaupt ist" (GW 11, 383, 33–34; SL 544).
41. "ist so weiter nichts als ein *Seyn* oder *Existenz* überhaupt" (GW 11, 381, 31–32; SL 542).
42. "blosses Seyn oder Existenz, aber in seiner Wahrheit gesetzt" (GW 11, 384, 1–2; SL 545).
43. "Das Zufällige ist ein Wirkliches, das zugleich nur als möglich bestimmt, dessen Anderes oder Gegentheil eben so sehr ist" (GW 11, 383, 36–384, 1; SL 545).
44. "den Werth eines Gesetzseyns oder der Möglichkeit zu haben" (GW 11, 383, 2–3; SL 545).
45. "Umgekehrt ist die Möglichkeit . . . gesetzt als Gesetzsein" (GW 11, 384, 3–4; SL 545, Miller, altered).
46. "Das Zufällige bietet daher die zwey Seiten dar" (GW 11, 384, 7; SL 545; emphasis added).
47. "*nicht Gesetzseyn*" (GW 11, 384, 9; SL 545).
48. "Das Wirkliche als solches ist möglich; es ist in unmittelbarer positiver Identität mit der Möglichkeit" (GW 11, 383, 20–21; SL 544).
49. "Insofern es [i. e., das Zufällige] die Möglichkeit unmittelbar an ihm hat . . . ist es *nicht Gesetzseyn* noch vermittelt, sondern *unmittelbare* Wirklichkeit; es hat *keinen Grund*" (GW 11, 384, 7–10; SL 545, Miller, altered).
50. "hat seine wahrhafte Reflexion-in-sich in einem Andern, *oder es hat einen Grund*" (GW 11, 384, 15–16; SL 545).
51. "ist das *gesetzte*, unvermittelte *Umschlagen* des Innern und Aeussern, oder des In-sich-Reflectirtseyns und des Seyns in einander" (GW 11, 384, 19–20; SL 545).
52. "Diese *absolute Unruhe* des *Werdens* dieser beyden Bestimmungen ist die *Zufälligkeit*" (GW 11, 384, 31–32; SL 545).

53. "eine haltungslose Unruhe"; "geht ebenso in *ruhige Einheit* zusammen" (GW 11, 57, 23, and 19).

54. "geht . . . eben so schlechthin *mit sich selbst zusammen*" (GW 11, 384, 33; SL 545).

55. "Resultat," "Einheit" (GW 11, 57, 17–37).

56. "*Identität*" (GW 11, 384, 34; SL 545).

57. "Vermittlung, das Werden, liegt hinter ihm" (GW 11, 59, 21–22).

58. "Das Zufällige ist also nothwendig, darum weil das Wirkliche als Mögliches bestimmt, damit seine Unmittelbarkeit aufgehoben und in *Grund* oder *Ansichseyn*, und in *Begründetes* abgestossen ist, als auch weil diese seine *Möglichkeit*, die *Grundbeziehung*, schlechthin aufgehoben und als *Seyn* gesetzt ist" (GW 11, 385, 2–6; SL 546).

Chapter 4. Actuality as Contingent Necessity

1. "zusammensinkt"; *unmittelbaren Einheit*" (GW 11, 57, 23 and 36–37).

2. "unmittelbare Einheit"; "nicht die Gestalt der Selbständigkeit haben" (GW 11, 385, 21; SL 546).

3. "in der Bestimmung der *Unmittelbarkeit*" (GW 11, 381, 10; SL 542).

4. "*bestimmt ist als gleichgültig* gegen den *Unterschied* der Formbestimmungen" (GW 11, 385, 25–26; SL 546).

5. "Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften."

6. "Die reale Wirklichkeit *als solche* ist zunächst das Ding von vielen Eigenschaften, die existierende Welt" (GW 11, 385, 30–31; SL 546).

7. "Satz des Grundes"; "'*Alles was ist, hat einen Grund*'" (GW 11, 324, 9; SL 481).

8. "Satz der Existenz" (GW 11, 324, 10–11; SL 481).

9. "Wenn aber ferner auch gesagt wurde, *was existirt, hat einen Grund und ist be-dingt*, so müßte auch ebenso gesagt werden: *es hat keinen Grund und ist unbedingt*" (GW 11, 324, 14–16; SL 481).

10. "enthält zwar die Reflexion, aber ihre Negativität ist in seiner Unmittelbarkeit zunächst erloschen" (GW 11, 323, 24–25; SL 479).

11. "Als Wirklichkeit ist sie zugleich *Ansichseyn* und *Reflexion-in-sich*" (GW 11, 385, 32–33; SL 546).

12. "Der Welt der Erscheinung stellt sich die in sich reflektirte, *an sich seiende Welt* gegenüber" (GW 11, 323, 30–31; SL 479–80).

13. "Aeusserlichkeit ist innerliches Verhalten nur *zu sich selbst*" (GW 11, 385, 33–34; SL 546).

14. "Was wirklich ist, *kann wirken*" (GW 11, 385, 34–35; SL 546). One could also translate: "That which is effective can effect." That translation would have the advantage of anticipating the later discussions of cause and effect [*Ursache und Wirkung*] and reciprocal effect [*Wechselwirkung*]. A great weakness of the translation of *Wirklichkeit* by *actuality* is its inability to make clear these connections, which Hegel maintains even in his choice of terminology. The French translation of Jarczyk and Labarrière uses *effectivité* for *Wirklichkeit* (see Hegel, *La doctrine de l'essence*, esp. 227, n. 1). The disadvantage of following their lead and using *effectivity* is that *possibility* and *actuality* are the standard English pair of terms in discussions of the logical modali-

ties. Using *effectivity* would obscure the relation of Hegel's presentation to other treatments in the Western philosophical tradition, especially Aristotle's.

15. "Die reale Wirklichkeit hat nun gleichfalls *die Möglichkeit* unmittelbar *an ihr selbst*" (GW 11, 386, 6–7; SL 547).

16. "in *einer* der Bestimmungen der Form, hiemit als das seyende von dem Ansichseyn oder der Möglichkeit unterschieden" (GW 11, 386, 8–9; SL 547).

17. "Möglichkeit als das Ansichseyn der *realen* Wirklichkeit ist selbst *reale Möglichkeit*, zunächst das *inhaltsvolle* Ansichseyn" (GW 11, 386, 10–11; SL 547).

18. "einen *Inhalt* hat"; "Einheit nunmehr *bestimmt ist als gleichgültig* gegen den *Unterschied* der Formbestimmungen" (GW 11, 385, 26 and 24–26; SL 546).

19. "der *Inhalt*, der gegen diese Formbestimmungen gleichgültig ist; sie machen daher die *Form* aus *bestimmt* gegen ihre Identität" (GW 11, 386, 24–26; SL 547).

20. "ist das Ansichseyn, bestimmt, als nur ein *gesetztes*; oder eben so sehr als *nicht an sich zu seyn*" (GW 11, 382, 37–383, 1; SL 544).

21. "gleichgültig" (GW 11, 383, 9; SL 544).

22. "ist die vergleichende Beziehung beyder" (GW 11, 383, 10; SL 544).

23. "Gleichgültigkeit des Unterschieds" (GW 11, 267, 31; SL 419).

24. "äusserliche Identität nun ist die *Gleichheit*, und der äusserliche Unterschied die *Ungleichheit*" (GW 11, 268, 21; SL 419).

25. "Die äussere Reflexion bezieht das Verschiedene auf die Gleichheit und Ungleichheit"; "das *Vergleichen*" (GW 11, 268, 29–30; SL 420). It is difficult to translate Hegel's play on *gleich*, *gleichgültig*, *Gleichgültigkeit* and *vergleichen*. I adopt Oliva Blanchette's ingenious solution of *like*, *like-valued*, *like-valuedness* and *liken*, respectively.

26. "enthält" (GW 11, 383, 11; SL 544).

27. "der beziehende *Grund*" (GW 11, 383, 12; SL 544).

28. "*Darum*, weil $A = A$, auch $-A = -A$ ist" (GW 11, 383, 12–13; SL 544).

29. "In dem möglichen A ist auch das mögliche Nicht A enthalten" (GW 11, 383, 13–14; SL 544; emphasis added).

30. "in sich reflektirte *Gleichheit* mit sich, die in ihr selbst die Beziehung auf die Ungleichheit enthält" (GW 11, 273, 4–5; SL 424).

31. "The contingent is just as much as possible as an actual, and it is indifferent to the fact of being designated as one or the other" ["Le contingent est tout aussi bien un possible qu'un effectif et il est indifférent au fait d'être désigné comme tel ou tel"] (Biard et al., 329).

32. "gleichgültige Identität enthält auch die Form als gleichgültige, d. h. als bloß *verschiedene* Bestimmungen" (GW 11, 385, 26–28; SL 546).

33. "*mannichfaltiger* Inhalt" (GW 11, 385, 28; SL 546).

34. "eine Wirklichkeit, die *nicht diejenige* ist, deren Möglichkeit sie ist" (GW 11, 388, 5; SL 549).

35. "Die Schranke und das Sollen," Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 21, *Wissenschaft der Logik: Erster Teil: Die objektive Logik: Erster Band: Die Lehre vom Sein*, 1832 ed., ed. Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985), 118, 18; SL 131.

36. "Wirklichkeit, welche die Möglichkeit einer Sache ausmacht . . . ist die Wirk-

lichkeit, die aufgehoben werden soll" (GW 11, 386, 31–34; SL 547; emphasis added). I translate *Sache* as capitalized *Thing* to distinguish it from the translation of *Ding* as lower-case *thing*. In doing so I adopt the practice of the French translation of Labarrière and Jarczyk, which distinguishes between *Chose* and *chose* (Hegel, *La doctrine de l'essence*, xxxi).

37. "eine nicht in sich reflektirte, zerstreute Wirklichkeit"; "sollen"; "in sich zurückzugehen" (GW 11, 386, 35–37; SL 547).

38. "Uebergang des Endlichen in das Unendliche" (GW 21, 123, 20; SL 136).

39. "Als *Sollen* ist somit Etwas *über seine Schranke erhaben*, umgekehrt hat es aber nur *als Sollen* seine *Schranke*. Beydes ist untrennbar" (GW 21, 120, 19–20; SL 133). Hegel's use of the singular *ist* in the last sentence emphasizes the inseparability of the two aspects under consideration.

40. "übergeht" (GW 11, 387, 7; SL 548). Hegel uses the word loosely here, since in his technical use of the term it is appropriate only to the Doctrine of Being.

41. "*Wenn alle Bedingungen einer Sache vorhanden sind*, so tritt sie in die Existenz" (GW 11, 321, 5–6; SL 477).

42. Biard et al., 331–32.

43. "Wenn alle Bedingungen einer Sache vollständig vorhanden sind, so tritt sie in Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 387, 14–15; SL 548).

44. "zwey Totalitäten des Inhalts"; "Eine absolute Totalität" (GW 11, 369, 10 and 16; SL 529).

45. "Die Vollständigkeit der Bedingungen ist die Totalität als am Inhalte, und *die Sache selbst* ist dieser Inhalt, bestimmt, ebenso ein Wirkliches als Mögliches zu seyn" (GW 11, 387, 15–17; SL 548).

46. "Diese Bewegung der sich selbst aufhebenden realen Möglichkeit bringt also *dieselben schon vorhandenen Momente* hervor, nur jedes aus dem andern werdend" (GW 11, 387, 30–32; SL 548).

47. "*ein Zusammengehen mit sich selbst*" (GW 11, 387, 33–34; SL 548).

48. "Die *Negation* der realen Möglichkeit ist somit *ihre Identität* mit sich" (GW 11, 388, 6; SL 549).

49. "nicht erst *wird*, sondern schon *vorausgesetzt* ist, und zu Grunde liegt" (GW 11, 388, 17–18; SL 549).

50. Miller excises the reference to ground and opens the door to the idea of a substrate when he translates "*zugrunde liegt*" as "lies at their base" (SL 549).

51. "Reale Möglichkeit und die Nothwendigkeit sind daher nur *scheinbar* unterschieden" (GW 11, 388, 15–16; SL 549).

52. "enthält eine unmittelbare Voraussetzung, eine unabhängige Seite gegen das Wesen" (GW 11, 247, 24–25; SL 397).

53. "daß das Wesen vielmehr den Schein in sich selbst enthält" (GW 11, 249, 15; SL 399).

54. "unendliche Bewegung in sich" (GW 11, 249, 15–16; SL 399). Although *sich* is grammatically ambiguous between the dative and the accusative, it seems to be dative. The entire section bears the title "Essence as Reflection *within* Itself" ["Das Wesen als Reflexion *in ihm selbst*"]. Only with the analysis of positing reflection does the idea of the other that is at the same time reflection itself become sufficiently strong to enable Hegel to speak of a "return *into* self" (cf. ch. 2, n. 12).

55. "Diese Nothwendigkeit . . . hat nemlich eine *Voraussetzung*, von der sie anfängt, sie hat an dem *Zufälligen* ihren *Ausgangspunkt*" (GW 11, 388, 21–23; SL 549).

56. "eine *Identität*, die nicht erst *wird*, sondern schon *vorausgesetzt* ist, und zu Grunde liegt" (GW 11, 388, 16–18; SL 549).

57. "*Die Nothwendigkeit hat sich* noch nicht *aus sich selbst zur Zufälligkeit bestimmt*" (GW 11, 389, 1–2; SL 550).

58. "die gegen die Form gleichgültige Identität, daher von ihr unterschieden und ein *bestimmter Inhalt* überhaupt" (GW 11, 389, 4–5; SL 550).

59. "Das real Nothwendige ist deßwegen irgend eine beschränkte Wirklichkeit, die um dieser Beschränktheit willen in anderer Rücksicht auch nur ein *Zufälliges* ist" (GW 11, 389, 5–7; SL 550).

60. "Die einfache gediegene Identität des Absoluten ist unbestimmt" (GW 11, 370, 3; SL 530).

61. "Die Schranke aber weist über sich selbst unmittelbar hinaus zu seinem Andern, welches das Sollen ist" (GW 21, 123, 34–35; SL 136).

62. "dieselbe Entzweyung des *Ansichseyns* und des *Daseyns* wie die Schranke" (GW 21, 123, 35–124, 1; SL 137).

63. "Über sich hinaus geht sie daher ebenso nur mit sich zusammen" (GW 21, 124, 1–2; SL 137).

64. "*Diese Identität mit sich*"; "das Andere des Endlichen" (GW 21, 124, 2–3; SL 137).

65. "Wenn wir von den Dingen sagen, *sie sind endlich*, so wird darunter verstanden, daß . . . das Nichtseyn ihre Natur, ihr Seyn, ausmacht" (GW 21, 116, 20–24; SL 129).

66. "die Negation der Negation, ist affirmatives Seyn" (GW 21, 124, 2–3; SL 137).

67. "das Jenseits des Endlichen"; "das unbestimmte Leere" (GW 21, 126, 31–32; SL 139, Miller).

68. "Es ist die Natur des Endlichen selbst, über sich hinauszugehen, seine Negation zu negiren und unendlich zu werden" (GW 21, 125, 10–12; SL 138).

69. "sich auf sich als Schranke, sowohl als Schranke als solche, wie als Sollen, zu beziehen, und über dieselbe hinauszugehen, oder vielmehr als Beziehung auf sich sie negirt zu haben und über sie hinaus zu seyn" (GW 21, 125, 20–22; SL 138). The grammar and the sense of the passage make it equally possible to read *dieselbe* and the two occurrences of *sie* as referring to *Schranke* alone, rather than both *Schranke* and *Sollen*.

70. "Wechselbestimmung des Endlichen und Unendlichen" (GW 21, 126, 2; SL 138).

71. "So ist das Endliche im Unendlichen verschwunden, und was *ist*, ist nur das *Unendliche*" (GW 21, 125, 26–27; SL 138).

72. "in die Kategorie des Etwas mit einer Grenze, zurückgefallen" (GW 21, 126, 8; SL 138).

73. "das *Schlecht-Unendliche*, das Unendliche des *Verstandes*" (GW 21, 127, 2–3; SL 139).

74. "Die [sic] Endliche . . . ist das Daseyn mit der *Bestimmung* gesetzt in sein *Ansichseyn* überzugehen, unendlich zu werden" (GW 21, 126, 15–17; SL 139).

75. "die als Schranke gesetzte Schranke" (GW 21, 126, 15; SL 139).

76. "um dieser Beschränktheit willen in anderer Rücksicht auch nur ein *Zufälliges* ist" (GW 11, 389, 6–7; SL 550).

77. "Insofern, *Seiten und Rücksichten*" (GW 11, 269, 3–4; SL 420).
78. "der sich entfremdeten Reflexion" (GW 11, 269, 1; SL 420).
79. "*an sich* auch Zufälligkeit" (GW 11, 389, 8–9; SL 550).
80. "ist die reale Möglichkeit nur *an sich* das Nothwendige, *gesetzt* aber ist sie als das *Andersseyn* der Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit gegen einander" (GW 11, 389, 12–14; SL 550).
81. "die Rückkehr in-sich aus jenem unruhigen *Andersseyn* der Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit gegen einander" (GW 11, 389, 15–16; SL 550).
82. "nicht aus sich selbst zu sich" (GW 11, 389, 16; SL 550).

Chapter 5. Actuality as Necessary Contingency

1. "Absolute Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 389, 18; SL 550, Miller).
2. "das real Nothwendige, der *Form nach*, zwar ein Nothwendiges, aber dem Inhalte nach ein Beschränktes sey, und durch ihn seine Zufälligkeit habe" (GW 11, 389, 9–11; SL 550).
3. "ihre Negation, die Zufälligkeit, an ihr hat" (GW 11, 389, 23; SL 550).
4. "So hat sie sich ergeben" (GW 11, 389, 23–24; SL 550).
5. "Die *bestimmte* Nothwendigkeit ist daher unmittelbar *wirkliche Nothwendigkeit*" (GW 11, 389, 26–27; SL 550).
6. "nur eine *leere* Bestimmung; oder sie ist *Zufälligkeit*" (GW 11, 389, 32–33; SL 551).
7. "unruhigen *Andersseyn* der Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit gegen einander" (GW 11, 389, 12–14; SL 550; emphasis on *restless* added).
8. "einer *bloßen* Möglichkeit" (GW 11, 389, 34; SL 551).
9. "die Wirklichkeit in ihrer *unmittelbaren* Einheit mit der Möglichkeit" (GW 11, 384, 22–23; SL 545).
10. "noch nicht in sich reflectirten Einheit des Möglichen und Wirklichen" (GW 11, 388, 38; SL 550).
11. "ist diese Wirklichkeit, weil sie gesetzt ist, *absolut*, das heißt, *selbst die Einheit ihrer und der Möglichkeit zu seyn*, nur eine *leere* Bestimmung, oder sie ist *Zufälligkeit*" (GW 11, 389, 31–33; SL 550–51; emphasis added on *because*).
12. The absolute is "the first unity—i. e., being in itself—of the internal and the external" ["l'unité première, c'est-à-dire étant en soi, de l'intérieur et de l'extérieur"]. Gwendoline Jarczyk, *Système et liberté dans la logique de Hegel*, Philosophie de l'Esprit (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1980), 218.
13. "Gleichgültigkeit gegen sich selbst" (GW 11, 390, 1–2; SL 551).
14. "So enthält die reale Nothwendigkeit nicht nur *an sich* die Zufälligkeit, sondern diese *wird* auch an ihr" (GW 11, 390, 3–4; SL 551).
15. "*unmittelbares Bestimmte*" (GW 11, 390, 5; SL 551).
16. "Aeusserlichkeit" (GW 11, 390, 4; SL 551).
17. "fängt . . . an"; "dieses *Voraussetzen* und die in sich *zurückkehrende Bewegung* ist noch getrennt" (GW 11, 388, 37–389, 1; SL 550).
18. "*Die Nothwendigkeit hat sich* noch nicht *aus sich selbst zur Zufälligkeit bestimmt*" (GW 11, 389, 1–2; SL 550).

19. "das Aufgehobenseyn der Wirklichkeit in der Möglichkeit und umgekehrt" (GW 11, 390, 8–9; SL 551).

20. "in dem andern nur *mit sich selbst zusammengeht*" (GW 11, 390, 11; SL 551).

21. "*positive Einheit*" (GW 11, 390, 10; SL 551).

22. "*einfache Umschlagen* des einen dieser Momente in das andere" (GW 11, 390, 9–10; SL 551).

23. "Aber darum weil jede unmittelbar in die entgegengesetzte umschlägt, so *geht* sie in dieser ebenso schlechthin *mit sich selbst zusammen*" (GW 11, 384, 32–33; SL 545).

24. "Das Nothwendige ist ein *Wirkliches*" (GW 11, 384, 35; SL 545).

25. "So ist sie aber die *Wirklichkeit*" (GW 11, 390, 11–12; SL 551).

26. "die nur ist, als dieses einfache Zusammengehen der Form mit sich selbst" (GW 11, 390, 12–13; SL 551).

27. "die ausser sich gekommene Reflexion" (GW 11, 257, 3; SL 407).

28. "Ankommen bey sich [ist] das Aufheben seiner und die von sich selbst abstossende, voraussetzende Reflexion, und ihr Abstossen von sich ist das Ankommen bey sich selbst" (GW 11, 252, 8–10; SL 402).

29. "in ihrem Seyn sich von sich abstößt, in diesem Abstossen selbst nur in sich zurückgekehrt ist, und in dieser Rückkehr als ihrem Sein sich von sich selbst abgestossen hat" (GW 11, 390, 26–28; SL 551).

30. "absolute Einheit des *Seyns* und der *Reflexion*" (GW 12, 12, 8–9; SL 578).

31. "Die Wahrheit des *Seyns*"; "das in die Unmittelbarkeit hervorgegangene Wesen" (GW 11, 324, 11–13; SL 481).

32. "ununterschiedne Einheit des Wesens mit seiner Unmittelbarkeit" (GW 11, 323, 23–24; SL 479).

33. "Die Wirklichkeit ist die *Einheit des Wesens und der Existenz*" (GW 11, 369, 3; SL 529).

34. "in dieser Rückkehr als ihrem Seyn" (GW 11, 390, 27–28; SL 551).

35. "So hat die *Form* in ihrer Realisirung alle ihre Unterschiede durchdrungen" (GW 11, 390, 29; SL 551).

36. "Der Unterschied von dem *Inhalte* und der Form selbst ist eben so verschwunden. . . . Die Auflösung dieses Unterschieds aber ist die absolute Nothwendigkeit, deren Inhalt dieser in ihr sich durchdringende Unterschied ist" (GW 11, 390, 32–391, 4; SL 551–52; emphasis on *that* and *this* added).

37. "So hat die *Form* in ihrer Realisirung alle ihre Unterschiede durchdrungen und sich durchsichtig gemacht" (GW 11, 390, 29–30; SL 551). It is just as possible grammatically to take *sich* as a direct object rather than an indirect object. In that case the last part of the quotation would read: "and made itself transparent." I choose the other reading because of the parallel between *durchsichtig machen* and *durchdringen*. Since *difference[s]* is the direct object of the latter, the parallel argues for taking it as the direct object of the former as well. The choice between *differences* and *form* as the direct object is not crucial, since the differences are differences of form.

38. "ist eben so sehr einfache Unmittelbarkeit oder *reines Seyn*, als einfache Reflexion-in-sich, oder *reines Wesen*; sie ist diß, daß diß beydes ein und dasselbe ist" (GW 11, 391, 8–10; SL 552). Hegel exploits the German language's possession of both the singular *beides* and the plural *beide*, where English has only the one form

both for both singular and plural. He uses the singular to emphasize the identity of being and reflection.

39. "Das schlechthin Nothwendige *ist* nur, weil es *ist*; es hat sonst keine Bedingung, noch Grund" (GW 11, 391, 10–11; SL 552, Miller, altered).

40. "Als Reflexion hat es Grund und Bedingung, aber es hat nur *sich* zum Grunde und Bedingung" (GW 11, 391, 13–14; SL 552).

41. "Wirklichkeit, Möglichkeit und Nothwendigkeit machen die formellen Momente des Absoluten oder die Reflexion desselben aus" (GW 11, 369, 24–26; SL 529).

42. "Die absolute Nothwendigkeit ist also die Wahrheit, in welche Wirklichkeit und Möglichkeit überhaupt, so wie die formelle und reale Nothwendigkeit zurückgeht" (GW 11, 391, 5–7; SL 552).

43. "Die absolute Nothwendigkeit ist so die *Reflexion oder Form des Absoluten*" (GW 11, 391, 18–19; SL 552).

44. "die *Einheit des Wesens und der Existenz*" (GW 11, 369, 3; SL 529).

45. "Unterschiede daher nicht als Reflexionsbestimmungen, sondern *als seyende Mannichfaltigkeit*, als unterschiedene Wirklichkeit, welche die Gestalt von selbständigen Anderen gegen einander hat" (GW 11, 391, 20–22; SL 552). Note how the last phrase passes between singular and plural constructions, identifying the two.

46. "freye . . . *Wesenheiten*" (GW 11, 256, 36–37; SL 407).

47. "freye *Wirklichkeiten*" (GW 11, 391, 28; SL 552).

48. "*Keins im andern scheint*, keins eine Spur seiner Beziehung auf das Andere an ihm zeigen will" (GW 11, 391, 28–29; SL 552).

49. "die Gestalt der *Reflexion-in-sich* als des *Seyns*" (GW 11, 391, 27; SL 552).

50. "Die Nothwendigkeit als *Wesen* ist in diesem *Seyn* verschlossen" (GW 11, 391, 30–31; SL 552).

51. "Wesen ist das *Lichtscheue*, weil an diesen Wirklichkeiten kein *Scheinen*, kein Reflex ist" (GW 11, 391, 39–392, 2; SL 553).

52. "nur *Seyn* sind" (GW 11, 392, 3; SL 553).

53. "Die *Einfachheit* ihres Seyns, ihres Beruhens auf sich, ist die absolute Negativität; sie ist die *Freyheit* ihrer scheinlosen Unmittelbarkeit" (GW 11, 392, 4–6; SL 553).

54. "Das absolute Verhältnis."

55. "Diese Manifestation dessen, was die *Bestimmtheit* in Wahrheit ist, negative Beziehung auf sich selbst, ist *blinder* Untergang im Andersseyn" (GW 11, 392, 16–18; SL 553).

56. "das *absolute Umkehren* ihrer Wirklichkeit in ihre Möglichkeit und ihrer Möglichkeit in Wirklichkeit" (GW 11, 391, 23–25; SL 552).

57. "Die absolute Nothwendigkeit ist daher *blind*" (GW 11, 391, 25; SL 552).

58. "Die Berührung dieser Wirklichkeiten durch einander erscheint daher als eine leere Aeusserlichkeit; die Wirklichkeit *des einen in dem andern* ist die *nur* Möglichkeit, *die Zufälligkeit*" (GW 11, 391, 31–33; SL 552).

59. "das *Uebergehen* des Wirklichen in Möglichen, des Seyns in Nichts" (GW 11, 392, 22–23; SL 553; emphasis on *under* added).

60. "Werden oder *Uebergehen* des Seyns in Nichts" (GW 11, 392, 19–20; SL 553).

61. "das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst" (GW 11, 249, 17–18; SL 249).

62. "So ist die Aeusserlichkeit ihre Innerlichkeit, ihre Beziehung ist absolute

Identität; und das *Uebergehen* des Wirklichen in Mögliches, des Seyns in Nichts ein *Zusammengehen mit sich selbst*" (GW 11, 392, 21–24; SL 553).

63. "Diese *Identität des Seyns* in seiner Negation *mit sich selbst*, ist sie nun *Substanz*" (GW 11, 392, 26–27; SL 553). The grammar is inexplicable. Why insert the *sie*? Can the *sie* possibly refer back to *absolute Nothwendigkeit*? In any case the main point is clear.

64. "Verhältniß zu sich selbst" (GW 11, 392, 28; SL 553).

65. "Das *blinde* Uebergehen der Nothwendigkeit ist vielmehr die *eigene Auslegung* des Absoluten" (GW 11, 392, 28–30; SL 553). The closing genitive is both subjective and objective. The absolute is both subject and object of the act of exposition.

66. "Die *Auslegerin* des Absoluten . . . ist die *absolute Nothwendigkeit*" (GW 11, 393, 18–19; SL 554).

67. "ist das Voraussetzen jener ersten absoluten Wirklichkeiten" (GW 11, 392, 24–25; SL 553).

68. "Einheit als in ihrer Negation oder als in der Zufälligkeit" (GW 11, 392, 27–28; SL 553).

69. "Sie ist zunächst die reale Nothwendigkeit; absolute *Identität* mit sich, so daß der Unterschied der Nothwendigkeit und die in ihr sich aufeinander beziehenden Bestimmungen, Substanzen, *freie Wirklichkeiten*, gegen einander, sind" (GW 11, 408, 19–22; SL 570).

70. Biard et al. point out that, in this discussion of substance and necessity on the final pages of the Doctrine of Essence, "real necessity" "has a broader signification or field of application than in the second chapter [what I am calling "part" B of the chapter on actuality], where it is equivalent to relative necessity, differentiated from absolute necessity, which here is no longer the case" ["a une signification ou un champ d'application plus large que dans le second chapitre, où elle équivaut à la nécessité relative, différenciée de la nécessité absolue, ce qui n'est plus le cas ici"] (Biard et al., 371). Their explanation of this different sense of real necessity rests on the meaning of "real" already articulated in the logic of Being. From that early passage onward, "the adjective 'real' designates a first unity of self and its other" ["L'adjectif 'réel' désigne une première unité de soi et de son autre"] (ibid.). It is true that real necessity here is not simply identical with real necessity in part B of the chapter on actuality. But the sense of real necessity in this context is also inseparable from that earlier thematization. The key is to reread, as it were, the discussion of real necessity in part B in the light of the realization that real necessity is none other than the way in which absolute necessity explicates the absolute.

71. GW 11, 381, 1–5; SL 542.

72. "Die Nothwendigkeit ist auf diese Weise die *innre Identität*; die Causalität ist die Manifestation derselben, worin ihr Schein des *substantiellen Anderseyn* sich aufgehoben hat, und die Nothwendigkeit zur *Freyheit* erhoben ist" (GW 11, 408, 22–25; SL 570).

73. "ist das Voraussetzen jener ersten absoluten Wirklichkeiten" (GW 11, 392, 24–25; SL 553).

74. "Nothwendigkeit und Causalität sind also darin verschwunden" (GW 11, 408, 31; SL 570).

75. "Die Nothwendigkeit wird nicht dadurch zur *Freyheit*, daß sie verschwindet, sondern daß nur ihre noch *innre Identität manifestirt* wird" (GW 11, 409, 5–6; SL 571).

76. "zeigt sich die *Freyheit* als die *Wahrheit der Nothwendigkeit*" (GW 12, 12, 5–6; SL 578).

77. "Die *Identität selbst* des Seyns und Scheins ist noch die *innre* Nothwendigkeit. Diese *Innerlichkeit* oder diß *Ansichseyn* hebt die Bewegung der Causalität auf" (GW 11, 409, 1–3; SL 571; emphasis on *movement* added).

78. "eine Manifestation, welche die identische Bewegung des Unterschiedenen in sich selbst . . . ist" (GW 11, 409, 7–8; SL 571; emphasis added).

79. "einfache *Identität des Seyns in seiner Negation* oder in dem *Wesen mit sich selbst*" (GW 11, 390, 31–32; SL 551).

80. "das Scheinen seiner in sich selbst" (GW 11, 249, 17–18; SL 399).

81. "Der Schein ist das Wesen selbst in der Bestimmtheit des Seins" (GW 11, 248, 13; SL 398).

82. "die *Verhältnißweise des Begriffs* . . . Der *Begriff* nun ist diese absolute Einheit des Seyns und der *Reflexion*, daß das *An- und Für sich seyn* erst dadurch ist, daß es eben so sehr *Reflexion* oder *Gesetzseyn* ist, und daß das *Gesetzseyn* das *An- und Für sich seyn* ist" (GW 12, 6–11; SL 578, Miller, altered).

83. "Der Schein ist dasselbe, was die *Reflexion* ist; aber er ist die *Reflexion* als *unmittelbare*" (GW 11, 249, 21; SL 399).

84. "die *an und für sichseyende Identität*, welche die Nothwendigkeit der Substanz ausmacht" (GW 12, 15, 36–37; SL 582).

85. "zugleich als aufgehoben, oder als *Gesetzseyn* ist" (GW 12, 15, 37; SL 582).

86. "unendliche *Reflexion*" (GW 12, 14, 2; SL 580).

87. "Die *ursprüngliche Sache* . . . die *Ursache ihrer selbst* ist, und diß ist die *zum Begriffe befreyte Substanz*" (GW 12, 16, 4–6; SL 582). I know of no way to reproduce in English the play on words between *Sache* and *Ursache*.

88. "Die Dunkelheit der im Causalverhältnisse stehenden Substanzen für einander, ist verschwunden, denn die Ursprünglichkeit ihres Selbstbestehens ist in *Gesetzseyn* übergegangen, und dadurch zur sich selbst durch-sichtigen *Klarheit* geworden" (GW 12, 16, 1–4; SL 582).

89. "hat sich die Bestimmtheit durch die Beziehung auf sich befestigt und unendlich fixirt" (GW 11, 256, 37–38; SL 407).

Chapter 6. The Actuality of Possibility and the Presence of the Future

1. "die Annahme eines dem Akt der göttlichen Freiheit schon vorgegebenen absoluten Wesens," Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Die Bedeutung des Christentums in der Philosophie Hegels," *Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1972), 109; translated as "The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel," *The Idea of God and Human Freedom*, trans. R. A. Wilson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 173.

2. "die Freiheit Gottes als Ausdruck seines vermeintlich ihr vorgegebenen Wesens zu denken suchte, nämlich als Manifestation dieses Wesens" (*ibid.*). Since neither of the English pronominal equivalents of *seines* are accurate here, I have translated by using the noun to which the German pronoun refers.

3. "So als die *Manifestation*, daß es sonst nichts ist und keinen Inhalt hat, als die Manifestation seiner zu seyn, ist das Absolute *die absolute Form*. Die *Wirklichkeit* ist als diese reflectirte Absolutheit zu nehmen. . . . Das Wirkliche ist darum *Manifestation*" (GW 11, 380, 18–381, 1; SL 541–42).

4. "das Wesen Gottes selbst aus der absoluten Zukunft der Freiheit zu verstehen, statt es umgekehrt als Vermögen seiner Freiheit zugrunde liegend zu denken" (Pannenberg, "Bedeutung des Christentums," 110; "Significance of Christianity," 174).

5. "Vielmehr erweisen sich die Hegelschen Gedankenbestimmungen in ihrer dialektischen Natur an ihnen selbst als antizipatorisch . . . ist das Denken dieser Bestimmungen selbst auf eine Zukunft seiner Wahrheit bezogen, aus der es entspringt, indem es auf sie vorgreift" (Pannenberg, "Bedeutung des Christentums," 111, n. 96; "Significance of Christianity," 175–76).

6. The reference is from the statement in the final paragraph of the *Logic*: "The idea freely releases itself" ["Die Idee sich selbst frey entläßt"] (GW 12, 253, 22; SL 843, Miller).

7. Pannenberg, "Bedeutung des Christentums," 112, n. 96; "Significance of Christianity," 176.

8. "Die *Wahrheit des Seyns* ist das *Wesen*" (GW 11, 241, 3; SL 389).

9. "Das Wesen ist das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Seyn" (GW 11, 241, 15; SL 389, Miller, altered).

10. A takeoff on Wilfrid Sellars expression "the myth of the given."

11. "*bey sich selbst*" (GW 12, 35, 12; SL 603). My translation here follows a common idiomatic usage of *bei*, which seems to express Hegel's meaning.

12. "das Sein des Nichtseins" (TW 9, §259, Zu., 55; PN 235, 28). Enrique Dussel attributes to Hegel an equation of "the pure future" with "non-being" and "the irrational, barbaric, the non-existent" ["el puro futuro"; "el no-ser"; "lo irracional, bárbaro, lo inexistente"]. Enrique D. Dussel, *Método para una filosofía de la liberación: superación analéctica de la dialéctica hegeliana* (Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1974), 114. Since Hegel treats time in general as becoming, the unity of being and nonbeing, the identification of the future with nonbeing is misleading. Dussel is right, though, to the extent that Hegel does very little explicitly to include the future in the rational mediation of his system. Dussel holds that Hegelian reason's abstraction from the future has disastrous consequences, "ending up by providing a foundation for the imperial wars of a Europe that dominates all the other peoples constituted as colonies, neo-colonies, 'dependents' at all levels of their being" ["termina por fundar las guerras imperiales de una Europa dominadora de todos los otros pueblos constituidos como colonias, neocolonias, 'dependientes' en todos los niveles de su ser"] (ibid.). By the end of the present work I hope to have shown that Hegel's devaluation of abstract forms of the future is not equivalent to discounting the liberating power of the future. From this perspective I must reject Dussel's conclusion.

13. "nec proprie dicitur: tempora sunt tria, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed fortasse proprie diceretur: tempora sunt tria, praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris," Aurelius Augustinus, *Confessiones*, ed. Martin Skutella, Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1981), XI, XX, 6–9; translated as Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), 269, Pine-Coffin, altered.

14. "Mehrfachmodalisierung," Niklas Luhmann, "Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte," *Soziologische Aufklärung 2: Aufsätze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft*, 2d ed. (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), 112; translated as "World-Time and System History: Interrelations Between Temporal Horizons and Social Structures," *The Differentiation of Society*, trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore, European Perspectives (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 304. My use of the concept of manifold modalization is heavily dependent on the development given to that concept by Michael Welker, "Gesetz und Evangelium," lectures at Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, 1983–1984.

15. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Our God is Marching On!," *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, ed. James Melvin Washington (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986), 230.

16. Cf. Luhmann, "Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte," 112; "World-Time and System History," 304.

17. "die abstrakt sich auf sich beziehende Negativität" (GW 19, §258, 26–27; PN 230, 16–17).

18. "In dieser Abstraktion ist noch kein reeler Unterschied" (GW 19, §258, 27–28; PN 230, 17–18).

19. "als gleichgültig gegen das ruhige Nebeneinander erscheinend" (GW 19, §257, 192, 8–9; PN 229, 10–11).

20. "Die Zeit . . . ist gleichfalls ein schlechthin Abstractes, Ideelles" (GW 19, §258, 192, 11–12; PN 229, 31–32).

21. "ist das Seyn, das, indem es *ist*, *nicht* ist, und indem es *nicht* ist, *ist*" (GW 19, §258, 192, 12–13; PN 229, 32–230, 1).

22. "das, aber *angeschaute*, Werden" (GW 19, §258, 192, 13; PN 230, 1–2).

23. "die Entäusserung, in welcher der Geist sein Werden zum Geiste, in der Form des *freyen zufälligen Geschehens* darstellt, sein reines *Selbst*, als *die Zeit* ausser ihm . . . anschauend" (GW 9, 433, 5–8; PhS 492; emphasis on *externalization* and *outside* added).

24. "ist das *äussere* angeschaute vom Selbst *nicht erfaßte* reine Selbst" (GW 9, 429, 10–11; PhS 487).

25. "die zwar schlechthin *momentanen*, d. i. unmittelbar sich aufhebenden, Unterschiede als *Aeußerliche*, d. i. jedoch *sich selbst* äußerliche, bestimmt sind" (GW 19, §258, 192, 13–15; PN 230, 2–4).

26. "eine haltungslose Unruhe" (GW 11, 57, 23).

27. "ruhiges Resultat" (ibid.).

28. "Die *Zeit* ist der *Begriff* selbst, der *da ist*" (GW 9, 429, 7; PhS 487). One could also translate *da ist* as *has determinate being*, in keeping with the practice of translating *Dasein* in the Doctrine of Being as *determinate being*.

29. "das Endliche"; "vergänglich und *zeitlich*" (GW 19, §258, 193, 6 and 7; PN 230, 34 and 35).

30. "Das Natürliche ist darum der Zeit unterthan, in sofern es endlich ist" (GW 19, §258, 193, 14–15; PN 231, 8–9).

31. "der nur angeschaute Begriff" (GW 9, 429, 11; PhS 487).

32. "der Geist sein Werden zum Geiste, in der Form des *freyen zufälligen Geschehens* darstellt" (GW 9, 433, 6–7; PhS 492).

33. "sein reines *Selbst*, als *die Zeit* ausser ihm, und ebenso sein *Seyn* als Raum anschauend" (GW 9, 433, 7–8; PhS 492).

34. "Dieses sein letzteres Werden, die *Natur*, ist sein lebendiges unmittelbares Werden" (GW 9, 433, 8–9; PhS 492).

35. "Die andere Seite aber seines Werdens, die *Geschichte*, ist das *wissende sich vermittelnde* werden — der an die Zeit entäusserte Geist" (GW 9, 433, 12–13; PhS 492).

36. "ist in ihrem Daseyn nichts, als diese ewige Entäusserung ihres *Bestehens* und die Bewegung, die das *Subject* herstellt" (GW 9, 433, 9–11; PhS 492).

37. "Diese Entäusserung ist ebenso die Entäusserung ihrer selbst" (GW 9, 433, 13–14; PhS 492).

38. GW 9, 433, 35–38; PhS 493.

39. "Diß Werden stellt eine träge Bewegung und Aufeinanderfolge von Geistern dar" (GW 9, 433, 15–16; PhS 492).

40. "Ihre Aufbewahrung nach der Seite ihres freyen in der Form der Zufälligkeit erscheinenden Daseyns, ist die Geschichte, nach der Seite ihrer begriffnen Organisation aber die *Wissenschaft des erscheinenden Wissens*" (GW 9, 434, 2–4; PhS 493).

41. "beyde zusammen, die begriffne Geschichte" (GW 9, 434, 4–5; PhS 493).

42. After arguing that "the 'suppression' of time is the condition of the entrance into 'conceptually grasped history,'" Pierre-Jean Labarrière goes on to identify "conceptually grasped history" with "meaningful time" ["la 'suppression' du temps est la condition de l'entrée dans l'histoire conçue"; "histoire conçue," "temps sensé"] (Pierre-Jean Labarrière, "La sursumption du temps," 155, 157).

43. Ryosuke Ohashi argues that Hegel's explicit treatment of time contains an implicit idea of "original time." Ohashi equates "original time" with spirit, because Hegel calls spirit "the concept of time." Although logical content is not intratemporal, "the *Logic*, as the categories of this spirit and of its eternal essence, must then contain the structure of temporality" ["Die *Logik* als die Kategorien dieses Geistes bzw. dessen ewiges Wesen muß dann die Struktur der Zeitlichkeit enthalten"], Ryosuke Ohashi, *Zeitlichkeitsanalyse der Hegelschen Logik: zur Idee einer Phänomenologie des Ortes*, Symposium, vol. 72 (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984), 59–61. I avoid the phrase "original time" because it too easily suggests that primacy of the past and of the given that Hegel criticizes.

44. "*seyende Abstrahieren*" (GW 19, §258, 193, 1–2; PN 230, 25–26).

45. "abstracte Subjektivität" (GW 19, §258, 192, 21; PN 230, 10).

46. "Die Zeit ist dasselbe Princip als das Ich = Ich des reinen Selbstbewußtseyns; aber dasselbe oder der einfache Begriff noch in seiner gänzlichen Aeußerlichkeit und Abstraction" (GW 19, §258, 192, 21–23; PN 230, 11–13).

47. "die abstrakten Momente der Einheit, welche das Werden ist" (TW 9, §259, Zu., 54; PN 235, 13–14).

48. "jedes für sich als das Ganze gesetzt . . . aber unter entgegengesetzten Bestimmungen" (TW 9, §259, Zu., 54; PN 235, 14–15).

49. "Im positiven Sinne der Zeit kann man daher sagen: Nur die Gegenwart ist, das Vor und Nach ist nicht; aber die konkrete Gegenwart ist das Resultat der Vergangenheit, und sie ist trüchtig von der Zukunft. Die wahrhafte Gegenwart ist somit die Ewigkeit" (TW 9, §259, Zu., 55; PN 235, 29–31). Herbert Marcuse points out that in Hegel's presentation "eternity is therefore without natural time, timeless, because—it

is itself time" ["Die Ewigkeit ist deshalb ohne die natürliche Zeit, zeitlos, weil—sie selbst die Zeit ist"], Herbert Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*, 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1968); translated as *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*, trans. Seyla Benhabib, *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 149.

50. "Die Zeit selbst ist in ihrem Begriffe ewig" (TW 9, §258, Zu., 50; PN 231, 38–39).

51. "Die Zeit als Zeit ist ihr Begriff" (TW 9, §258, Zu., 50; PN 231, 39–232, 1).

52. "der nur angeschaute Begriff" (GW 9, 429, 11; PhS 487).

53. "begrift das Anschauen, und ist begriffnes und begreifendes Anschauen" (GW 9, 429, 12–13; PhS 487).

54. Particularly notable among those who take the conceptual sublation of time to mean time's disappearance is Herbert Marcuse. His *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity* emphasizes the historical dynamism of the categories of the *Logic*. Yet Marcuse considers the *Phenomenology* "Hegel's first and last attempt . . . historically to undergird the ahistoricity of absolute knowing" ["der erste und letzte Versuch Hegels . . . die Ungeschichtlichkeit des absoluten Wissens geschichtlich zu unterbauen"] (Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie*, 256; *Hegel's Ontology*, 227). Marcuse's later work *Reason and Revolution* extends that criticism to the culmination of the *Logic* in the unity of the absolute idea. "The manner in which Hegel demonstrates this unity shows, however, that he has made a final transformation of history into ontology," Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 163.

55. "Es ist die Wahrheit der Zeit, daß nicht die Zukunft, sondern die Vergangenheit das Ziel ist" (TW 9, 261, Zu., 59; PN 240, 3).

56. Exclusive emphasis on this strain of Hegel's thought has resulted in the criticism that Hegel brings history to an end. This criticism sees Hegel's system as closed, so that all history is essentially past. Ernst Bloch, for instance, characterizes Hegel as a "thinker of the past" who took the arising future and "buried it in a closed system" ["Vergangenheitsdenker"; "es in einem abgeschlossenen System begrub"], Ernst Bloch, "Hegel und der Humor," *Über Methode und System bei Hegel* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 139.

57. "Die Kreisbewegung ist die räumliche oder bestehende Einheit der Dimensionen der Zeit" (TW 9, §261, Zu., 59; PN 239, 38–39).

58. "Das, was er nach sich hat, ist zugleich das, wohin er erst kommen wird; und beim Vor, zu dem er gelangt, war er schon" (TW 9, §261, Zu., 59; PN 239, 40–240, 1).

59. The German word translated as *subsistent*, *bestehende*, has for its root the verb *stehen*, to stand.

60. Reinhart Koselleck identifies the "contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous" ["Gleichzeitigkeit der Ungleichzeitigen"] as a basic mode of temporal experience, Reinhart Koselleck, "Geschichte, Geschichten und formale Zeitstrukturen," in Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel, eds., *Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung*, Poetik und Hermeneutik, vol. 5 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973), 213; translated as "History, Histories and Formal Structures of Time," in Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, trans. Keith Tribe, *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), 94, Tribe. Cf. also

Dieter Wandschneider's idea of a "macro-condition" in which past, present, and future are all present. "Past, present, future have therefore no *absolute* meaning, but are continually *relative* to a macro-condition, into which they all together are bound and in which they are related to each other as temporal modes" ["Vergangenheit, Gegenwart, Zukunft haben demnach keinen *absoluten* Sinn, sondern sind stets *relativ* auf einen Makrozustand, in den sie insgesamt eingebunden und darin als Zeitmodi aufeinander bezogen sind"], Dieter Wandschneider, *Raum, Zeit, Relativität: Grundbestimmungen der Physik in der Perspektive der Hegelschen Naturphilosophie*, Philosophische Abhandlungen 50 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), 103. By "macro-condition" Wandschneider seems to mean any unit that is in itself temporally meaningful.

61. As a correction to the ahistorical import of the circular model, Christofer Frey proposes replacing it with the model of "spiral stairs," Christofer Frey, *Reflexion und Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum Selbstverständnis der Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung vor allem mit Hegel* (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1973), 173.

62. "Denn die Vergangenheit ist die Aufbewahrung der Gegenwart als Wirklichkeit; aber die Zukunft ist der Gegensatz hiervon,—vielmehr das Gestaltlose. . . . Es kann also überhaupt in der Zukunft keine Gestalt angeschaut werden," Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Theorie-Werkausgabe*, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, vol. 18, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 501; translated as *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 1, trans. E. S. Haldane, The English and Foreign Philosophical Library (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1893), 434.

63. "Die Notwendigkeit nach ihrem höheren Begriff, die *reale Notwendigkeit*, Freiheit, ist denn eben die Freiheit als solche, der Begriff als solcher, oder näher bestimmt der *Zweck*." ". . . im Zweck, da beginnt das *Dasein des Begriffs* überhaupt, des Freien, das als Freies existiert," Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, vol. 4, *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*, pt. 2: *Die bestimmte Religion* <a:text>, ed. Walter Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985), 303, 304; translated as *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, vol. 2, *Determinate Religion*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson and J. M. Stewart, Hegel Lectures: Selected Texts (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), 403, 404. Note that "real necessity" carries a different sense here than in the *Logic*.

64. "der Zweck der Begriff selbst in seiner Existenz ist" (GW 12, 155, 17; SL 735).

65. "einen Begriff, ein *an und für sich bestimmtes* und damit selbstbestimmendes voraussetzt" (GW 12, 156, 11–12; SL 736, Miller, altered).

66. "die begriffne Geschichte" (GW 9, 434, 5; PhS 493).

67. Herbert Marcuse goes further in the direction of this interpretation than most commentators, identifying time with the self of spirit. Yet he stops short of explicating the being of this self as coming. He retains the primacy of the past over the future by emphasizing that time is the self that *maintains* itself in difference. "Time is essentially the self that, in these differences [i. e., the temporal differences of past, present and future], continually maintains and moves itself as the self-same" ["Die Zeit ist wesentlich das in diesen Unterschieden sich als ständig das selbige erhaltende und bewegende Selbst"]. The self that maintains itself in the differences of time is "free" (Marcuse, *Hegels Ontologie*, 343, 345; *Hegel's Ontology*, 302, 303).

Ryosuke Ohashi touches on the idea of a present future when he says that the concept as universal "is at home with itself—i. e., present—only in this future [i. e., 'its future self']" ["erst in diesem Künftigen 'bei sich', d. h. gegenwärtig ist"]. But he understands "the present in the complete sense" to be "the present of that which is past" ["Die Gegenwart im vollkommenen Sinne"; "Die Gegenwart des Gewesenen"]. On that basis he interprets "coming to itself" as "the coming to itself of its pastness" ["das Kommen-zu-sich"; "das Zu-sich-Kommen seiner Gewesenheit"]. It is "the coming of pastness which alone is what is present as concept" ["das Kommen der Gewesenheit, die allein das ist, was als Begriff gegenwärtig ist"] (Ohashi, 137–38). Ohashi sees in this a primacy of the future, but if that which comes is pastness, then the future itself lies under the domination of the past.

68. "Das Wesen ist das vergangene, aber zeitlos vergangene Seyn" (GW 11, 241, 15; SL 389). Otto Pöggeler speaks for most when he observes that "Hegel's parallel placement of 'essence' [*Wesen*] and '(has) been' [*gewesen*]" points to an "understanding of being in the perfect tense" ["Hegels Parallelisierung von 'Wesen' und 'gewesen'"; "perfektische Seinsauffassung"]. That this particular passage in Hegel expresses a primacy of the past is incontrovertible. But this particular passage is not the final word of the Logic. Pöggeler moves too quickly to his conclusion that "this 'having been' in its perfection can then also be treated as an eternal present" ["Dieses Gewesensein in seiner Vollkommenheit kann dann auch als ewige Gegenwart angesprochen werden"] (Otto Pöggeler, "Temporale Interpretation und Hermeneutische Philosophie," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 43, no. 1 [1989]: 25).

69. "durch seine Natur sich erinnert, und durch diß Insichgehen zum Wesen wird" (GW 11, 241, 21–22; SL 389).

70. "tritt . . . in die Existenz"; "tritt aus dem Grunde nur insofern er zu *Grunde* gegangen und keiner ist, aus dem Grundlosen, d. h. aus der eigenen wesentlichen Negativität oder reinen Form hervor" (GW 11, 321, 5–6 and 322, 3–6; SL 477 and 478).

71. "*die Verhältnißweise des Begriffs*" (GW 12, 12, 6; SL 578).

72. "Der Begriff aber . . . ist an und für sich die absolute Negativität und Freiheit, die Zeit daher nicht seine Macht, noch ist er in der Zeit und ein Zeitliches, sondern *er* ist vielmehr die Macht der Zeit. . . Die Idee, der Geist, ist *ewig*" (GW 19, §258, 193, 10–16; PN 231, 1–5).

73. Helpful here is George di Giovanni, "The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic," in Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz, eds., *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), esp. 193–94.

74. Adopting and adapting Robert Jenson's distinction between predestination and "postdestination," I would say that Hegel is talking about 'postdetermination' rather than predetermination, Robert Jenson, "The Holy Spirit," in Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, eds., *Christian Dogmatics*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 138.

75. "Contingency is the *only content of necessity*" (Giovanni, 198, n. 6.). Cf. also Joseph Flay's conclusion that "there is no necessity in a real or an absolute sense until the contingencies have temporally occurred which constitute that necessity" (Joseph C. Flay, "Essence and Time in Hegel," *The Owl of Minerva* 20, no. 2 [1989]: 191).

76. Among the many who subscribe to the contrary interpretation is Martin Heidegger. "But the concept is the power of time, which is to say that the pure concept

abolishes time. In other words, the problem of being is properly grasped only at the point and from the moment where time is brought to disappearance" ["Mais le Concept est la puissance du temps, c'est-à-dire que le concept pur abolit le temps. Autrement dit, le problème de l'être n'est proprement saisi que là et à partir du moment où le temps est porté à la disparition"], cited by Jacques Taminiaux, "Heidegger et Hegel à l'époque de l'ontologie fondamentale ou d'une ontologie fondamentale à l'autre," in Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, eds., *Metaphysik nach Kant?*, Stuttgart Hegel Congress 1987 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988), 403.

77. "absolute Negativität"; "einseitig"; "Macht"; "allgemeines Wesen" (GW 19, §258, 193, 6–12; PN 230, 35–231, 1).

Chapter 7. Conclusion

1. "Die absolute Zeitlosigkeit ist von der Dauer unterschieden; das ist die *Ewigkeit*, die ohne die natürliche Zeit ist" (TW 9, §258, Zu., 50; PN 231, 37–38).

2. Robert Jenson, *God after God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, Seen in the Work of Karl Barth* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 34–35.

3. "Ne serait-il pas plus exacte de dire que le concept n'est concept que 'hors' du concept (que la logique n'est logique que 'hors' de la logique)?" (Pierre-Jean Labarrière, Gwendoline Jarczyk, and Jean-Louis Schlegel, "Bulletin de littérature hégélienne," *Archives de Philosophie* 44, no. 2 [1981]: 307).

4. "ein mangelhaftes" (GW 11, 382, 10–11; SL 543).

5. Cf. Eberhard Jüngel's critical comment in the context of his discussion of Aristotle: "Dieses Noch-Nicht, das das Mögliche vom Wirklichen unterscheidet, macht die ontologische Priorität der Wirklichkeit aus" (Eberhard Jüngel, "Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit: Zum ontologischen Ansatz der Rechtfertigungslehre," *Unterwegs zur Sache: Theologische Bemerkungen*, Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie 61 [Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972], 210). I owe to Jüngel my basic understanding of the category of "not yet." It was also Jüngel who first led me to question "the ontological priority of actuality" over possibility.

6. "Le présent est ce qu'il y a de plus haut," cited by Francis Guibal, *Dieu selon Hegel: Essai sur la problématique de la "Phénoménologie de l'Esprit"*, Philosophie de l'Esprit (Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1975), 5.

Select Bibliography

Primary Sources

- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. 1827 edition. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Hans-Christian Lucas. Vol. 19 of *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989.
- . *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse: Die Naturphilosophie mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*. 1830 edition. Vol. 9 of *Theorie Werkausgabe*. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.
- . *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede. Vol. 9 of *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1980.
- . *Die "Rechtsphilosophie" von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungsnotizen, 1821-1825*. Vol. 2 of *Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie, 1818-1831*. Edited by Karl-Heinz Ilting. Stuttgart: Frommann; Bad Canstatt: Holzboog, 1974.
- . *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion: Die Bestimmte Religion*. Edited by Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 4 of *Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.
- . *Wissenschaft der Logik: Erster Band: Die Objektive Logik*. 1812/1813 edition. Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 11 of *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1978.
- . *Wissenschaft der Logik: Erster Teil: Die Objektive Logik: Erster Band: Die Lehre vom Sein*. 1832 edition. Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 21 of *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.
- . *Wissenschaft der Logik: Zweiter Band: Die Subjektive Logik*. 1816 edition. Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. Vol. 12 of *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by the Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1981.

Primary Sources in Translation

- Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *The Consummate Religion*. Vol. 3 of *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. Edited by Peter C. Hodgson. Translated by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson and J. M. Stewart. Hegel Lectures: Selected Texts. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985.
- . *La doctrine de l'essence*. Vol. 1:2 of *Science de la Logique*. Translation, presentation, and notes by Pierre-Jean Labarrière and Gwendoline Jarczyk. Bibliothèque Philosophique. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1976.
- . *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Edited by Allen W. Wood. Translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- . *Hegel's Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969; The Muirhead Library of Philosophy. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, 1989.
- . *Introduction, Foreword and Mechanics*. Vol. 1 of *Hegel's Philosophy of Nature*. Translated and edited by Michael John Petry. New York: Humanities Press, 1970.
- . *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. Vol 1. Translated by E. S. Haldane. The English and Foreign Philosophical Library. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1892.
- . *La logique subjective ou Doctrine du concept*. Vol. 2 of *Science de la Logique*. Translation, presentation, and notes by Pierre-Jean Labarrière and Gwendoline Jarczyk. Bibliothèque Philosophique. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1981.
- . *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Secondary Sources

- Aubenque, Pierre. "Hegel et Aristote." In *Hegel et la pensée grecque*, edited by Jacques D'Hondt, 97–120. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974.
- Augustine, Saint. *Confessions*. Translated by R. S. Pine-Coffin. New York: Penguin Books, 1961.
- Augustinus, Aurelius. *Confessiones*. Edited by Martin Skutella. Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1981.
- Biard, J., D. Buvat, J.-F. Kervegan, J.-F. Kling, A. Lacroix, A. Lecrivain, and M. Slubicki. *Introduction à la lecture de la Science de la logique de Hegel*. 3 vols. Philosophie de l'Esprit. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1981–87.
- Bloch, Ernst. "Hegel und der Humor." In *Über Methode und System bei Hegel*, 136–40. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.
- Burbidge, John. *On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981.
- Burbidge, John W. "Concept and Time in Hegel." *Dialogue* 12, no. 3 (1973): 403–22.

- . "The Necessity of Contingency." In *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, edited by Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz, 201–17. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980.
- Cornehl, Peter. *Die Zukunft der Versöhnung: Eschatologie und Emanzipation in der Aufklärung, bei Hegel und in der Hegelschen Schule*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1971.
- Crites, Stephen. *In the Twilight of Christendom: Hegel versus Kierkegaard on Faith and History*. AAR Studies in Religion, vol. 2. Chambersburg, Penn.: American Academy of Religion, 1972.
- Derrida, Jacques. *Glas: Que reste-t-il du savoir absolu?* Vol. 1. Bibliothèque Média-tions. Paris: Editions Denoël/Gonthier, 1981.
- . *Glas*. Translated by John P. Leavey, Jr. and Richard Rand. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
- . "The Pit and the Pyramid: Introduction to Hegel's Semiology." In *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by Alan Bass, 69–108. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- . "Le puits et la pyramide: Introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel." In *Marges de la philosophie*, 79–127. Collection "Critique." Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1972.
- Di Giovanni, George. "The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic." In *Art and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy*, edited by Warren E. Steinkraus and Kenneth I. Schmitz, 179–200. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980.
- Dubarle, Dominique. "La logique de la réflexion et la transition de la logique de l'être à celle de l'essence." In *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*. Hegel-Tage Chantilly 1971, edited by Dieter Henrich, 173–202. Hegel-Studien. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1978.
- Dussel, Enrique D. *Método para una filosofía de la liberación: superación analéctica de la dialéctica hegeliana*. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 1974.
- Fackenheim, Emil L. *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967.
- Fessard, Gaston. "L'attitude ambivalente de Hegel en face de l'histoire." *Archives de Philosophie* 24, no. 2 (1961): 207–41.
- Findlay, John N. "Hegel's Use of Teleology." In *New Studies in Hegel's Philosophy*, edited by Warren E. Steinkraus, 92–107. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971.
- Flay, Joseph C. "Essence and Time in Hegel." *The Owl of Minerva* 20, no. 2 (1989): 183–92.
- Frey, Christofer. *Reflexion und Zeit: Ein Beitrag zum Selbstverständnis der Theologie in der Auseinandersetzung vor allem mit Hegel*. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1973.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*. Translated by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- . *Hegels Dialektik: Sechs hermeneutische Studien*. Enlarged edition. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1980.
- Geraets, Théodore F., ed. *Hegel: The Meaning of Absolute Spirit*. International Sym-

- posium on the Meaning of Absolute Spirit in Hegel. *Philosophica*, vol. 26. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1984.
- Guibal, Francis. *Dieu selon Hegel: Essai sur la problématique de la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*. Philosophie de l'Esprit. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1975.
- Habermas, Jürgen. "Arbeit und Interaktion: Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenenser 'Philosophie des Geistes.'" In *Technik und Wissenschaft als "Ideologie"*, 9–47. Edition Suhrkamp, vol. 287. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1969.
- . "Hegels Begriff der Moderne." In *Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne: Zwölf Vorlesungen*, 34–58. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1985.
- . "Hegel's Concept of Modernity." In *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures*, translated by Frederick Lawrence, 23–44. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.
- . "Hegel's Critique of the French Revolution." In *Theory and Practice*, translated by John Viertel, 121–41. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- . "Hegels Kritik der Französischen Revolution." In *Theorie und Praxis: Sozialphilosophische Studien*, 128–47. Neuwied am Rhein: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag, 1971; Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 243. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978.
- . "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena *Philosophy of Mind*." In *Theory and Practice*, translated by John Viertel, 142–69. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Harris, Errol E. *An Interpretation of the Logic of Hegel*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1983.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- . *Sein und Zeit*. 15th ed. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979.
- Henrich, Dieter. "Absoluter Geist und Logik des Endlichen." In *Hegel in Jena: Die Entwicklung des Systems und die Zusammenarbeit mit Schelling*. Hegel-Tage Zwettl 1977, edited by Dieter Henrich and Klaus Düsing, 103–18. Hegel-Studien. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1980.
- . *Hegel im Kontext*. 3d ed. Edition Suhrkamp, vol. 510. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1981.
- . "Hegels Logik der Reflexion: Neue Fassung." In *Die Wissenschaft der Logik und die Logik der Reflexion*, edited by Dieter Henrich, 203–324. Hegel-Studien. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1978.
- Hondt, Jacques D'. *Hegel: Philosophe de l'histoire vivante*. Epiméthée: Essais philosophiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966.
- Hyppolite, Jean. *Logique et Existence: Essai sur la Logique de Hegel*. Epiméthée: Essais philosophiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1953.
- Janicaud, Dominique. *Hegel et le destin de la Grèce*. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1975.
- Jarczyk, Gwendoline. *Système et liberté dans la Logique de Hegel*. Philosophie de l'Esprit. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1980.

- Jarczyk, Gwendoline, and Pierre-Jean Labarrière. *Hegelianism*. Philosophie d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986.
- Jenson, Robert. *God After God: The God of the Past and the God of the Future, Seen in the Work of Karl Barth*. Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.
- . "The Holy Spirit." In *Christian Dogmatics*, edited by Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson, vol. 2, 101–78. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986.
- Jenson, Robert W. *The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982.
- Jüngel, Eberhard. "Die Welt als Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit: Zum ontologischen Ansatz der Rechtfertigungslehre." In *Unterwegs zur Sache: Theologische Bemerkungen*, 207–33. Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, vol. 61. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1972.
- Kaufmann, Walter. "Hegel." In *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*, edited by J. O. Urmson, 157–61. London: Hutchinson of London, 1960.
- Kearney, Richard. "Heidegger, le possible et Dieu." In *Heidegger et la question de Dieu*, edited by Richard Kearney and Joseph Stephen O'Leary, 125–67. Paris: Editions Grasset et Fasquelle, 1980.
- King, Martin Luther, Jr. "Our God is Marching On!" In *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr.*, edited by James M. Washington, 227–30. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1986.
- Koch, Traugott. *Differenz und Versöhnung: Eine Interpretation der Theologie G. W. F. Hegels nach seiner "Wissenschaft der Logik"*. Studien zu Religion, Geschichte und Geisteswissenschaft, vol. 5. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967.
- Kojève, Alexandre. *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: Leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes*. Edited and compiled by Raymond Queneau. 1947. Reprint. Collection Tel, vol. 45. Paris: Gallimard, 1979.
- . *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Compiled by Raymond Queneau. Edited by Allan Bloom. Translated by James H. Nichols, Jr. Agora Paperback Editions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980.
- Koselleck, Reinhart. "Geschichte, Geschichten und formale Zeitstrukturen." In *Geschichte—Ereignis und Erzählung*, edited by Reinhart Koselleck and Wolf-Dieter Stempel, 211–22. Poetik und Hermeneutik, vol. 5. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1973.
- . "History, Histories and Formal Structures of Time." In Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*, 92–104. Translated by Keith Tribe. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985.
- Küng, Hans. *Incarnation de Dieu: Introduction à la pensée théologique de Hegel comme prolégomènes à une christologie future*. Translated by Elisabeth Galichet and Catherine Haas-Smets. N.p.: Desclée De Brouwer, 1973.
- . *The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's Theological Thought as Prolegomena to a Future Christology*. Translated by J. R. Stephenson. New York: Crossroads, 1987.

- Labarrière, Pierre-Jean. *Le discours de l'altérité: Une logique de l'expérience. Philosophie d'aujourd'hui*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982.
- . "Die Hegelsche Wissenschaft der Logik in und aus sich selbst: Strukturen und reflexive Bewegung." In *Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik: Formation und Rekonstruktion*, edited by Dieter Henrich, 94–106. Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung, vol. 16. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986.
- . *Structures et mouvement dialectique dans la Phénoménologie de L'Esprit de Hegel*. New Edition. Analyse et Raisons. Paris: Aubier, 1985.
- . "La sursomption du temps et le vrai sens de l'histoire conçue." In Gwendoline Jarczyk and Pierre-Jean Labarrière, *Hegelianism*, 149–57. Philosophie d'aujourd'hui. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986.
- . *L'unité plurielle: Eloge*. Présence et Pensée. Paris: Editions Aubier Montaigne, 1975.
- Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, Gwendoline Jarczyk, and Jean-Louis Schlegel. "Bulletin de littérature hégélienne." *Archives de Philosophie* 44, no. 2 (1981): 277–330.
- Lakebrink, Bernhard. *Sein und Wesen*. Vol. 1 of *Kommentar zu Hegels "Logik" in seiner Enzyklopädie von 1830*. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, n.d.
- Lauer, Quentin, S. J. *Hegel's Concept of God*. SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982.
- . *A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York: Fordham University Press, 1976.
- Lebrun, Gérard. *La patience du Concept: Essai sur le discours hégélien*. Bibliothèque de Philosophie. Gallimard, 1972.
- Léonard, André. "Le primat du négatif et l'interprétation spéculative de la religion: Un exemple: la reprise hégélienne du dogme christologique de Chalcédoine." In *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes*, edited by Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 160–71. Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung, vol. 13. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984.
- Longuenesse, Béatrice. *Hegel et la critique de la métaphysique: Etude sur la doctrine de l'essence*. Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1981.
- Lugarini, Leo. "Philosophie et mouvement réfléchissant dans la logique hégélienne." In *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes*, edited by Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 42–62. Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung, vol. 13. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984.
- Luhmann, Niklas. "Weltzeit und Systemgeschichte." In *Soziologische Aufklärung 2. Aufsätze zur Theorie der Gesellschaft*. 2d ed., 103–33. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982.
- . "World-Time and System History: Interrelations Between Temporal Horizons and Social Structures." In *The Differentiation of Society*, translated by Stephen Holmes and Charles Larmore, 289–323. European Perspectives. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.

- Lukács, Georg. *Der junge Hegel: Über die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Ökonomie*. Vol. 1. 1948. Reprint. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 33. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973.
- . *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations Between Dialectics and Economics*. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. Merlin Press, 1975; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976.
- Marcuse, Herbert. *Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit*. 2d ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1968.
- . *Hegel's Ontology and the Theory of Historicity*. Translated by Seyla Benhabib. Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987.
- . *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.
- Min, Anselm. "Hegel's Retention of Mystery." *CLIO* 12 (Summer 1983): 333–53.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. "The Future as New Paradigm of Transcendence." In *Religion, Revolution, and the Future*, translated by M. Douglas Meeks, 177–99. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969.
- . "Richtungen der Eschatologie." In *Zukunft der Schöpfung: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 26–50. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1977.
- . "Die 'Rose im Kreuz der Gegenwart.'" In *Perspektiven der Theologie: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 212–31. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag; Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1968.
- . "The 'Rose in the Cross of the Present': Towards an Understanding of the Church in Modern Society." In *Hope and Planning*, translated by Margaret Clarkson, 130–54. London: SCM Press, 1971.
- . *Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre*. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1980.
- . *The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God*. Translated by Margaret Kohl. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.
- . "Die Zukunft als neues Paradigma der Transzendenz." In *Zukunft der Schöpfung: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 9–25. Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1977.
- Mühlen, Heribert. *Die Veränderlichkeit Gottes als Horizont einer zukünftigen Christologie: Auf dem Wege zu einer Kreuzestheologie in Auseinandersetzung mit der Altkirchlichen Christologie*. Münster: Verlag Aschendorf, 1969.
- Mure, G. R. G. *A Study of Hegel's Logic*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967.
- Oeing-Hanhoff, Ludger. "Hegels Trinitätslehre: Zur Aufgabe ihrer Kritik und Rezeption." *Theologie und Philosophie* 52, no. 3 (1977): 378–407.
- Ohashi, Ryosuke. *Zeitlichkeitsanalyse der Hegelschen Logik: Zur Idee einer Phänomenologie des Ortes*. Symposium, vol. 72. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1984.
- Opiela, Stanislas. *Le réel dans la logique de Hegel: Développement et auto-détermination*. Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie, new series, vol. 41. Paris: Beauchesne, 1983.
- Pannenberg, Wolfhart. "Die Bedeutung des Christentums in der Philosophie Hegels." In *Gottesgedanke und menschliche Freiheit*, 78–113. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1972.

- . "Der Geist und sein Anderes." In *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes*, edited by Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 151–59. Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung, vol. 13. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984.
- . "The Significance of Christianity in the Philosophy of Hegel." In *The Idea of God and Human Freedom*, translated by R. A. Wilson, 144–77. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973.
- . "Die Subjektivität Gottes und die Trinitätslehre: Ein Beitrag zur Beziehung zwischen Karl Barth und der Philosophie Hegels." In *Grundfragen systematischer Theologie: Gesammelte Aufsätze*, vol. 2, 96–111. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1980.
- Pöggeler, Otto. "Temporale Interpretation und Hermeneutische Philosophie." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 43, no. 1 (1989): 5–32.
- Ritter, Joachim. "Hegel and the French Revolution." In *Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated by Richard Dien Winfield, 35–89. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.
- . "Hegel and the Reformation." In *Hegel and the French Revolution: Essays on the Philosophy of Right*, translated by Richard Dien Winfield, 183–91. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.
- . "Hegel und die französische Revolution." In *Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel*, 183–233. 1969. Reprint. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 199. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977.
- . "Hegel und die Reformation." In *Metaphysik und Politik: Studien zu Aristoteles und Hegel*, 310–17. 1969. Reprint. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 199. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1977.
- Scharlemann, Robert P. "Hegel and Theology Today." *Dialog* 23 (Autumn 1984): 257–62.
- Schlitt, Dale M., O. M. I. *Hegel's Trinitarian Claim: A Critical Reflection*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984.
- Taminiaux, Jacques. "Le dépassement heideggérien de l'esthétique et l'héritage de Hegel." In *Recoupements*, 175–208. Brussels: OUSIA, 1982.
- . "Finitude and the Absolute: Remarks on Hegel and Heidegger as Interpreters of Kant." Translated by Thomas Sheehan. In *Dialectic and Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, edited by James Decker and Robert Crease, 55–77. Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985.
- . "Finitude et absolu: Remarques sur Hegel et Heidegger, interprètes de Kant." In *Le regard et l'excédent*, 116–42. *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 75. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . "Hegel and Hobbes." Translated by James Decker and Shaun Gallagher. In *Dialectic and Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, edited by James Decker and Robert Crease, 1–37. Contemporary Studies in Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985.
- . "Hegel et Hobbes." In *Recoupements*, 11–48. Brussels: OUSIA, 1982.

- . "Heidegger et Hegel à l'époque de l'ontologie fondamentale ou d'une ontologie fondamentale à l'autre." In *Metaphysik nach Kant?* Stuttgart Hegel Congress 1987, edited by Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 393–405. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1988.
- . "Le langage selon les écrits hégéliens d'Iéna." In *Le regard et l'excédent*, 42–54. *Phaenomenologica*, vol. 75. La Haye: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977.
- . "Spéculation et différence: Remarques sur le statut spéculatif de l'art." In *Hegels Logik der Philosophie: Religion und Philosophie in der Theorie des absoluten Geistes*, edited by Dieter Henrich and Rolf-Peter Horstmann, 262–73. *Veröffentlichungen der Internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung*, vol. 13. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984.
- Taylor, Charles. *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
- Taylor, Mark C. *Journeys to Selfhood: Hegel & Kierkegaard*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.
- Theunissen, Michael. *Hegels Lehre vom absoluten Geist als theologisch-politischer Traktat*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1970.
- . *Sein und Schein: die kritische Funktion der Hegelschen Logik*. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 314. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1980.
- Tugendhat, Ernst. *Selbstbewußtsein und Selbstbestimmung: Sprachanalytische Interpretationen*. Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, vol. 221. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979.
- . *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*. Translated by Paul Stern. *Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986.
- . *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. 2d ed. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter and Co., 1970.
- Wagner, Falk. "Religiöser Inhalt und logische Form: Zum Verhältnis von Religionsphilosophie und *Wissenschaft der Logik* am Beispiel der Trinitätslehre." In *Die Flucht in den Begriff: Materialien zu Hegels Religionsphilosophie*, edited by Friedrich Wilhelm Graf and Falk Wagner, 196–227. *Deutscher Idealismus: Philosophie und Wirkungsgeschichte in Quellen und Studien*, vol. 6. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982.
- Wandschneider, Dieter. *Raum, Zeit, Relativität: Grundbestimmungen der Physik in der Perspektive der Hegelschen Naturphilosophie*. *Philosophische Abhandlungen*, vol. 50. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982.
- Weil, Eric. *Hegel et l'état*. Collège Philosophique. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1950.
- Welker, Michael. "Gesetz und Evangelium." *Lectures at Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen*, 1983–1984.
- Westphal, Merold. *History and Truth in Hegel's Phenomenology*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979.
- Yerkes, James. *The Christology of Hegel*. *American Academy of Religion Dissertation Series*, no. 23. Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1978.

Index

- Absolute, the, 7, 16–19, 22, 26, 34–35, 40, 44–45, 47, 50–51, 53, 55
 Actuality: absolute, 16, 18, 39–41, 50–51, 53, 55; formal, 21, 22, 30, 32, 33, 39; real, 25–27, 29–34, 44, 59
 Advent, 5, 8, 58, 65, 66, 70
 Appearance, 7, 17, 19, 25, 26, 37, 44, 70
 Aristotle, 74, 85–86n.4
 Augustine, 57, 94n.13

 Being, determinate, 10, 23, 25, 35, 37, 56, 60–63, 66, 95n.28
 Biard, J., Burnt, D., Kerregan, J.–F., Kling, J.–F., Lacroix, A., Lecrivain, A., Slubicki, M., 83n.21, 86n.31, 92n.70
 Blanchette, Oliva, 79n.11, 86n.25
 Bloch, Ernst, 97n.56

 Causality, 50–52, 85n.14
 Condition, 30, 46
 Contradiction, 20, 28–29, 31, 37, 48, 60

 Determinism, 53, 57, 71
 Di Giovanni, George, 99nn. 73 and 75
 Diversity, 20, 28–31, 38, 40, 41, 60–61
 Domination, vii, 12–13, 15, 43, 67, 82 n.44
 Dussel, Enrique, 94n.12

Elements of the Philosophy of Right, vii
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, 3–6, 57, 60–61, 64–65, 71–74
 Eternity, 3, 4, 6, 64, 66, 68, 70–74, 96–97n.49, 99n.68

 Externalization, 3–5, 26, 60–63, 81 n.12; self-, 3, 62

 Fixedness, 12, 13, 15. *See also* Fixity
 Fixity, 52. *See also* Fixedness
 Flay, Joseph, 99n.75
 Form, absolute, 17, 55
 Frey, Christofer, 98n.61

 Ground, 17, 20, 22–23, 25, 26, 29, 31–33, 46, 69–70, 87n.50
 Groundedness, 22–24, 26, 70
 Groundlessness, 22–24, 26, 70
 Guibal, Francis, 100n.6

 Heidegger, Martin, 78n.8, 99–100n.76
 Henrich, Dieter, 82n.36
 History, 61–64, 67, 74, 97n.56; conceptually grasped, 63, 67, 96n.42

 Infinity, 12, 30–31, 33–38, 53

 Jarczyk, Gwendoline, 80n.4, 81 n.13, 85–86n.14, 86–87n.36, 89n.12
 Jenson, Robert, 74, 99n.74, 100n.2
 Jüngel, Eberhard, 100n.5

 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 57–59, 95n.15
 Koch, Traugott, 81n.28
 Koselleck, Reinhart, 97n.60

 Labarrière, Pierre-Jean, 74, 79–80n.20, 80n.4, 81 n.13, 82n.1, 85–86n.14, 86–87n.36, 96n.42, 100n.3
Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 66

Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion,
66–67

Limit, 30–31, 34–37

Limitation, 34–35, 38

Luhmann, Niklas, 57, 95nn. 14 and 16

Manifestation, 17, 26, 37, 48–49,
51–57, 67–70

Marcuse, Herbert, 96–97n.49, 97n.54,
98n.67

Modalization: manifold, 57, 95n.14;
reflexive, 57, 59–60, 64, 69, 72

Nature, 3–4, 6, 56, 61–64, 73

Necessity: absolute, 7, 39, 51, 92n.70;
actual, 39, 44–52, 55, 71; formal,
25–26, 30, 32–33, 68; real, 32–34,
38–42, 45, 47, 50–51, 66, 68, 71,
92n.70, 98n.63; relative, 7, 33–34,
51, 92n.70

Negation, negation of, 35–36

Negativity, 4, 10, 26, 48, 60, 70–72

Nonbeing, 3, 10, 35–36, 57, 60, 64,
94n.12

Ohashi, Ryosuke, 96n.43, 99n.67

Origin, 8–9, 12–13, 46, 54, 57

Otherness, 9, 10–12, 16, 26, 51, 79n.11

Ought, the, 30–31, 34–37

Pannenberg, Wolfhart, 55–56,
93nn. 1–2, 94nn. 4, 5, and 7

Phenomenology of Spirit, 3, 5–6,
60–65, 67, 71

Poggeler, Otto, 99n.68

Possibility: absolute, 40; formal, 21, 22,
27–30, 32, 33, 68; real, 27, 30–34, 38,
40, 44, 59, 68, 75

'Postdetermination,' 99n.74

Process, 3–4, 11, 21, 37, 41, 43, 45, 53,
61–63, 71

Purpose, 66–67

Quality, 37

Reflection: determinations of, 12–13,
15, 17, 20, 28–29, 31, 47, 49, 60;
determining, 8, 11–13, 15, 17, 41,
43–45, 47, 52, 54; external, 8, 11–12,
15–17, 28, 41, 43–44, 61, 70, 82n.36;
positing, 8, 10–13, 16, 33, 43–44, 53,
82n.36, 87n.54

Relation: absolute, 7, 16, 48; essential,
17–19; self-, 12, 21, 26, 36, 40–41,
46, 49–50, 60, 62, 79n.11

Sellars, Wilfrid, 94n.10

Show, 9–10, 33–34, 47–48, 51–53

Space, 5, 62–63, 65

Subject, 50, 62–63, 67

Subsistence, 13, 54, 62, 65, 97n.59

Substance, 50–54, 62, 92n.70

Substrate, 8, 18, 33, 63, 67

Taminiaux, Jacques, 99–100n.76

Theunissen, Michael, 82n.44

Time: abstract, 64; circular model of,
65–67, 98n.61; concrete, 64; linear
model of, 65

Timelessness, 66, 69, 73–74, 96–97n.49

Totality, 18–22, 25, 31, 45, 64

Transcendence, vii, 9–13, 31, 35, 62, 65,
69

Wandschneider, Dieter, 97–98n.60

Welker, Michael, 95n.14

The Advent of Freedom

The Presence of the Future in Hegel's Logic

JOHN F. HOFFMEYER

For over two centuries, freedom has been a central category of modern Euro-American thought. But the disagreements about what counts as freedom have run deep. Hegel saw his philosophy as an exposition of the concept of freedom. Critics have charged him with sacrificing freedom on the altar of historical necessity. Some have even regarded his thought as a precursor of twentieth-century totalitarian ideologies.

The Advent of Freedom analyzes two of the key concepts in Hegel's articulation of a logic of freedom. These key concepts are time and possibility. His *Science of Logic* shows that possibility is constitutive of actuality, without ever being exhausted by actuality. The *Logic* and other writings present a parallel argument that Hegel himself did not see clearly: the future is constitutive of the present, without ever being exhausted by the present. The full force of Hegel's concept of freedom depends upon combining his explicit analysis of possibility with his generally implicit analysis of time. Since Hegel claimed that time had no place in his *Logic*, interpreting his notion of freedom in this way requires reading Hegel's text in a way that differs from Hegel's own self-understanding.

This book combines two interpretive approaches. On the one hand, it engages in a detailed reading of a few selected sections of Hegelian texts. On the other hand, in the case of the *Logic*, it gains insights into these sections by examining their respective places within the careful

(Continued on back flap)

(Continued from front flap)

and complex structuring of the work as a whole. These sections bring into play terms that have been widely used in Western philosophy, but which in Hegel's discourse take on distinctive meanings: actuality, necessity, freedom.

The Advent of Freedom is an undertaking of philosophical interpretation. Its ultimate frame of reference, however, is Trinitarian theology. Hegel saw his philosophy in general as a philosophical exposition of the Christian Trinity. His philosophy is one grand response to the question: If we were to take the Trinity as our starting point, how would we think about reality? This volume seeks to render Hegel's response to one aspect of that question: namely, if we were to take the Trinity as our starting point, how would we think about time and possibility?

LC 93-45045
ISBN 0-8386-3558-X
Printed in the U.S.A.

About the Author

John F. Hoffmeyer received a B.A. in philosophy from Haverford College, a Certificate of Advanced Theological Studies from Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary, and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Boston College. He has pursued studies in theology and philosophy in Tübingen and Paris. He has taught philosophy, French, and New Testament Greek at Boston College, Georgia Southwestern College, Fisher College, and Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary. His other publications include articles on Hegel and Schleiermacher, as well as numerous translations from German into English. He currently works as a Lutheran pastor and a theological translator.

Fairleigh Dickinson University Press
London and Toronto: Associated University Presses

ISBN 0-8386-3558-X



9 780838 635582